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Management buy-outs(“MBOs”) can be defined as transactions involving the purchase of a 
business by its management, usually in co-operation with outside financiers. It originated in 
UK in the late1970s and spread rapidly in the early 1980s.  
 
MBOs are an increasingly integral element of global corporate finance, however, their nature 
and extent varies considerably from country to country, depending upon the particular 
characteristics of individual business, industrial base, financial and entrepreneurial 
backgrounds. In addition, the present state of MBOs in any country depends upon the stage 
reached in the life-circle of this form of ownership change.  
 
The popularity of MBOs is a relatively recent phenomenon in China. The market and legal 
regime for MBOs in China lags considerably behind development in UK. But MBO is 
beginning to become an important innovation in China’s economic reform. 
 
In many recent mergers and acquisitions deals in China, MBOs have occurred and risen in 
popularity over the past several years. Since the 15th National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China held in September 1997, many state-owned companies and collectively-owned 
enterprises in China utilize MBOs to privatize and clarify the ownership, convert themselves 
into standard companies and stimulate the management. Some legislation was issued to 
facilitate the growth of MBOs. The adoption of the landmark statute, the Measures for 
Administration of the Acquisition of Listed Companies in December 2002 marked the 
beginning of Chinese legislation in the management buy-outs sector. 
 
MBOs are an important innovation in China’s economic reform. However, in spite of the 
issuance of several supportive rules and regulations pertaining to MBOs over the past years, 
there remain quite a lot of obstacles and risks when conducting the deals under the Chinese 
legal regime. Moreover, China has an undeveloped capital market, the industrial banks have 
had problems with both debt finance and equity investments, and the venture capital market in 
China, unlike UK is at an early stage of development. Thus, there has been a growing debate 
that management buy-outs are now at the crossroads. 
 
The MBO deals will be motivated by China’s further reform of state-owned enterprises, and 
the changing of government’s economic function after China’s entry to the WTO. To take 
advantage of MBOs during the special period of state-owned enterprises’ reform, relative 
laws and regulations should be improved or established. For example, the merits of current 
laws including the Chinese Company Law could be maintained, but defects and unreasonable 
prohibitions in them shall be eliminated. Also, other supplemental regulations and 
sophisticated modern English law in regard to MBOs shall be also taken in such laws. 
Furthermore, a unified code on MBOs is essential to avoid legal loopholes and discrepancies 
existing in the present China’s law. Finally, to prevent loss of state-owned assets, and protect 
the shareholders of the Target Company, government supervision and a unified state-owned 
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Chapter 1: Introduction of the study 
Recent trends in China’s economy indicate that mergers and acquisitions activities are 
growing more and more important compared with traditional business incorporating activities. 
In many recent mergers and acquisitions deals, an especially common type of leveraged 
buyout, management buyouts(“MBOs”), have occurred and risen in popularity over the past 
several years. In particular, many state-owned companies and collectively-owned enterprises 
in China attempt MBOs to convert themselves into standard companies in terms of a 
clarification of the ownership and the investors’ rights and responsibilities in such companies 
or privatize the ownership and stimulate the management. 
 
Management buy-outs first came to prominence in the U.K. during the late 1970s, and 
developed greatly in US and Europe thereafter. Management buy-outs are no longer a rare 
occurrence; they are now one of the most popular forms of acquisition in UK economy. 
During 1979, 18 MBOs took place in the U.K., with a total value of £14m. Today, in an 
average month, up to 50 MBOs will be completed and around £2 billion will change hands in 
the process. In 2003, there were over 680 MBO transactions recorded with a market value of 
£16.1bn.1 In recent years management buy-outs have become a common feature in UK’s 
corporate market.  
 
As noted above, MBOs are an increasingly integral element of global corporate finance. 
                                                        
1  A Practical Guide to MBOs, online: Deloitte 
<http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/Guide%20to%20mbos.pdf>. 
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Nonetheless, the popularity of the transaction is a relatively recent phenomenon in China. 
Since the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China held in September 1997, 
the state owned enterprises (listed and unlisted) have experienced a substantial change 
including ownership. The problem of a lack of motivation for managers of the enterprises to 
work more effectively has become one of critical issues facing state-owned enterprises 
development. Notably, MBOs are one of the instruments that can be used to push state owned 
enterprises to convert themselves into standard companies and explore incentives for 
enterprise managers. Meanwhile, privately owned enterprises would also like to take 
advantage of MBOs to facilitate their divestment of non-core divisions and subsidiaries and 
reorganization of diverse shareholders. 
 
In recent years, a variety of laws and regulations related to mergers and acquisitions in China 
were promulgated and revised. In spite of issue of several supportive rules and regulations 
pertaining to MBOs over the past year, there remain quite a lot of obstacles and risks under 
the Chinese legal regime. Some practices were conducted in the absence of successful 
experience and supportive regulations. 
 
While transactions of MBOs develop rapidly in China, an official suggestion which got in the 
way of development of MBO transactions was adopted by the Ministry of Finance(“MOF”) of 
the PRC in March 2003, pursuant to which, approval shall not be granted by relevant 
government departments to any transaction of MBOs, including MBOs of listed and unlisted 
companies, prior to the promulgation of the relevant law governing MBO transactions. Later 
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in December 2003, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of 
the State Council issued an official opinion which places a strict prohibition on acquiring the 
ownership of a state-owned company by its management and through financial assistance. 
Accordingly management involved in a state-owned company is precluded from the process 
of MBO transactions including decision-making, audit, and property evaluation. And 
management is prevented from using the company’s own funds to finance purchases. Thus, 
there has been a growing debate that management buy-outs are now at the crossroads.  
 
This research is intended to study the brief commercial background, practical structure and 
principal legal issues that arise in the management buy-out activities in UK and those in 
China. This article is divided into seven chapters. It starts with an overview of the nature of 
the management buy-outs and the general comparisons between MBOs in UK and China. It is 
followed by a discussion of the legal issues concerning MBOs in UK. The emphasis will then 
be placed on the latest MBOs deals in China. The paper continues with a detailed analysis of 
problems arising from the current MBOs in China and defects in the current Chinese laws and 
it ends with a proposal for the improvement of the Chinese legal regime concerning MBOs. 
 
I proceed on the assumption that the reader has a basic grounding in the issues which arise in 
UK and China corporate mergers and acquisitions transactions generally. It is hoped that this 
thesis may in itself stimulate interest in the MBO process and result in an increased flow in 
transaction volumes to the benefit of shareholders, management team members, investors and   
the like. It is also hoped that this research will be a useful read for other professionals 
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involved, such as the legislator, lawyer, as well as accountants.  
 
This research does not deal in any detail with taxation issues. Taxation issues are only referred 
to where to do so is helpful to explain how the management buy-out transaction is structured. 
Chapter 2: Introduction and analysis of the management buy-outs  
Before comparing UK and China management buy-out in this article, some basic contents of 
MBOs should be clarified. First is the definition of MBOs, although no clear definition for 
MBOs is provided by relevant Chinese laws or regulations. 
I. Definition of MBOs 
Management buy-outs can be defined as transactions involving the purchase of a business by 
its management, usually in co-operation with outside financiers. Buy-outs vary in size, scope 
and complexity but the key feature is that the managers acquire an equity interest in their 
business, sometimes a controlling stake, for a relatively modest personal investment.2
 
An MBO is commonly achieved through the following steps.3 First, a new company(“Newco”) 
is established to acquire shares or business in a target company (“Target”). Next, Newco and 
Management agree terms with equity investors and with bankers to fund the acquisition of 
Target and to provide working capital. If there is a funding “gap” between the equity and debt 
funds available and the funds required, this may be filled by mezzanine funding, which ranks 
                                                        
2 Glossary- MBO, online: The Center for Management Buy-out research <http://www.cmbor.org/>. 
3 Niall McAlister, “Management Buy-outs: Issues Affecting Management and the Seller”, International Company 
and Commercial Law Review, ICCLR 1998, 9(9), 248-254.
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behind “senior” bank debt but in priority to equity (and may include a right to subscribe for 
equity). Then management and the equity investor subscribe for shares in Newco and 
Newco’s bankers (and, if relevant, the mezzanine funders) commit to provide debt facilities. 
Once funds are in place, Newco completes the acquisition of Target. 
 
Thus, a word of explanation on the use of the terms “Newco” and “Target” may be helpful. 
The managers of a business become its owners or major shareholders. However, the managers 
have insufficient funds to buy the company outright and therefore need a third party to finance 
the deal.  Newco is the term used to describe the limited company which management and 
outside financiers will set up and in which they will subscribe for shares. It is Newco which 
will purchase either the shares in the company or the business and assets of the company 
being sold by the vendor. Management will hold a majority or a substantial minority of the 
equity in the new company. Target is the term used to describe the company being sold by the 
vendor to Newco although, it should also be read as referring to business and assets being 
sold. 
 
A buyout can provide a management team a once in a lifetime opportunity both to prove 
themselves and to generate unachievable leverage of their personal wealth if the target 
company operates well. Nevertheless, the buyout is not only focused on the generation of 
capital gains for the management team and their financiers, it also demonstrates a significant 
and long-lasting influence on corporate ownership structures. In the domain of corporate 
finance, the buyout has grown to play a major role in the Mergers and Acquisitions market 
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and one of the most important tools, compared with the situation when it was only an obscure 
offshoot of the fledgling venture capital industry in the mid-1980s at its starting point.4
II. The spread of the management buy-outs concept. 
The concept of MBOs originated in the United State in the 1950s, but it was only in the late 
1970s that the phenomenon began to occur with any frequency in the U.K..5 In 1980, Mike 
Wright, at the time working on divestments, noticed that a number of companies were being 
divested by means of a sale to the management. At that time, he had identified the 
phenomenon but did not know what to call it, thus, an interest in the phenomenon with no 
name was born. Following the discovery, it was in the early discussion that the title 
“management buy-outs” was introduced at the Industrial and Commercial Finance 
Corporation (“ICFC”). The idea for further and more detailed research was formed following 
the first national conference on management buy-outs which was held at Nottingham 
University in March 1981, and jointly organized by the University and ICFC. This conference 
attracted a great deal of professional and industrial delegates, and demonstrated that the 
buy-out was both a significant development on the UK commercial scene, and an activity 
worthy of further research,6 and thereafter, gave rise to the spread of the MBO concept and 
the growth of MBO transactions in the U.K. and continental Europe. 
III. An agency theory perspective on MBOs. 
An agency theory perspective was adopted in UK on MBOs, which has direct implications for 
                                                        
4 Gary Sharp, Alex Shinder, ed., Buyouts: A Guide for the Management Team (London: Euromoney Books and 
Montagu Private Equity, 2003) at 1. 
5 Weinberg & Blank, Takeovers and Mergers, looseleaf (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 2-6003. 
6 Mike Wright & John Coyne, Management Buy-outs (London: Croom Helm, 1985) at preface. 
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how buyouts affect productivity. That is because buyouts typically result in a change in the 
incentive and governance structure of the corporation.7 In publicly-traded corporations, peak 
tier agency problems may arise where management hold negligible amounts of equity and 
diffuse shareholders are unable to exert effective monitoring. A second tier agency problem 
arises in divisions of large public corporations. Incomplete labor contracts in internal capital 
markets raise the possibility of opportunism and a resultant need for monitoring. This 
monitoring may be ineffective when remuneration of senior management is not linked to 
performance and access to divisional information may be problematical in large complex 
organizations. Difficulties in introducing appropriate performance-related incentives at the 
level of individual divisions may compound these problems.8
 
Following an MBO, senior management typically obtains a significant share of the equity, 
with a small group of private equity investors retaining the balance. The subscribers of this 
private equity, whether a leveraged buyout association or a private equity firm, provide close 
monitoring of the target company through requirements for detailed information, board 
representation, etc.. Taking on significant debt to fund the purchase of the company 
introduces a major commitment to service this financing because of the threat of bankruptcy 
should interest payments not be met. Debt providers also set and monitor a range of covenants 
as a condition of extending loan finance.9 These changes in incentive and governance 
                                                        
7 Richard Harris, Donald S. Siegel and Mike Wright, “Assessing the Impact of Management Buy-outs on 
Economic Efficiency: Plant-Level Evidence from the Unite Kingdom.” (October 2003), Working Papers in 
Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, online: <http://www.rpi.edu/dept/economics/www/workingpapers/>. 
8 Thomson, Steve and Mike Wright, “Corporate Governance: The Role of Restructuring Transactions,” (1995) 
Economic Journal, Vol. 105, 690-703. 
9  Citron, Ken Robbie and Mike Wright, “Loan Covenants and Relationship Banking in MBOs,” (1997), 
Accounting and Business Research, 27, 277-296. 
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mechanisms are expected to lead managers to seek out more efficient uses of factors of 
production. 
IV. General reasons for MBOs  
Why are management buy-outs of corporations, subsidiaries and divisions common today? 
There have always been many corporate transactions as companies have been bought and sold 
and have divested operating units for strategic reasons. MBOs are now a world-wide 
phenomenon. There are many reasons for the large number of these transactions. 
 
First, large corporations are focusing their resources on their main lines of business and 
divesting other operations to stay viable in the highly competitive world economy.  
 
Second, management is widely believed to work more efficiently when it owns a piece of the 
action and some of its capital is at risk in the business. There is more incentive for each 
manager to prove themselves and there is less need for the costly supervisory and monitoring 
systems that typify large, absentee-owned corporations and conglomerates. 
 
Third, management not only works harder when they are owners, but they expect the entire 
organization to work harder and smarter to enhance the value of their ownership. Managers 




Fourth, as investors have become more sophisticated, they would rather make their own 
decisions concerning diversification (by investing in companies with different lines of 
businesses) instead of investing in a single corporation whose management makes such 
decisions by diversifying the company’s assets through conglomeration.10
V. Legal relationship and structure of MBOs 
Some management buy-outs are straightforward affairs with the owners of the business 
selling to a manager or a group of managers personally. However, where the sums involved 
are large and the management team needs to raise finance from external sources, the process 
























It is not unusual for a buy-out to involve four or five different parties including the vendor, 
which may be a company, private or public, an individual, a number of individuals, a receiver 
or the government,11 the buy-out vehicle, Newco, normally a newly formed company for the 
                                                        
10 Mike Wright & John Coyne, supra note 6 at13. 
11 Debbie Anthony et al., Ian Krieger, ed., Management Buy-outs, second ed. (London, Dublin and Edinburgh: 
Butterworths & Co Ltd, 1994) at 19.
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purpose, the funding institutions composed of equity investors or debt providers or both, and 
the individual members of the buy-out team. The relationships of the parties are illustrated in 
Figure 1.12
Chapter 3. General Comparison of MBOs in UK and China 
Te market for management buy-outs in China lags considerably behind the U.K. It can be 
demonstrated in the following discussion that the reasons, fairly obviously, relate to the nature 
of the industrial base, ownership structure, the level of development of the venture capital 
markets, the extent to which banks are allowed to invest in this kind of organization, the 
nature of acquisition activity, and the level of development of stock markets. 
I. History and Background of MBOs in UK 
1. Trends of MBOs in UK 
The past few years in UK have witnessed an explosion of M&A activity unlike that of any 
comparable period in recorded history. One aspect of the current M&A trend is the continued 
use of leverage by financial buyers. The management buyout, an especially common type of 
leveraged buyout, also has continued to rise in popularity during the 1980s. There was 
significant growth in the value of assets transferred through buyouts in UK during the 1980s, 
reaching a peak in 1989. Following a decline in 1990, MBO activity increased virtually 
monotonically until 2004. Figure 2 demonstrates the rate of this growth in UK, in terms of 
                                                        
12 A Practical Guide to MBOs, supra note 1. 
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both total value and numbers of transactions.13
 
Figure 2: UK MBO Trends (1984-June, 2004) 
 
Source: CMBOR/Barclays Private Equity/Deloitte & Touche 
The proportion of mergers and acquisition activity represented by management buy-outs has 
varied from year to year. As is illustrated by the following Figure 3,14 they have come to 
account for approximately half of all such mergers and acquisitions activity in UK in terms of 
numbers over the period 1987-2001  
Figure 3: MBOs as a % of UK Takeover Activity (1987-2001) 
  
Source: CMBOR/Barclays Private Equity/Deloitte & Touche 
                                                        
13 Annual Buy-out trends, online: The Center for Management Buy-out research <http://www.cmbor.org/>. 
14 Ibid. 
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2. Historical review 
In the U.K. the management buy-out idea started to take off in the late 1970s and spread 
rapidly in the early 1980s.15 During the 1980s, the number and the average size of MBOs in 
the United Kingdom increased substantially, from an estimated 100 MBOs with a value of 
£40 million in 1980 to a peak of 500 MBOs with a value of £6,490 million in 1989.16 In the 
years 1986-89 there were several very large buy-outs exceeding £100 million in size, some of 
these being financed substantially by debt.17 However, with the onset of deep recession in the 
United Kingdom in 1990, the more cyclical businesses which were burdened by high levels of 
acquisition debt began to run into difficulties. Uncertain stock markets and interest rates rising 
to 15% gave rise to some spectacular failures to some of the more leveraged MBOs 
transactions. Inevitably, lending banks subsequently have had to make large provisions to 
cover their exposure to highly leveraged transactions. As a result, financiers have, since 1990, 
adopted a much more cautious approach to risk appraisal. A number of equity and debt 
providers have withdrawn from the market, and those who remain are insisting on more 
conservative financing structures. This withdrawal of financial capacity has led to a 
remarkable decline in both the number and the average size of management buy-outs.18 
Nevertheless, it would seem that the management buy-out phenomenon has established a 
secure position in UK corporate life. Subsequent to 1990, activity has been experienced at a 
very much lower, but relatively stable level.19
                                                        
15 Bryan de Caires, ed., Management Buy-outs, (London: Erupmoney Publications Plc, 1988) at 14. 
16 Weinberg & Blank, supra note 5 at 2-6003. 
17  Lord Hanson, Corporate Acquisitions and Mergers - A Practical Guide to the Legal, Financial and 
Administrative Implications, 3d ed. (London, Dordrecht, Boston: Graham & Trotman) at 14.01. 
18 Weinberg & Blank, supra note 5 at 2-6003, 6004. 
19 Also currently, 2003 saw a reversal in the downward trend seen in the UK buy-out market since the market 
peaked at £23.9 billion in 2000. With 2001 seeing a fall to £19.5 billion and a further decline in 2002 to £15.3 
 12
3. Background behind the growth of MBOs. 
Apart from a brief look at historical trends of MBOs in the U.K., it is essential to appreciate 
the background of this development. 
 
To a substantial degree, the development of management buy-outs in the U.K. is attributable 
to change in tax and company laws, specifically to the grant of interest relief for individuals 
on acquisition debt20 and the permission for private companies to finance the acquisition of 
their own shares.21 However, the background of development of MBOs in China is different; 
this will be explained later in this chapter. 
 
In UK, management buy-outs should also be seen in a sociological context. There are a 
variety of influences behind the growth of MBOs.22 First, management buy-outs come from 
corporate restructuring including large companies or groups disposing non-core subsidiaries, 
privatizations of stated-owned entities, distress sales, managerial takeovers of family-run 
firms or private companies and public to private transactions.23 Another factor is the growth 
of the entrepreneurial culture. Management buy-outs would not exist without management 
teams who are willing to take the risks they entail and who are motivated by the rewards they 
offer. This willingness to pursue this route has been hugely influenced by the concept of 
                                                                                                                                                               
billion total market value recovered last year to end 2003 at £16.2 billion. The latest figure represents a six per cent 
increase over the 2002 value and is the fourth highest UK buy-out total ever recorded, although it still remains 
three per cent below the £16.7 billion of 1999. Buy-out volume also showed renewed strength last year with the 
highest number of deals completed since 1998 when 688 were recorded. The total last year of 670 buy-outs was an 
eight per cent increase on the 620 of 2002 and also well above the 2001 figure of 634 transactions. 
20 See Lord Hanson, supra note 17 at 14.06-14.09 for further discussion. 
21 See Chapter 4 IV “Financial assistance and MBO under Section 151 of the Companies Act 1985”, below, for 
further discussion. 
22 Garry Sharp, supra note 4 at 9 
23 See Source of Management Buy-outs, below. 
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entrepreneurship independence. This concept contributes much to the modern corporation, as 
it can be seen that the essential elements of the entrepreneurship, risk taking, risk assessment 
and profit maximizing are perhaps the most essential feature of modern companies.24 Also, 
the growth of management buy-outs is associated with the availability of funds provided by 
the development capital market and stock market liquidity. 
4. Source of Management buy-outs 
The popularity of management buy-outs, where a business is bought from its owners by a 
management team continues. Opportunities for managers to buy all or part of the company 
which employs them from its owners frequently occur. The sources of buy-outs are many and 
varied. In the main, the sources in recent years are shown in Figure 4 and details of them are 
discussed below.25
















The principal source of UK buy-outs lies in the divestment of divisions and subsidiaries by 
                                                        
24 Mike Wright & John Coyne, supra note 6 at 45. 
25 A Practical Guide to MBOs, supra note 1. 
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domestically-owned parent firms.26 A division or subsidiary of a larger group is or will 
become a non-core activity. In these circumstances management can become isolated from 
the parent company’s overall strategy and in consequence may not be receiving the full 
support of the organization. The parent company may wish to dispose of the subsidiary in 
order to realize funds to concentrate on particular “core activities”.27
 
The second major category of deals involves managerial takeovers of family-run firms or 
private companies in general. These situations occur when owners of family-owned firms and 
controlling shareholders of private companies decide to end their involvement as a result of 
the death or retirement of a dominant entrepreneurial figure.28 Often, in established family 
companies no obvious successor exists for the owner or managers planning to retire. In such 
circumstances the incumbent managers may be able to purchase the company from the 
retiring family members or, frequently, a suitable solution is a management buy-in, which will 
see the current management being strengthened with new managers from outside. Besides, in 
privately owned companies with diverse shareholder groups it is possible for the aspirations 
of different shareholders to diverge over time and this may require a reorganization of the 
shareholders. Such reorganization can often include a buy-out of certain of the shareholders. 
 
Thirdly, a substantial proportion of UK deals reflect distress sales. Highly geared groups may 
be required to raise funds at short notice. They are often compelled to accept a forced sale of a 
business to raise those funds. Management may be the only potential purchasers able to meet 
                                                        
26 Bryan de Caires, ed., supra note 15 at 15. 
27 A Practical Guide to MBOs, supra note 1. 
28 Bryan de Caires, ed., supra note 15 at 15. 
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a short time scale. 
 
Fourthly, in many large corporate acquisitions a bundle of businesses are transferred. It is 
often the case that the purchaser is not really interested in all the businesses in the bundle, but 
has taken them all for simplicity. The managers in those ‘unwanted’ acquisitions may be well 
placed to buy their companies, not least because their new parent may have borrowed heavily 
to fund the larger acquisition and may also face constraints on management resources in 
attempting to integrate the businesses acquired. 
 
Furthermore, in a receivership there is a tendency for managers to attempt a buy-out in order 
to simply preserve their jobs. This is never a sufficient reason to attempt a buy-out. Where the 
company or group has failed it must be clearly demonstrated that the underlying cause of 
failure can be redressed after the buy-out. Where a group of companies has gone into 
receivership it may well be possible to purchase one or more profitable subsidiaries. 
 
In addition, a subset of the buy-outs arising from divergent shareholder aspirations is the 
increasingly common secondary buy-out. Institutional investors and, in some instances, 
members of a previous management buy-out team, may be seeking an exit from their 
investment. In such circumstances a re-organization of shareholdings is possible in which 
non-equity holding managers become shareholders and existing equity investments held by 
managers can be restructured to allow some of their locked-in gain to be realized.29
                                                        
29 Ian Webb, ed., Management Buyouts: A Guide for the Prospective Entrepreneur, second ed. (London: Gower 
Publishing Company Limited, 1990) at 15. 
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 Finally, in recent years there have been a significant number of public to private transactions. 
These involve the management of a quoted company making an offer for the shares of the 
company. 
II. History and background of MBOs in China. 
The past few years in China have witnessed an explosion of MBOs activity unlike that of any 
comparable period in recorded history. It started in 1997 as the first successful management 
buy-out transaction in China was implemented in Si Tong Group.30  
 
However, the background of growth of MBOs in China is different from that in UK. China’s 
ongoing economic reform towards a more mature free market economy is an important 
influence. Since 1999, a particular feature of recent Chinese experience has been the use of 
the management buy-out as a device to privatize or restructure the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs)31 and collectively-owned enterprises.32 For instance, a variety of SOEs have been 
recently transformed into non state-owned enterprises through management buy-outs to 
realize the diversification of investment sources.33  
 
                                                        
30 Si Tong is a collectively-owned enterprise. In this case a shell company was incorporated by the Union of Share 
Holding Employee. For further discussion, see Chapter 5 II Types of present management buy-outs in China 
below. 
31 State-owned companies are a special category of companies; Article 64 of Company Law defines a wholly 
State-owned company as a limited company established solely by the State-authorized Investment Institution or by 
a department authorized by the State. See Online: 
<http://www.isinolaw.com/jsp/companylaw/CL_stateowncom.jsp?LangID=0>. 
32 This kind of organization is not a corporation incorporated according to the Company Law of the PRC. Due to 
historical reason, its ownership is not clear. It is in a state of confusion that who is the investor and who shall take 
responsibility in this organization. 
33 MBO of Hunan Dongting Aquaculture Co., Ltd,(website: http://www.hndtsz.com/main.htm) and Shandong 
Shengli Co., Ltd.(website: http://www.vicome.com/english/about/index1.asp). 
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Before looking to the special features of frequently-occurring management buy-outs in China, 
the case of the management buy-out of Holley Group34 shall be discussed. The unorthodox 
management buy-out strategy at Holley Group is argued as a model for China’s state-owned 
enterprise reform. 35  It is also deemed as a possible model for other Chinese 
collectively-owned enterprises which have been trying to privatize the ownership and convert 
themselves into standard companies by means of management buy-outs. 
1. MBO of collectively-owned Holley Group and arising problem 
A. Background of the MBO of Holley Group 
Privatization is a nice idea, and for years foreign economists have urged China to embrace it. 
Inefficient state-owned and collectively-owned industries have been a drag on China’s 
economy for too long. Governments believe that large-scale privatization through 
management buy-outs would bring higher productivity, accountability and would be best of 
all for local governments - fatter tax revenues. But even when local governments support a 
company’s privatization plans, the mechanics of transferring any but the smallest of 
enterprises from state or collective ownership to private hands can be daunting.36
 
The country’s market leader in sales of electricity meters to the power industry, Holley Group, 
based in Zhejiang province, and headquartered in nearby Hangzhou, had been trying to 
privatize since 1994. Its projected management-buyout scheme has been closely supervised 
                                                        
34 Holley Group, online: <http://www.holleymeter.com/htmnew/index.htm>. 
35 Susan V Lawrence, “Back-door takeover”, Far Eastern Economic Review, HongKong Aug 17,2000. Vol. 163, 
Iss. 33 at 42, 43. 
36  EMKT.com.cn, “Barrier of Conducting MBOs” (Feb 2003) Online: 
<http://www.emkt.com.cn/news/other/2003-02-26/6857.html>. 
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by provincial officials and state-enterprise administration as a possible model for other 
Chinese companies. No national guidelines exist for companies that want to privatize through 
management buy-outs. Therefore, companies like Holley and governments like Zhejiang’s are 
forced to improvise, bend rules and privatize only in fits and starts. 
 
Holley’s tangled ownership structure goes back to the 1950s, when Chairman Mao Zedong 
called on entrepreneurs to join together to create small handicrafts cooperatives. In Zhejiang, 
three cooperatives that made pens, umbrellas and brooms were generated. Individuals made 
the initial investments to get the cooperatives up and running. In 1970, the state merged the 
three cooperatives into a single company and decreed it to be “collectively-owned”. And 
according to the state, collectively-owned companies were owned by “all the labouring 
masses.” Still with no input of state money, that company switched to mailing electricity 
meters the same year. Thirty years later, Holley’s core business remains electricity meters, but 
it has expanded into copper sheeting, chemicals and real estate.37  
 
Collective enterprises are owned by “all the labouring masses”, as government policy remains 
unchanged. But according to the policy, it is still imprecise that who owns Holley. Is it owned 
by all the workers in this enterprise, or by all the workers in this industry, or by everybody? It 
needs to be clarified urgently because until ownership is clear, everyone says it is his property, 
but no one takes responsibility. 
                                                        
37 Profits of Holley in 1999 were 297 million RMB ($25 million) on sales of r.5 billion RMB. Holley operates 16 
factories and 26 sales companies in China. It holds controlling stakes in four other companies, including Chonqing 
Holley, which it bought in 1999 and is listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Holley also has an electricity-meter 
factory in Thailand and a controlling stake in another in Vilnius, Lithuania. 
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B. Management buy-out of Holley Group and Policy obstacles 
One obvious way to clarify Holley’s ownership might have been to return the company to the 
hands of the original entrepreneurs who set up the bamboo cooperatives. But most of them 
have died and it wasn’t clear who had invested, or how much. Another way might have been 
to list Holley on a stock market. But national policy made it difficult as firms that want to be 
listed have to join a long queue for approval from relevant government departments. A third 
way to privatize would have been to have the managers buy the company outright. The factor 
in favour of Holley’s MBO has been the support of its local government, which urged Holley 
to privatize in the first place, largely to create incentives for managers. The factor against 
Holley is the confusion one encounters everywhere in China about who owns state-owned and 
collective enterprises, and thus who has the right to sell them to private investors, and how to 
make the transaction legal.38
 
In 1995, Holley and its government backers finally ended up offering to “sell” a portion of the 
company’s shares to all employees. While no shares were actually transferred to any 
employee, each was entitled to the dividends accruing on them. Employees could “buy” 
shares depending on their position in the company. Thereafter, the management wanted to buy 
all the shares back, paying employees a premium of 20% on their original investments, but 
some employees were unhappy to accept the buy-back offer. 
 
                                                        
38 Holley’s Vice-Chairman Li Yiqing, one of the few veterans of the bamboo cooperatives still with the company, 
says “pricing our assets was very difficult. If the price was too high, we managers wouldn't be willing to pay it. If 
the price was too low, the workers wouldn’t go along. There was also the question of to whom any money should 
be paid. ” 
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In 1999, management started over with a management buy-out. This time they registered a 
new company Zhejiang Holley Holding (Holley Newco). Shortly after the company’s 
registration, each of the 129 managers all handpicked by Chairman Wang was required to buy 
from local government between 100,000 RMB worth and 5 million RMB worth of Holley 
Newco’s shares depending on their positions. As stated later in Chapter 5, Type B of MBOs 
was utilized in this situation. However, no one had that kind of money. So they found a bank 
in Hangzhou that was willing to extend illegal three year loans to Holley’s managers using the 
shares they planned to buy as part of the collateral. The loans were illegal because national 
policy doesn’t allow borrowers to use shares as collateral.39 Some also were illegal because 
national policy bans bank loans in excess of 500,000 RMB to individuals. In fact, Chinese 
banks rarely make loans to individuals.  
C. Government turns a blind eye 
“In reform, we often hit against policy obstacles,” says Deputy Mayor of Hangzhou, Ma 
Huimin. “How are you going to leap across them? The government can only turn a blind eye 
and not discuss them.” 
 
The idea this time around was to give Holley’s management team a big-enough stake and 
generous share options in the company to give them a strong personal interest in how the 
company performs. To make his purchase of 300,000 RMB worth of Zhejiang Holley shares, 
for example, public-relations director Qiu Xiaoping borrowed one-third of the sum from a 
                                                        
39 See Chapter 5, III Legal problems arising in current MBOs below. 
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sister in New York and two-thirds from the bank, with his apartment and all his worldly 
possessions as part of the collateral. In the previous share buy-up, his stake had been just 
20,000 RMB. “I didn’t really feel it then,” he says. “If the company failed, I’d have felt a bit 
of pain. But now, my home and all my assets are at stake. It feels very different.” One year 
later, Qiu’s shares and share options yielded him 120,000 RMB. “Everyone felt good at the 
end of the first year,” says Qiu. “One third is already paid off.” 
 
Zhejiang Holley ultimately displaced the parent company as the majority shareholder in each 
healthy subsidiary. Holley’s Type B management-buyout model has drawn a lot of attention in 
China, feeding a hunger for ideas about how to move larger state and collectively owned 
businesses out of their murky ownership situations. Holley has hosted visits from interested 
provincial leaders and from other state-owned enterprises.  
D. Conclusion 
As a solution to China’s ownership confusion, however, the Holley plan has its shortcomings. 
It requires bank’s backing which is technically illegal. It rewards one set of hand-picked 
employees lavishly while denying the same riches to other loyal employees. And Holley’s tale 
says a lot about how far it is possible to take economic reform in today’s China.  
2. China’s SOE reform and market opening-up  
Advancing sustainable economic development is an important topic for all the countries in the 
world. Enterprises are the microcosmic foundations of economic and social development. 
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Stimulating the vigor of enterprises and keeping harmonious the relationship between enterprises’ 
development and social development are the important guarantees for realizing comprehensive, 
coordinated and sustainable economic development. Since late 1970’s, China, taking the market as 
the direction, SOE reform as the core task, has been incessantly pushing forward the economic 
system reform. 
 
In China, the state-owned enterprise is an important composition of the economy and plays an 
essential role in economic growth, technology advancement and social employment.40 However, 
due to historical reasons, a considerable amount of state-owned enterprises which were generated 
under a long-term socialist plan economy system and lack operational mechanisms of modern 
corporations but have redundant employees are unable to adapt to the market-oriented system.41  
Also, an old problem was left over from China’s traditional system that the status of an investor in 
an SOE is not recognized. It is not clear that who has the rights and takes the responsibilities in a 
SOE. And except those important industries and key areas that have a vital bearing on the national 
security and the lifeline of the state economy which should be controlled by the state, the state 
economy still has its massive presence in other general competitive sectors and areas, such as 
processing industries and common service industries.42 The problems in the state economy’s 
layout and structure not only affect the quality and efficiency of the national economy, but also 
exert a negative impact on the national economy, and harm the deepening of the state-owned 
                                                        
40 In 2002, the total assets of 159,000 state-owned enterprises and state holding enterprises have reached 18.02 
trillion Yuan with 378.63 billion Yuan of profit, 679.41 billion Yuan of tax payment and 46.805 million employees. 
See State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), News Update, 
“Aggressively advance SOE reform and development: Enhance China’s sustainable economic development and 
overall social progress, Li Rongrong, Chairman of SASAC”, (7 November 2003), online: 
<http://www.sasac.gov.cn/eng/new/new_0008.htm>.
41 “Resolution of the Communist Party’s Central Committee on several important issues regarding the SOEs 
reform.”(1999), online: <http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/archive/131784.htm>. 
42 Ibid. 
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assets management system reform and the reform of SOEs. 43
 
As a result, a good environment of laws and policies must be created to encourage private capital 
to participate in the restructuring and renovation of SOEs to meet the needs of the SOEs reform 
and the adjustment of the layout and structure of the state economy.  
3. Since China’s SOE reform and market opening-up, MBO has been explored as one of the 
means and modes for harmonious combination of state ownership and market economy. 
Since the topic of reform and opening-up proposed by the 14th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China(“CPC”) in 1992, China has insisted on a market-oriented system, 
constantly deepened SOE reform, and actively explored means and modes for a harmonious 
combination of state ownership and market economy. Significant changes have taken place in 
SOEs’ management system and operating mechanisms and strategic adjustment of the layout and 
structure of the state economy has made progress. Importantly, in order to accelerate the pace of 
establishing modern enterprise system, SOEs are pushed to convert themselves into standard 
companies and improve corporate governance in terms of a clarification of the ownership and the 
investors’ rights and responsibilities, a separation of government functions of social and public 
administration from the functions of investors of state-owned companies, and an establishment of 
a scientific management mechanism.44
 
                                                        
43 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), News Update, 
“Continuously adjusted the layout and structure of China’s state economy, propelling Chinese SOEs to participate 
in international competition and cooperation, Li Rongrong, Chairman of SASAC”, (19 November 2003), online: 
<http://www.sasac.gov.cn/eng/new/new_0007.htm>. 
44 “Resolution of the Communist Party’s Central Committee on several issues regarding establishment of a 
socialist market economy system.”(1993), online: <http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/archive/131747.htm>. 
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Thereafter, at the 15th National Congress of the CPC held in September 1997, President Jiang 
Zemin outlined a programme which permitted, and perhaps opened wide the gates for, the sale of 
SOEs to private investors. The resolution of the CPC indicated that adjusting the layout and 
structure of the state economy strategically is the vital content of China’s economic system reform. 
This adjustment will adapt to the main trend of the structural adjustment of the world industry and 
based on the guideline of “the state economy should enter into certain sectors while withdrawing 
from others, and focus on some business sectors while shrinking from others”, China will optimize 
the layout and structure, strengthen the consolidation of resources and support and direct private 
capital to participate in SOEs’ restructuring as strategic investors.45  
 
Thus, a new pattern with state ownership playing a dominant role and diverse forms of ownership 
developing side by side has come into force and it is still being continuously improved. And since 
the encouragement of the CPC’s resolution, a variety of SOEs have been transformed in non 
state-owned entities by virtue of management buy-outs.  
 
Later, the CPC’s 16th National Congress held in 2002 called for the great target of taking the 
rationalization of the state economy’s layout and structure as an essential factor for the deepening 
of the economic system reform. The purpose of the convention to pursue the diversified forms for 
effectively realizing public ownership and intensify efforts to develop a mixed sector of the 
economy in which the state capital, collective capital and non-public capital all participate, 
boosted the development of the MBO concept in China. At the same time, this convention 
                                                        
45 “Resolution of the Communist Party’s Central Committee on several important issues regarding the SOEs 
reform.”(1999) See online: <http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/archive/131784.htm>. 
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intended to establish and develop the modern property right system with clear ownership, rights 
and responsibilities, strict protection and smooth liquidation, protect various forms of property 
rights according to law, and fully evolve the rule of property rights’ transaction and its regulation 
system.46  
 
In order to reform the state-owned assets management system, according to the State Council’s 
Institutional Reform Scheme approved at the first session of the 10th NPC of the People’s 
Republic of China, the State Council set up the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission(“SASAC”), and promulgated and implemented the Interim 
Regulations on Supervision and Management of State-owned Assets of Enterprises.47 The 
establishment of SASAC realizes the separation of government functions of social and public 
administration from the functions of investor of state-owned assets at the government level 
for the first time and realizes the combination of regulation of assets, personnel and affairs, 
which is an important breakthrough in China’s economic system reform and marks a new 
stage of SOE reform and development. The deepening of the state-owned assets management 
system reform, especially the clarification of the state-owned assets’ investor, creates sound 
external conditions for SOE reform and development and sets more urgent requirements for 
accelerating SOE reform.48 Taking the opportunity of reforming the state-owned assets 
management system, a great deal of state-owned companies has been involved in 
                                                        
46 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), News Update, 
“Continuously adjusted the layout and structure of China’s state economy, propelling Chinese SOEs to participate 
in international competition and cooperation, Li Rongrong, Chairman of SASAC”, (19 November 2003), online: 
<http://www.sasac.gov.cn/eng/new/new_0007.htm>. 
47 See Chapter 5, I Overview of the present legal regime of Chinese law, below.
48 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), News Update, 
“Aggressively advance SOE reform and development: Enhance China’s sustainable economic development and 





According to the Chinese policy improvement for SOE reform, SASAC would bolster the 
external regulation on its enterprises from several aspects, such as solve the old problem left 
over from China’s old system that the status of an investor in an SOE was not recognised, and 
push forward the reform and restructuring of the supervised enterprises including the 
establishment of modern enterprise system in SOE, the perfection of corporate governance, 
stimulate the internal change and the transformation of operating mechanisms, separate the 
non-core business from the core business in order to sharpen the core business.49  
 
As a result, accelerating the pace of establishing modern enterprise system, MBOs are one of 
the prominent instruments that can be used to push SOEs to convert themselves into standard 
companies, improve corporate governance, facilitate qualified SOEs to introduce the 
diversification of sources of investment, and explore various forms of effective incentives and 
restraint mechanisms for enterprise managers.  
 
Early in April 2003, Mr. Jia Chan, head of the Enterprise Section of Ministry of 
Finance(“MOF”) said that the MOF would concentrate on the promulgation of management 
rules for management’s acquisition of Listed Companies.50 It was also noticed that the 
                                                        
49 State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), News Update, 
“SASAC will reinforce the external regulation on its enterprises from five aspects, Shao Ning, vice chairman of 
SASAC” (23 September 2003), online: <http://www.sasac.gov.cn/eng/new/new_0005.htm>.
50 O’Melveny & Myers LLP, China Law & Policy Digest( 30 April 2003), (China Securities(zhong guo zheng 
quan bao), April 22, 2003), “Ministry of Finance (MOF) to Perfect Financial Systems through Promulgation of 
MBO Management Rules for Listed Companies.” online: 
<http://www.omm.com/webdata/content/publications/clp030430.pdf>. 
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SASAC is studying laws and regulations pertaining to management buy-outs.51
 
Such supportive policies and law improvement gave rise to a development of MBOs in China, 
and MBOs become more and more necessary for being an effective method of property rights 
reform. Although law relating to MBOs can be drawn from some areas, the government tries 
to, on a continuous basis, improve and streamline the regulatory structure for MBOs. This 
will be discussed later in Chapter 5. 
III. Brief Comparison of MBO phenomena in UK and China 
Generally, the nature and extent of MBO phenomena varies considerably in the U.K. and 
China. 
 
First, MBOs in U.K. based on the agency cost theory is utilized to increase the efficiency of 
corporate mechanisms. Most management buy-outs in the U.K. come from corporate 
restructuring including large companies or groups disposing non-core subsidiaries, 
privatizations of stated-owned entities, distress sales, managerial takeovers of family-run 
firms or private companies and public to private transactions. The MBO has been explored in 
China as one of the means and modes for establishing modern enterprise system. MBOs are a 
major device for collectively-owned enterprises to clarify the ownership and for state-owned 
enterprises to convert themselves into standard companies, to introduce the diversification of 
sources of investment, and explore various forms of effective incentives and restraint 
                                                        
51 O’Melveny & Myers LLP, China Law & Policy Digest (21 November 2003) “SACSAC is studying Laws and 
regulations regarding MBO methods” online: 
<http://www.omm.com/webdata/content/publications/clp031121.pdf>. 
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mechanisms for enterprise managers.  
 
Second, in the overwhelming majority of UK MBOs, management teams acquire a substantial 
equity holding and obtain an actual or potential majority of the voting shares.52 Due to the 
insufficient wealth of the management team, and undeveloped capital markets, it is difficult 
for management teams to obtain substantial equity holding in China.53
 
Third, China’s central government and local governments play dual roles in MBOs. On the 
one hand, they are the vendor in a MBO of SOE, on the other hand they are law-makers who 
will supervise such transactions. However, the government in the U.K. seldom intervenes in 
the conduct of MBOs. 
 
Fourth, pricing of illiquid state-owed shares and corporate shares in MBOs are only based on 
net assets values in the balance sheet.54 This is not the case in the U.K. where pricing is based 
on the combined consideration of net assets value, earning basis and others55  
 
Finally, the development of the MBO business in the U.K. has been accompanied by an 
increase in the number and size of financing institutions and in the scope of the services they 
offer. But China has an undeveloped capital market. The industrial banks’ service is restricted 
in both debt finance and equity investments, and the venture capital market in China, unlike 
                                                        
52 Bryan de Caires, supra note 15 at 14. 
53 See Chapter 5, II Types of the present management buy-outs in China, below. 
54 See Chapter 5, III 4 Pricing of management buy-outs in China, below. 
55 See Chapter 4 and 5, below, for separate discussion on pricing in UK and China. 
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the U.K. is at an early stage of development. 
 
Although the market for management buy-outs in China lags considerably behind 
development in the U.K., it is beginning to become an important innovation in China’s 
economic reform. However, in spite of the issuance of several supportive rules and 
regulations pertaining to MBOs over the past years, there remain quite a lot of obstacles and 
risks when conducting the deals under the Chinese legal regime. Thus, to examine the 
principal legal issues concerning MBOs in the U.K. and those in China is of importance. 
Chapter 4: Legal issues of MBOs in UK 
Management buy-outs often involve numerous, complex legal issues and problems. Of 
particular importance is the risk that members of the buy-out team may be in breach of their 
contractual and fiduciary duties to the company (e.g. conflict of interest and confidentiality). 
Also, the offer letter which must be carefully drafted and may well include the seller’s 
consent to disclosure of confidential information, its undertaking not to offer the company to 
another purchaser for a period and its agreement to assisting with the costs.  
I. Director’s duties at Common Law and other statute rules 
Clearly, management teams will have their personal interests to consider in carrying out a 
management buy-out. The fairness of a buy-out for the shareholders has attracted much 
criticism, focused on the potential conflict between the fiduciary duties of the members of the 
buy-out team to selling shares or assets of a company on the one hand and their own personal 
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aspiration as buyers on the other hand. Because the management team has access to inside 
information, it has the ability to affect the share price of the target company and consequently 
its valuation. The resultant opportunity for manipulation has created a fundamental concern 
that the management team may be benefiting from an opportunity which properly belongs to 
the company and its shareholders. These concerns about conflicting interests, inside 
advantages and misappropriation of corporate opportunities impose a much higher standard of 
fiduciary duty than will be required in normal transactions.  
 
Hence, before making or entertaining a possible management buy-out, each proposed member 
of the buy-out team must analyze his legal position in relation to the companies of which he is 
a director or employee and their shareholders. The buy-out team must carefully consider their 
fiduciary duties at common law, their contractual obligations, and statutory constrains and 
obligations. Regulatory constraints and obligations imposed by the listing rules of the London 
Stock Exchange(“Listing Rules” ) and the City Code on Takeovers and Merges(“City Code”) 
will be discussed separately. 
1. To whom are the duties owed 
A. Company and individual shareholder 
Before turning to the specific common law duties, it is necessary to consider to whom such 
duties are owed. Clearly, common law duties of directors are owed to the company of which 
the person is a director.56 Therefore, where the management buy-out takes the form of a 
                                                        
56 Paul L. Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, 7th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell 
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purchase of the business of a company one would clearly have to consider whether the actions 
of the directors of that company in the conduct of the buyout amount to a breach of any of 
those duties. However, where the buyout is of the shares in the directors’ company the issue is 
not so clear because the precise extent of a director’s duty to the shareholders of his company 
is unclear, and there is a question whether shareholders can bring litigation against the 
directors in such circumstances.57 In addition, following completion of the buyout, the 
ownership and control of the target company to which the directors owe duties will have 
passed to the directors and their funders through a formed Newco. Thus, once the vendor has 
agreed to the principle of a management buyout of its shares, it will, practically speaking, be 
impossible for the shareholders to cause the company to pursue any remedy against the 
management team.58
 
The doctrine of shareholder protection, both as regards fiduciary duties owed and the 
misappropriation of corporate opportunity, does not deal satisfactorily with the issues. The 
leading case Percival v. Wright59 is generally accepted as authority for the proposition that the 
directors of the company only owe a fiduciary duty to the company, not to the shareholders.60 
On the basis of this rule it has been recognized that there is no obligation on a director to 
disclose even highly material price-sensitive information that he has learnt by virtue of his 
                                                                                                                                                               
Ltd, 2003) at 371. 
57 Ibid. at 374. 
58 Maurice Dwyer, Private Equity Transactions, looseleaf (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003) at 1.03. 
59 See Percival v. Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421. 
60 In this case a director of a company bought shares from a shareholder at a price less than that for which the 
director knew that a third party had expressed interest in. The latter proposal came to nothing, but the selling 
member sued the director for breach of fiduciary duty to the member in not disclosing the interest expressed by the 
third party. Lord Swinfen Eady J. drew a clear distinction between the directors’ fiduciary duty to act in the best 
interests of the company and the plaintiff’s contention which he strongly rejected that the directors held a fiduciary 
position as trustees for the individual shareholders. Accordingly, he rejected the claim, holding that the purchasing 
director was under no obligation to disclose to the vendor shareholders the negotiations which ultimately proved 
abortive. 
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office to a person with whom he deals in regard to the shares of his company.61
 
Moreover, the Scottish Court of Session case of Dawson International plc v. Coats Paton plc 
and others62 confirms that there is no secondary general fiduciary duty owed by directors to 
shareholders of their company.63
 
Although, the rule established in Percival v Wright remains as the basis of UK law relating to 
directors’ duties, it has been criticized over the years that it should not be inferred that 
directors can never stand in a fiduciary relationship to the individual shareholders. It was 
criticized not because it was based on the ground that a director’s fiduciary duties are owed to 
the company and not to individual members, but because the application of that doctrine in 
those circumstances led to a supposed unfairness which ultimately led to the enactment of 
legislation against insider trading.64  
 
The decision has stood for almost a century without being overruled in UK or not followed 
                                                        
61 “Insider Beware” (Case Comment on Percival v Wright), COMPLAW 1993, 14(11), 202. 
62 See Dawson International plc v. Coats Paton plc and others [1989] B.C.L.C. 233. 
63 The case concerns an alleged agreement between a bidder for a listed company and the company itself that the 
company would recommend the bidder’s offer and not seek or co-operate with alternative bidders for its shares. 
The bidder alleged that the company had breached the agreement when the company co-operated with a 
subsequent rival bid which resulted in an agreed takeover of the company being announced. The case included an 
action against two of the directors of the company for reimbursement of the expenses that the bidder had incurred 
in taking steps to implement arrangements for what ultimately was an aborted bid. Lord Cullen rejected the 
company’s and directors’ argument that the alleged contract would have been contrary to a general fiduciary duty 
that the directors of the company owed to individual shareholders to advise them on the merits of any takeover bid. 
He was careful to distinguish between directors’ fiduciary duties to the company itself and the absence of any 
general fiduciary duty owed to shareholders. However, Lord Cullen confirmed that directors could put themselves 
in a position where they have a duty directly to shareholders. 
64 Tom Bostock (Partner, Mallesons Stephen Jaques of Melbourne), “Director’s Duties: Recent Developments and 
Their Implications for Directors and Advisers: To Whom Are the Duties of a Company Director Owed?” Australian 
Institute of Company Directors and Center for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation(the University of 
Melbourne) Seminar, November 8 2000, unpublished, online: 
<http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/lcj/casino/ch2.html>. 
 33
elsewhere in the Commonwealth, except by the New Zealand decision in Coleman v Myer.65 
Mahon J at first instance refused to follow Percival v Wright stating that the rule of fiduciary 
duties towards the shareholders should be confined to private companies and to such 
transactions in public company shares where the identity of the shareholder is known to the 
director at the time of sale. The New Zealand Court of Appeal emphasized that even in the 
absence of agency, a fiduciary duty arose in the case of a small family company where there 
was a gross disparity of knowledge between the directors and the shareholders and where the 
shareholders had relied on the directors for information and advice.66 When the directors 
negotiated with the shareholders for the purchase of their shares and were apparently not 
acting on behalf of the shareholders, they were nevertheless held to be subject to a fiduciary 
duty of full disclosure of relevant facts about the company to the shareholders. 
 
Coleman v Myer was also acknowledged in Australia by Handley JA in delivering the 
judgment of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Brunninghausen v Glavanics.67 After an 
extensive review of the decided cases since 1902, Handley JA concluded that while the 
general principle that a director owes fiduciary duties to the company and not to shareholders 
                                                        
65 See Coleman v Myer [1977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 225. In the Supreme Court Mahon J had held the Percival v Wright was 
wrongly decided but the Court of Appeal distinguished it. ‘In the present case, which is the case of a private 
company with unlisted shares, it seems an untenable argument to suggest that the shareholders on an offer to buy 
their shares are not perforce constrained to repose a special confidence in the directors that they will not be 
persuaded into a disadvantageous contract by non-disclosure of material facts. [T]here is inherent in the process of 
negotiation for sale a fiduciary duty owing by the director to disclose to the purchaser any fact ... which might 
reasonably and objectively control or influence the judgment of the shareholder in forming the decision in relation 
to the offer.’ 
66 Ibid. at 325, 330. 
67 See Brunninghausen v Glavanics (1999) 46 NSWLR 538, CANSW. Handley JA acknowledged that “The 
general principle that a director’s fiduciary duties are owed to the company and not to shareholders is undoubtedly 
correct, and its validity is undiminished.” In Brunninghausen, the company had two shareholders who were both 
also its only directors. After a falling out, the claimant ceased to take part actively in the management of the 
company's business. Subsequently, the active director and majority shareholder agreed to buy out the claimant's 
minority shareholding without disclosing that he was in negotiations for the sale of the company's entire business. 
The sale of the company's business was concluded shortly afterwards at a price valuing the shares at over 10 times 
the sum which the claimant received for them. 
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remains valid, the decision of a single judge in Percival v. Wright should not be allowed to 
stand in the way of the recognition of such a duty at this time.68
 
Although, the decision in Percival v. Wright is one of a corpus of cases from the Victorian and 
Edwardian eras that has cast a long shadow over the development of company law in general 
and the law of directors’ obligations in particular,69 the law relating to director’s fiduciary 
duties towards the company’s shareholders in UK is at present in a developing state.70 Two 
recent cases Platt v. Platt71 and Peskin v. Anderson72 continue a series of judgments that 
justify the imposition of fiduciary duties on directors to individual shareholders in special 
circumstances.73
 
The principle that a duty of some sort can be owed by the director to the shareholder has now 
been fully accepted in English Law as a result of decision of the English Court of Appeal in 
Peskin v. Anderson,74 where Mummery L.J. distinguished clearly between the fiduciary duties 
owed by directors to the company and fiduciary duties owed to shareholders which are 
dependent on establishing a special factual relationship between the shareholders and 
                                                        
68 Handley JA stated the question in Brunninghausen as being “whether the principle applies in a case, such as the 
present where the transaction did not concern the company, but only another shareholder.” “the decision of a high 
judge in Percival v Wright should not stand in the way of recognition of ….[a] fiduciary duty owed by directors to 
shareholders where there are negotiations for a takeover or an acquisition of the company’s undertaking [that] 
would require the directors to loyally promote the joint interests of all shareholders. A conflict could only arise if 
they sought to prefer their personal interests to the joint interest.” 
69 “The Latest Rites for Percival v. Wright” Case Comment on Brunninghausen v Glavanics, COMPLAW 2000, 
21(9), 261. 
70 Demetra Arsalidou, “Directors’ Fiduciary Duties to Shareholders: the Platt and Peskin cases” Case Comment, 
COMPLAW 2002, 23(2), 61-63. 
71 See Platt v. Platt [1999] 2 B.C.L.C. 745, Chd. 
72 See Peskin v. Anderson [2000] B.C.C. 1110; [2000] 2 B.C.L.C. 1, Chd. 
73 Demetra Arsalidou, supra note 70. 
74 Peskin v. Anderson involved the demutualization by a scheme of arrangement of the Royal Automobile Club. 
Following this, the business was eventually sold and the members realised over £34,000 each for their shares. The 
claimants were former members of the Club and former shareholders who began proceedings against the directors 
seeking damages for breach of a fiduciary duty to disclose the plans relating to the demutualisation. 
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directors in particular case.75   
 
In Platt v. Platt which involved a family company,76 David Mackie Q.C. effectively followed 
the reasoning in Coleman v. Myers, to the extent of holding that a fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders was owed and breached. He noted that the facts of Coleman v. Myers bear a 
resemblance to those in this case. He held that while the relationship between a director and 
shareholder does not of itself give rise to a fiduciary duty, this does not prevent such an 
obligation arising when the circumstances require it, and a fiduciary duty was imposed on the 
director which obliged him to disclose to his brothers shareholder matters which he knew or 
had reason to believe would be material to their decision to transfer their shares.77
 
Overall, despite the recent significant development in English Law, the general proposition 
that a director’s primary fiduciary duty is owed to the company remains. An exception arises 
where a special factual relationship between the shareholders of the company and the 
directors exists, which is capable of triggering fiduciary obligations to shareholders. In the 
absence of a special relationship, directors do not owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of 
the company to keep them constantly informed of all information that might affect their 
position. Thus, the duty may arise where directors, through negotiations or dealings, are 
                                                        
75 Paul L. Davies, supra note 56 at 374. 
76 In Platt, three brothers were shareholders in a company which held a BMW dealership. The defendant ran the 
business and held ordinary shares. The claimants were the two other brothers who did not work in the business and 
held redeemable preference shares. In 1992, when the company became financially weak, the defendant 
recommended to the claimants that they transfer their preference shares to him for £1. The claimants alleged that 
they were warned that the transfer was necessary because of the financial position of the company to enable the 
business to be sold at the insistence of BMW. They were also told that, if the sale did not eventually happen, the 
shares would be returned. When the company's financial position improved, BMW did not require the business to 
be sold and the claimants asked their brother to retransfer the shares, which he refused to do. In 1996, the business 
was sold and the claimants began proceedings seeking damages for breach of contract, misrepresentation and 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
77 Platt, supra note 71 
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brought into close contact with the shareholders, or a relationship of trust and confidence 
exists between the directors and the shareholders.78 However, it is suggested that the 
exception is essentially for family or small companies and does not significantly reduce the 
significance of the general proposition within large shareholder bodies.79  
B. Creditors and employees 
It should also be borne in mind that directors owe duties both to creditors (in cases where the 
company is insolvent) and employees. The case of West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v. Dodd80 
illustrates the former duty where it was held that once a company was insolvent the interests 
of the creditors overrode those of the shareholders since the company’s assets belonged to the 
creditors who could displace the power of the shareholders and director to deal with the 
company’s assets upon liquidation.81
 
With regard to the duty to employees, section 309 of the Companies Act 1985 makes clear 
that directors are to have regard to the interests of the company’s employees in general as well 
as to the interests of its members in the performance of their functions. Under that, the matters 
to which the directors of a company are to have regard in the performance of their function 
include the interests of the company’s employees in general, as well as the interests of its 
members. However, subsection (2) of section 309 provides that: “Accordingly, the duty 
imposed by this section on the directors is owed by them to the company (and the company 
                                                        
78 Demetra Arsalidou, supra note 70. 
79 Paul L. Davies, supra note 56 at 376. 
80 See West Mercia Safetywear Ltd v Dodd [1988] B.C.L.C. 250. 
81 This is the rationale contained in the dictum of Street C.J. in Kinsela v Russel Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq.) (1986) 4 
N.S.W.L.R. 722 at 730. 
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alone) and is enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary duty owed to a company by 
its directors”, which means enforcement by the company and that the employees as such have 
no or very limited means of enforcing it.82 The practical effect of section 309 seems to be not 
to give an employee a direct remedy against defaulting directors.83 Indeed, it may be that one 
effect of section 309 is to dilute director’s accountability to shareholders rather than to 
strengthen their accountability to employees. 
2. Conflict of interest and fiduciary duties 
Whether or not directors owe duties to their companies’ shareholders, they clearly owe duties 
to their company which will be relevant in the period leading up to completion of the buyout. 
Furthermore, if the buyout takes the form of a purchase of the business and assets of Target, 
rather than its shares, such duties may remain of relevance during and following completion. 
Such duties have been described as being in the nature of fiduciary duties.  
 
Under UK principles, there are four major categories of fiduciary duty.84 First directors must 
exercise their powers for a proper purpose.85 Second, the directors must not fetter their 
discretion to exercise their power. Third, they must act in good faith in what they believe to be 
the best interests of the company. Fourth, they must not place themselves in a position where 
                                                        
82 See Dawson International, supra note 62 at 243 
83 See e.g. Re Saul D. Harrison & Sons Plc [1995] 1 B.C.L.C. 14, CA, where s.309 was prayed in aid to 
undermine the shareholder petitioning under s. 459 against the board/majority shareholders of the company. There 
is nothing wrong with such use of s.309, but it means that employees will benefit from it only to the extent that 
their interests are aligned with those of the board, which will not necessarily be the case. 
84 Paul L. Davies, supra note 56 at 381. 
85 In Piercy v Mills & Co. Ltd. [1920] 1 Ch. 77, it was held that the allotment of the shares by existing directors to 
supporting shareholders to dilute the voting right of the majority shareholder was found to be improper exercise of 
power. 
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the duties of their office and their personal interests conflict.86 For management buy-outs, 
directors not only have a duty to act honestly but also have various fiduciary duties, based on 
the basic concept that they must act in the best interests of their company, and the most 
relevant of these duties is often expressed as a duty not to make a secret profit from one’s 
position.87
 
The management team will face legal conflicts of interest from the moment they start to 
consider a buy-out. All directors are bound by fiduciary duties at all times to act in good faith 
in the best interests of the company of which they are directors. It is described as the “core 
duty” of directors, because it applies to every decision which the directors take whether or not 
there is an operative conflict of interest.88 This general principle is expressed in the famous 
guiding statement of Lord Greene in Re Smith v Fawcett Ltd.: ‘[W]here the articles of a 
company confer a discretion on directors… [t]hey must exercise their decision bona fide in 
what they consider-not what a court may consider-is in the best interests of a company, and 
not for any collateral purpose.’89  
 
However, it should be noted that the duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company is a 
                                                        
86 In Regal (Hasting) Ltd. v Gulliver [1942] 1 ALL E. R. 378, the directors had to account for the profits made 
when they sold the shares of their subsidiary company to their company they were working in. 
87 Maurice Dwyer, “Legal Aspects of Management Buy-outs”, ICCLR 1995, 6(4), 129-134. 
88 Paul L. Davies, supra note 56 at 387. 
89 See Re Smith v Fawcett Ltd. [1942] Ch. 304 at 306. In this case, one of the two shareholders and directors (also 
acting as executor) refused the son of the deceased for registration of share transfer, unless the latter sold the shares 
to the former. It was held that the director had exercised the powers in the interests of the company. For early 
statements, see Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 406 (1742) (‘[B]y accepting of a trust of this sort, a person 
is obliged to execute it with fidelity and reasonable diligence’) and Re Forester Dean Coal Mining Co. (1878) 10 
Ch. D. 450. (‘Directors have sometimes been called trustees, or commercial trustees, sometimes they have been 
called managing partners; it does not matter much what you call them as long as you understand what their true 
position is, which is really that they are commercial men managing a trading concern for the benefit of themselves 
and all the other shareholders…They are bound to use fair and reasonable diligence in the management of the 
company’s affairs and to act honestly.’ 
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subjective duty, i.e. it is up to the directors not the court to identify what is in the best interests 
of a company. Even where the director has not acted as an honest person, this is not 
necessarily a demonstration of a breach of the duty of good faith. In a recent case,90 where the 
directors’ decision had caused substantial harm to the company, it was held that this was 
merely a piece of evidence against their contention that they acted in good faith rather than 
absolute proof that they had not acted so. Thus, this duty is simply to display subjective good 
faith.91  
 
Practically, management teams and ventures capitalists may point to the following factors as 
evidence that management buy-outs are in the best interest of the company. In these 
circumstances, it is hardly surprising that it is very difficult to show that the directors have 
broken their duty of good faith. First, it can be argued that the financing structure of 
management buyouts often results in a lower overall cost of capital. Second, management 
often argue that their deal is best for the company in its widest sense including the interests of 
its creditors and employees such as that they may argue a competing trade buyer of the 
business, although it might have been prepared to offer more money, would fairly quickly 
rationalize the business, close down divisions, reduce levels of business with suppliers and 
make employees redundant. On the other hand, management will argue, their deal will ensure 
the future stability of the business along existing lines and thus be in the better interests of 
creditors and employees. Third, management may hold that management buy-outs are safer 
because the businesses involved are already established in their methods and under the control 
                                                        
90 See Regentcrest Plc (in liquidation) v Cohen [2001] 2 B.C.L.C. 80. 
91 Paul L. Davies., supra note 56 at 388. 
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of experienced management. Fourth, a management buy-out may be preferable to a sale to a 
competitor of the business, both in terms of maintaining a competitive market and facilitating 
a sale without dispersing valuable commercial information amongst competitors of business 
in question, etc. Accordingly, it should be noted that, provided the directors genuinely 
consider a management buyout to be in the interests of the target, the fact that the buyout may 
also benefit them does not mean that they will be in breach of this fiduciary duty.92
 
In addition to act bona fide, directors must exercise their powers for a proper purpose. It is 
clear that, notwithstanding that directors have acted honestly for what they believe to be the 
benefit of the company, they may nevertheless be liable if they have exercised their powers 
for a purpose different from that for which the powers were conferred upon them.93 Perhaps, 
the greatest puzzle in this area is to know by which criteria the courts judge whether a 
particular purpose is proper. This is generally stated to be a matter of construction of the 
articles of association.94 Hence, the test is an objective one, even if it is applied to the 
directors’ subjective motivations.95
 
Perhaps the most relevant of the directors’ common law duties in management buyouts is the 
duty of a director not to put himself in the position where his personal interests and his duty to 
the company may conflict. Examples of this duty are that a director must not make a secret 
profit out of his position nor must he benefit from an opportunity which properly belongs to 
                                                        
92 Maurice, Dwyer, Private Equity Transactions, supra note 58 at para. 1.09. 
93 See Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Ltd [1974] A.C. 821 at 834, PC. 
94 See Re Smith, supra note 89 at 306. 
95 Paul L. Davies., supra note 56 at 386. 
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the company. Cook v. Deeks96 establishes that directors shall account for profits if they use 
their position to divert to themselves an opportunity. Regal (Hastings) Ltd v. Gulliver97 and 
Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v. Cooley98 establish that directors may have to 
account for profits even if they have acted in good faith and the company is commercially 
unable to exploit the opportunity. Fine Industrial Commodities Ltd v. Powling99 is authority 
for the proposition that directors may have to account even though the company is legally 
unable to exploit the opportunity. There are many more cases in this area illustrating particular 
aspects of this duty and a detailed consideration of them is unnecessary in the context of a 
consideration of how management who are directors should properly conduct themselves in 
the period of negotiation leading up to conclusion of their buyout.  
 
Management should not proceed with a management buy-out without prior discussion with 
and the consent of the board of directors of the Target and the vendor, otherwise they may risk 
liabilities at law. In practice, it is likely to be required by management’s financial backers. 
Accordingly, managers should notify Target’s directors and the vendor of their proposal and 
request written permission to prepare a business plan and to disclose the business plan and 
other relevant agreed information to advisors and potential investors.100
 
Provided that the principle of the buyout has been agreed with Target’s shareholders, the 
proper discharge of management’s duties in this area can usually be effected if management 
                                                        
96 See Cook v. Deeks [1916] 1 A.C. 554. 
97 See Regal (Hastings) Ltd, supra note 86. 
98 See Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v. Cooley [1972] 1 W.L.R. 443. 
99 See Fine Industrial Commodities Ltd v. Powling [1954] 71 R.P.C. 253. 
100 Niall McAlister, supra note 3. 
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provide full information to Target’s shareholders and if Target, acting independently of the 
directors (either through its shareholders or an independent board or committee) approves the 
action taken by the management directors. If these requirements are fulfilled, a director will 
be able to participate in investment opportunities and transactions belonging to the company, 
and the fact that such participation happens to occur in the context of a management buyout 
should not adversely affect management’s legal position. 
3. Duties arising out of service agreements and contractual arrangements 
Before looking to the fiduciary duties of directors under common law or statutory duties, a 
vendor may first examine the employment contracts of directors because usually, managers 
contemplating a buy-out will have service agreements or employment contracts containing 
express or implied contractual obligations.101 Thus, a director’s fiduciary duties will normally 
be supplemented in his service agreement, which will underline the director’s duty to act bona 
fide in the best interests of the company and to act for proper purpose. 
 
Most senior employees’ contracts are also likely to include “whole time and attention” clauses 
under which they are likely to have contractual obligations to spend the whole of their time 
and attention on their employer’s business and to act in its best interests.102 Clearly it will be a 
breach of such duties to be spending some of the time that he should be devoting to the 
business of his employer in meeting and discussing with potential funders of the buy-out. 
Although these duties are unlikely to preclude them from discussing a potential buy-out 
                                                        
101 Maurice Dwyer, Private Equity Transaction, supra note 58 at para. 1.31. 
102 Maurice Dwyer, “Legal Aspects of Management Buy-outs”, supra note 87. 
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during their personal time making use of their own facilities and property, preparatory activity 
may however still amount to a breach by the manager of his duty of fidelity towards his 
employer.103
 
Senior employees are also likely to have restrictive covenants which will prevent them from 
taking any action which could damage their employer’s business. This contractual duty 
prevents employees from entering into direct competition with the employer, from talking to 
customers, suppliers or other employees as to whether they would be supportive of a 
management buy-out, and from assembling a management team.104  
 
It can be seen, therefore, the act of talking to colleagues or to funders or professional advisers 
may constitute a breach of either or both of the manager’s common law or contractual 
obligations. If an employer learns of any serious breach by a director or employee of the 
duties, it can obtain an injunction from the High Court restraining the employee from 
committing further breaches. And this may entitle an employer to dismiss a manager 
summarily and without compensation and to have legal remedies against a director who take 
steps to launch a buy-out.105
 
In these circumstances, managers are often in a dilemma that they will need to obtain expert 
advice as to whether or not their buy-out is viable and need to present funders with a well 
rounded management team, which involve their talking to their colleagues. This dilemma can 
                                                        
103 Maurice Dwyer, Private Equity Transactions. supra note 58 at para. 1.32. 
104 Debbie Anthony, supra note 11 at 81.
105 Maurice Dwyer, “Legal Aspects of Management Buy-outs”, supra note 87. 
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only be overcome where the employer is amenable to the prospect of a management buy-out 
and waives its right to require compliance by the employee. If the employee keeps the 
employer informed of his proposed course of action before taking it and the employer 
consents to this action, the company will not be able to argue subsequently that the employee 
was in breach of his duties to the company.106 Therefore, it is essential for that prudent 
management shall ensure that they have squared their position with their employer before 
taking any real steps to pursue a buy-out which may potentially amount to a breach of their 
common law or contractual duties. 
4. Confidentiality provisions in service agreements and the initial approach to funders and 
advisors. 
It is, in fact, the confidentiality obligations in service agreements or employment contracts 
which can cause most difficulty to a director who wishes to plan a management buy-out. In 
many cases management may have service contracts which normally contain an express 
provision requiring them not to disclose or use confidential information belonging to the 
employer company either during the contact of employment or after its termination. This 
restriction gives the members of the buy-out team problems because these obligations will 
expressly prevent the director from providing his potential funders and outside advisers with 
the financial information on which they need to assess whether or not buy-out is feasible.107 
Breach of confidentiality obligations in service agreement can relatively easily be enforced by 
employers by way of injunction. 
                                                        
106 Debbie Anthony, supra note 11 at 81.
107 Maurice, Dwyer, Private Equity Transactions, supra note 58 at para. 1.34. 
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 In the absence of any express contractual duties, an employee will be under an implied duty 
not to use or disclose certain information confidential to the employer during the course of his 
employment and trade secrets following the termination of the employment. In the leading 
case of Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler108, the Court of Appeal determined that information 
of a highly confidential nature, such as details of a secret process, could never be divulged by 
an employee either during his employment or after its termination. The court then identified, 
as a second category, information which an employee should treat as confidential either 
because he has been expressly told that it is confidential or because, from its character, it is 
obviously confidential.  
 
However the court stated that the implied term which imposes an obligation on the employee 
as to conduct after the determination of the employment is more restricted in its scope than 
that which imposes a general duty of good faith. It is clear that the obligation not to use or 
disclose information may cover secret processes of manufacture and other information which 
is of sufficiently high degree of confidentiality as to amount to a trade secret. The obligation 
does not extend to cover all information acquired by the employee while in his employment. 
This distinction is clearly set out in Printers and Finishers Ltd v. Holloway109 that not all 
information which is given to a servant in confidence and which it would be a breach of his 
duty for him to disclose during his employment is a trade secret which he can be prevented 
from using for his own advantage after the employment is over, even though he has entered 
                                                        
108 See Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117, [1986] I.C.R. 297. 
109 See Printers and Finishers Ltd v. Holloway [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1; [1965] R.P.C. 239.  
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into no express covenant.110  
 
The more recent case of Brooks v. Olyslager OMS(UK) Ltd111 also supported the distinction 
between current and former employees. In this case, the information that a company was 
insolvent and its budgets were too optimistic was not of a sufficiently confidential nature to 
warrant protection post-termination by an implied term. The position might have been 
different had there been expression provisions in the contract. For these reason, an employer 
can usually stop the employee using or divulging such information after the termination of the 
contract if it is specifically entitled to do so by virtue of express provisions in the employment 
contract.112  
 
A company will therefore be able to restrain its directors and employees from making use of 
confidential information during the course of their contracts of employment, whether or not 
there is an express contractual stipulation regarding confidential information. 
 
However, a company can only act to protect information so long as its nature remains 
confidential. As soon as the information is in the public domain, no action for breach of 
confidence can be brought. Further, if the information is already in the possession of several 
other people, even if not available to the general public, it may nevertheless cease to be 
described as confidential.113 If a company is able to establish that certain categories of 
                                                        
110 See also E. Wousley & Co. Ltd v. Cooper [1939] 1 ALL E.R. 290. 
111 See Brooks v. Olyslager OMS(UK) Ltd [1998] I.R.L.R. 590, CA. 
112 Maurice, Dwyer, Private Equity Transactions, supra note 58 at para. 1.35. 
113 See Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd. [1969] RPC 41. In this case, the relevant company had made available 
to 43% of its shareholders certain information regarding a take-over proposal. It had also entered into confidential 
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information are confidential and can be protected, it can only seek to restrain a director or 
employee from using that information provided it can show that unauthorized use had caused 
or will cause the company some detriment114.  
 
It is common for management to make the initial approach to a prospective funder of a 
buy-out and discuss with a professional adviser for the purpose of obtaining general advice. 
They may produce to the funder and advisor copies of previously unpublished details of the 
target’s business plans, accounts, finances and other information which will undoubtedly be 
classed as confidential. As soon as the director commences discussions with potential 
financiers or other third parties and divulges information confidential to the target company, 
he is likely to be in breach not only of his general fiduciary duties to the company but also of 
his duty of confidentiality. Therefore, any director who makes use of information confidential 
to the company during the course of preparation for a buy-out will be at risk unless he has 
first obtained the prior consent of the target company to discuss the information of the 
purpose of carrying out the buy-out. Also the recipients of confidential information from any 
such director will be at risk if they have actual or constructive knowledge that the information 
is confidential. In terms of the law of confidentiality, the court has long had an equitable 
jurisdiction to restrain third parties from using information obtained in breach of 
confidence.115 Funders and advisors who use that information will be exposed to an action for 
damages if it can be show that its wrong doing caused the target loss. In order to avoid 
                                                                                                                                                               
discussion with another shareholder, disclosing similar information with a view to persuading that shareholder to 
mount a rival take-over bid. Mergarry VC decided that, in the circumstances, the company was no longer able to 
argue that the information was sufficiently confidential to prevent third parties, including its employees, from 
making use of it. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Maurice, Dwyer, Private Equity Transactions, supra note 58 at para. 1.38. 
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potentially embarrassing situation, it is advisable for them either to obtain such confidential 
information directly from the target or its owners, or at least ask management to confirm that 
Target has agreed that such information may be forwarded to them. 
5. Disclosure of directors’ interests is required at common law and under Section 317 of the 
Companies Act 1985. 
Both the common law and statute contain rules requiring directors to disclose the existence 
and nature of any personal interest which they have in a contract to which their company is a 
party.  
 
It was discussed above that the common law provides a general equitable requirement that a 
director may not have a personal interest in a contract with his company without the approval 
of the company in general meeting. Any such contract is voidable at the instance of the 
company and the director is liable to account for any profit he has gained from the transaction. 
This general rule is almost invariably relaxed by provision in the company’s articles of 
association, for example, Regulations 85, 86 and 94 to 96 of the Companies Act 1985. 
Contained in UK Statutory Instruments,116 Regulation 85 allows a director to be a party to, or 
otherwise interested in, any transaction or arrangement with the company, or in which the 
company is otherwise interested, and to be a director or other officer or employee of any body 
corporate promoted by the company or in which the company is interested, provided that he 
has disclosed to the board the nature and extent of any material interest which he has.117 
                                                        
116 The Companies (Table A to F) Regulations 1985/805 as amended by Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 
1985/1052). 
117 The Companies (Table A to F) Regulations 1985/805 as amended by Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 
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Regulation 86 provides for the director to be able to give a general notice on the board 
indicating his potential interest in any transaction involving a specified person or class of 
persons which could include Newco.118 However, Regulations 85 and 86 should not be 
confused with entirely separate procedural requirements contained in Regulation 94 
concerning the ability of directors to vote at meetings of the board or committees of the board 
on resolutions concerning matters in which they have a direct or indirect interest.119
 
The statutory requirements for disclosure of directors’ interests in transactions are contained 
in section 317 of the companies Act 1985. A director who fails to comply with section 317 is 
liable to a fine.120 It provides that it is the duty of a director of a company who is directly or 
indirectly interested in a contract or proposed contract with the company to declare the nature 
of his interest at a meeting of the directors of the company.121 The case of Guinness plc v. 
Saunders and Another122 establishes that disclosure must be to a full board meeting and not to 
a committee of the board. For this purpose “contract” includes any transaction or arrangement 
(whether or not constituting a contract) made or entered into on or after 22nd December 
1980 123  including transactions or arrangements of the kind described in section 330 
concerning prohibition of loans and quasi-loans to directors and connected persons.124
 
                                                                                                                                                               
1985/1052) Regulation 85. 
118 The Companies (Table A to F) Regulations 1985/805 as amended by Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 
1985/1052) Regulation 86. 
119 The Companies (Table A to F) Regulations 1985/805 as amended by Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 
1985/1052) Regulations 94, 95, 96. 
120 The Companies Act 1985, Section 317, Subsection (7). 
121 The Companies Act 1985, Section 317, Subsection (1). 
122 See Guinness plc v. Saunders and Anothe [1988] B.C.L.C. 43. 
123 The Companies Act 1985, Section 317, Subsection (5). 
124 The Companies Act 1985, Section 317, Subsection (6). 
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Furthermore, in the case of a proposed contract, the declaration shall be made at the meeting 
of the directors at which the question of entering into the contract is first taken into 
consideration, or if the director was not at the date of that meeting interested in the proposed 
contract, at the next meeting of the directors held after he became so interested. And in a case 
where the director becomes interested in a contract after it is made, the declaration shall be 
made at the first meeting of the directors held after he becomes so interested.125 It should be 
noted that, in the context of a management buyout, disclosure should be made at a very early 
stage. It applies to “proposed contracts” and the specific notification requirements provide for 
the declaration of interest to be made at the point at which the question of entering into the 
contract is “first taken into consideration”. 
 
This statute also provides for the requisite declaration of interest to be given by general notice. 
For example a general notice given to the directors of a company is deemed a sufficient 
declaration of interest by a director to the effect that he is a member of a specified company or 
firm and is to be regarded as interested in any contract which may, after the date of the notice, 
be made with that company or firm, or he is to be regarded as interested in any contract which 
may after the date of the notice he made with a specified person who is connected with him 
within the meaning of Section 346.126
 
Hence, as soon as the principle of a management buyout has been agreed with the target 
company or its shareholders, it is prudent for the directors in question to notify their 
                                                        
125 The Companies Act 1985, Section 317, Subsection (2). 
126 The Companies Act 1985, Section 317, Subsection (3). 
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respective interests in Newco and in any transaction with the target (or concerning Target’s 
shares) both for the purpose of Regulation 85 and Section 317.  
6. Other statutory duties.  
In addition to section 317, the avoidance of directors’ conflicts of interest is enforced by the 
system of monitoring and disclosure under sections 312 to 316 of the Companies Act 1985. 
 
Sections 312 to 314 of the Companies Act contain provisions intended to provide companies 
and shareholders with the right to approve or veto payments to directors for compensation for 
loss of office. It can be seen that Section 313 which applies on a sale of assets and Section 
314 which applies on sales of shares of the target address payments made to a director by any 
party including the vendor or the target, whereas only payments made to a director by his own 
company are caught by section 312. It shall be noted that Sections 312 to 314 do not apply to 
bona fide payments by way of damages for breach of contract or by way of pension in respect 
of past services.127
 
Section 320 of the Companies Act 1985 prohibits an arrangement for the acquisition of one or 
more non-cash assets of the requisite value from the company by a director of that company 
or its holding company or a person connected with such director, unless the arrangement is 
first approved by a resolution of the company in general meeting or if appropriate by a 
resolution in general meeting of the holding company. The most relevant connection in 
management buy-outs is that Newco is connected with a director if the director is interested in 
                                                        
127 The Companies Act 1985, Section 316, Subsection (3). 
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at least one fifth of the nominal value of the equity share of Newco or is entitled to exercise or 
control more than one fifth of the voting power at any general meeting of Newco according to 
Section 346.  
 
The application of Section 320 will depend upon the relationship between the members of the 
buy-out team at the time of transaction. If this relationship unavoidably triggers Section 320 
to apply, the requisite shareholders’ approval should be obtained. In the case of a quoted 
company buy-out, it is probable that shareholder’s consent will in any event be required by 
virture of Chapter 11 of the Listing Rules, which deals with transactions between related 
parties.  
 
Overall, it is important either to ensure that the relevant transaction does not fall within 
Section 320 or to obtain the necessary shareholder’s approval. If it is not obtained, the 
arrangement is voidable at the instance of the company. 
 
There are additional rules and guidelines arising out of the provisions of the Listing Rules of 
the Financial Services Authority, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, and the 
Institutional Shareholder Committees’ Guidelines. Some of these are dealt with in detail later 
in this Chapter.  
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II. Pricing and financing the MBOs 
1. Valuation and price 
The total finance required for a MBO will be made up of the purchase price, transaction cost, 
any funding required for capital expenditure or working capital and any bank debt taken over. 
 
To overpay for the business is the cardinal sin of management buy-outs. To do so 
dramatically increases the risk in the investment, as it becomes possible for a business to 
perform reasonably well and yet still fail to achieve a return for the investors and particularly 
managers when they wish to sell. Therefore, valuing the target and assessing an appropriate 
price is very important. 
 
Valuing any company will always involve an element of judgment in arriving at the bid price. 
Broadly there are three methods employed:128
A. Earnings based valuation 
Earnings based valuations are one of the most commonly used measures of value in financial 
circles. These valuations express value in terms of a multiple of profits, and this method can 
be broken into transaction multiples and public company comparable multiples. 
 
Transaction multiples relate to researching transactions in the target sector over several years 
in order to determine an average multiple. The post tax multiple relates to the price earnings 
                                                        
128 Debbie Anthony, supra note 11 at 19.
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ratio, although this will be at a discount to public company multiples to reflect non-liquidity 
status. 
 
Price earning ratios are defined as price divided by earnings after tax and after preference 
dividends. The calculation can be performed for a company as a whole or for each share in the 
company. Financiers tend to refer to the price for a company in the context of its most recent 
post tax profits. For example if a company that generated post tax profits of £1m was sold for 
£9m, this transaction would have been at a price earning of 9. 
 
For any company quoted on the Stock Exchange, each company has a price earnings ratio 
which determines the market capitalization of that company at a particular time; this figure 
can be easily calculated and is published daily in the Financial Times.129 For unquoted 
companies there is no regular pricing mechanism and therefore no recorded price earnings 
ratio, but this principle can also be applied. Thus one can study quoted share prices for the 
particular market sector containing the target company and obtain the current multiples. A 
quoted market price earning ratio will probably need adjusting downwards for an unquoted 
private company due to the lack of marketability of shares in a private company.  
 
Overall, the price earnings ratios paid in recent transactions and price earning ratios at which 
comparable quoted business are being traded are often used as an appropriate guide in the 
valuation exercise. 
                                                        
129 Glossary- PE ratios, online: The Center for Management Buy-out research <http://www.cmbor.org/>. 
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B. Net asset valuation 
Usually, both the price earnings ratios and net asset valuation are used to determine valuations 
in management buy-outs. Vendors are unlikely to accept less than net asset value, because it is 
this price which fits comfortably from both a psychological and an accounting viewpoint, as, 
at that price, the vendors realize the assets earned by the business to the date of sale and no 
accounting loss is recorded. 
 
This assets valuation model is based on a company being worth the value of its net assets as 
shown in the balance sheet. However, it can be argued that the value of the target is simply the 
valuation of the assets less any liabilities that it has in its balance sheet. It cannot provide a 
simple guide to the price that should be paid for several reasons. First, the balance sheet is 
usually months out of date. Second, the market value of an asset may be materially different 
from the value shown in the balance sheet. Finally, for certain businesses the value of the 
assets is no guide to the cash generating ability of the business. Nevertheless, the net asset 
value of the company can be used for setting a base price level.  
C. Discounted cash flows(DCF) 
The principle of discounted cash flow is that the value of any asset is the present value of the 
future cash flows it will generate. This method uses the cash flow projections of the business 
and the cost of capital raised to finance the deal to value the business. 
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2. Types and sources of finance 
A distinguishing characteristic of all management buy-outs is that the finance raised for the 
acquisition is based on the financial condition of the company being bought, rather than on 
the acquiring company, which is a usually simply a shell company with no business or assets 
of its own. This feature distinguishes management buy-outs from a normal corporate 
acquisition, in which the acquiring compay is a business in its own right, and is capable of 
borrowing funds or raising capital wholly or partly on the basis of its own financial state to 
make the acquisition. A management buy-out will usually involve the establishment of a 
Newco, which will be funded by both debt and equity and which will apply the funds at its 
disposal in the acquisition of a target company or business. 
 
Broadly, the bulk of the funding will come from financial institutions in the form of equity 
and debt. Debt is usually provided by specialized acquisition finance units of UK clearing 
banks or investment banks, while equity is provided by venture capital or private equity 
houses. 
 
Virtually all MBOs are financed with a combination of senior debt, subordinated debt and 
equity, other sources such as mezzanine and vendor finance may also be used. The amount of 
equity required in a transaction is determined in part by the amount of debt that can be 
borrowed. And finance for a management buy-out is conventionally provided in three or more 
layers. In terms of seniority, senior debt, subordinated debt and equity are in rank order.130 
                                                        
130 Lord Hanson, supra note 17 at para. 14.22. 
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The following describes the various components of financing in a typical MBO.  
A. Debt Finance 
Debt may include bank loans, overdrafts, and lease finance and may be long or short term, 
secured or unsecured. Unlike the equity holder who is a member of the company the provider 
of debt finance is a creditor of the business. The provider of debt finance will normally take 
security to protect his lending. There are two categories of debt finance the providers of which 
have slightly different objectives.  
i. Senior Debt  
The first category is known as senior debt. Senior debt is he highest form of debt and will 
rank for repayment ahead of other types of finance. Consequently it is the most secure form of 
debt. Providers of senior debt will require security over the company’s tangible and intangible 
assets and even, perhaps pledges of share capital of subsidiaries. Especially for large 
transactions, senior debt can effectively be secured on the cash flow of the business. 
 
Typically, 50% to 70% of an MBO’s financing takes the form of senior debt. A senior loan is 
collateralized by a first lien on the current and long-term assets of the company. Senior 
financing is generally made available from banks, although privately placed notes to 
institutional investors are also possible, or a public issue of bonds is on occasion the source of 
senior debt.  
 
One component of senior debt is a senior term loan. This is a loan based on a certain 
 58
percentage of the appraised fair market value of the land and buildings and the orderly 
liquidation value of the machinery and equipment. Such loans are further limited by the 
predictability of cash flow to service senior debt. The term for senior term debt is typically 
five to eight years. 
 
Another component of senior debt is a revolving line of credit, which is available at the option 
of the borrower for a defined period, usually one year with renewal provisions. It is loaned to 
an MBO based on a certain percentage of the appraised orderly liquidation value of the 
eligible accounts receivables and inventory. Such loans are further limited by the 
predictability of cash flow to service senior debt.131
ii. Subordinated Debt  
The second is known as subordinated debt. This type of debt may or may not be secured but 
will effectively rank behind senior debt in terms of repayment and interest payment priority. 
As a result, subordinate debt will carry a higher rate of return for a lender to compensate for 
the additional risk. For the lender of subordinate debt, profits and cash flows have to be 
sufficient to service borrowings. Sometime, mezzanine finance which will be discussed later 
takes the form of subordinate debt. 
 
Typically, 15% to 30% of the financing of an MBO is in the form of subordinated financing. 
These funds are subordinated to senior debt and generally have only second claim to the 
collateral of the company. Subordinated financing is generally made available directly from 
                                                        
131 Debbie Anthony, supra note 11 at 27-28.
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subordinated debt private and public funds and, in large transactions, directly from insurance 
companies. Alternatively, it is raised through public offerings of high-yield (“junk”) bonds to 
insurance companies, pension funds and other institutional investors. In many MBOs, 
subordinated debt is given back to the seller, comprising a portion of the purchase price.  
 
The term of such financing is typically six to 10 years, and principal payments are commonly 
deferred until after the senior debt is retired. These funds are loaned based on the amount and 
predictability of cash flow exceeding that required to service senior debt. Interest costs can be 
anywhere from 2 to 8 percentage points more than senior debt. Because subordinated debt 
usually has little collateral protection, it almost always is granted an equity kicker132 with the 
intention of providing the lender with an 18% to 27% compound annual total return over five 
years resulting from both the interest charges and equity kicker. The required return varies 
based on the risks associated with the transaction, the company, its market and its industry. 
 
So far as the debt element is concerned, in management buy-out this will be provided 
pursuant to a term loan agreement or facility between the bank and the Newco containing the 
usual terms including, in particular, positive covenants (matters which the company must do 
unless the bank consents), negative pledges (matters which the company may not do except 
with the consent of the bank) and events of default (which can trigger immediate repayment 
of the debt). The term loan agreement will also contain detailed financial covenants that must 
be adhered to. 
                                                        
132 Options or warrants to subscribe for equity at a later date. 
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B. Equity finance 
i. Equity 
Equity is essentially the term used to describe shares in a business conveying ownership of 
that business. It is normally permanent and it is the highest risk finance. The equity 
shareholder has a right to income after all other providers of finance have taken their return, 
and a right to whatever assets of the business remain after other providers of finance have 
been repaid.133  
 
Typically, 10% to 20% of the financing of an MBO is in the form of equity financing. These 
funds make up the difference in the financing requirement and the financing available in the 
form of debt. The most common source of equity finance for buy-outs is the venture capital 
market. 
 
Since equity finance carries the greatest risk and the greatest potential return, the management, 
in an MBO, usually invests in the equity of an MBO company together with a corporate 
investor or a group composed of institutional equity investors. The seller and subordinated 
lenders sometimes receive equity in the new company. An institutional investor investing in 
the equity of an MBO typically seeks a 30% to 40% compounded annual total return over five 
years, depending on the perceived risk. These returns are only projections; the investor has no 
contractual rights to such returns like a lender has concerning interest charges.  
 
                                                        
133 Debbie Anthony, supra note 11 at 26.
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On the equity side, a typical equity structure might consist of ordinary shares, preferred 
ordinary shares or preference shares. The ordinary shares will be held by the management and 
possibly also by the venture capitalist, the preferred ordinary shares and the preference shares 
will be held by the venture capitalist. The ordinary share is the pure form of equity finance. It 
ranks for dividend and repayment of capital behind every other type of finance. However, if 
the business is successful, there is the potential for ordinary shareholders to make the largest 
gains. Preference shares normally carry a fixed dividend, the preference shareholders rank 
behind providers of debt and creditors but ahead of the ordinary shareholders in terms of 
dividend and repayment of capital. The preferred ordinary shares is preferred to ordinary 
shares in the event of a winding up and participates in that it receives a dividend.134  
ii. Equity ratchet  
The rights and obligations of these different classes will vary according to the financial 
requirements of the venture capitalist. This will be the case particularly if there is to be an 
equity ratchet. An equity ratchet arrangement is designed to result in the percentage of the 
Newco’s equity represented by the management’s shares varying according to the 
performance of the buy-out vehicle after the investment is made. This is often introduced into 
pricing negotiations between the management and venture capitalists to bridge the gap 
between the management’s optimistic performance forecasts and venture capitalists’ more 
conservative projections. Venture capitalist will not allow the ratchet mechanism to limit 
totally their upside potential if the buy-out performs better than they expect but they will 
                                                        
134 Ibid. at 26.
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share the upside with the management team.135  
 
Ratchet mechanisms can take various forms and depend on the financing structure. 
Convertible redeemable preference share is quite common. These shares are held by the 
venture capitalists and all or part are redeemed if projections are achieved or partially 
achieved but converted into ordinary shares if results fall short of projections thus diluting 
management’s holding in the ordinary shares.  
 
Whilst common in the management buy-outs in 1980’s, ratchets are less common in today’s 
market place with many institutions arguing strongly that negotiations at the outset should 
conclude the level of the management’s shareholding.136
C. Mezzanine Finance 
Of the three finance layers described above, a new financing phenomenon called mezzanine 
finance, which started to be used in 1985, is the most novel in historical terms and is most 
closely identified with the subject of “leverage”. This type of finance referred to variously as 
mezzanine debt, subordinated debt, mezzanine capital or simply mezzanine is the layer of 
capital that falls in between senior debt and equity. It is often used to bridge the gap between 
the secured debt a business can support, the available equity and the purchase price. Because 
                                                        
135 For example, a company currently generating net profits of £1m is subject to an MBO. The management 
project it will generate net profits of £3m in three years’ time, but the investor believes it is likely to generate net 
profits of £2m in three years’ time. The investor requires 30% of the equity to achieve his required return based on 
net profits £2m at the end of three years. If he believed the company would make £3m net profits he would only 
require 20% of the equity. A ratchet is agreed that provides that in year 3 for every £100,000 net profit in excess of 
£2m and up to £3m, management will receive an extra 0.5% of the equity. Accordingly if they meet their target of 
£3m they will end up owning 75% of the company. In this example there is an upside limit to management’s share 
of the company. 
136 Debbie Anthony, supra note 11 at 50-52.
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of this, and because it normally ranks behind senior debt in priority of repayment, unsecured 
mezzanine debt commands a significantly higher rate of return than senior debt. Mezzanine 
finance has some of the features of both debt and equity. It is generally provided by way of a 
high interest term loan, or a debt with a lower rate of interest but may be associated with 
options or warrants to subscribe for equity at a later date (often known as an equity kicker). 
Whereas senior debt will generally be provided from conventional banks sources, mezzanine 
finance is often made available by venture capital institutions and other specialists in the 
buy-out field including pension funds, insurance companies and other institutional investors. 
Also, commercial and investment banks have also become active players in the mezzanine 
market. Through some banks choose to be in one and only one layer of finance, other banks 
will seek positions in both senior and mezzanine layers, looking to enhance an overall return 
by accepting he high risk of mezzanine.137  
 
The amount of mezzanine finance available to a buy-out team will depend on factors similar 
to the debt and equity. However, the debt provider may feel the characteristics of the 
mezzanine are too close to debt, this will be the case if the mezzanine finance carries an 
interest rate as high as or higher than the debt rate as it will cause a drain on the resources of 
the business and jeopardize the debt provider’s position even through the mezzanine may be 
legally subordinated to the senior debt. Alternatively the debt provider may require additional 
financial covenants to protect his position. 
D. Vendor Finance 
                                                        
137 Corporate Finance: Leveraged and Management Buy-outs, second ed. (London: Euromoney Publications, 
1994) at 14. 
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Vendor finance can be either in the form of deferred loans from, or shares subscribed by, the 
vendor. The vendor may well take shares alongside the management in the new entity. This 
category of finance is generally used where the vendor’s expectation of the value of the 
business is higher than that of management and the institutions backing them.138
III. MBOs concerning public companies 
A management buy-out by or from a publicly listed company raises a number of issues in 
addition to those common to other general management buy-outs. The provisions of the City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers (“City Code”), the guidelines published by the Institutional 
Shareholders’ Committee and the Listing rules of the London Stock Exchange will apply to 
the management buy-out transactions as well as the common law rules and statutory 
provisions.139 Other parts of this thesis are relevant to management buy-outs; this part 
summarises the special features of management buy-outs of listed public companies as well as 
unlisted public companies to the extent the City Code applies to such companies. 
1. MBOs under the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
In UK, all public companies and certain private companies are subject to the provisions of the 
City Code.140 If the target company in a management buy-out is a public company, its conduct 
and that of Newco and their respective managements will be subject to the City Code.141  
A. Introduction of the City Code 
                                                        
138 Debbie Anthony, supra note 11 at 53.
139 Ibid. at 98.
140 Maurice Dwyer, Management buyouts (London:Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at para. 14.01. 
141 Debbie Anthony, supra note 11 at 77.  Also see the Disclosure Table(26/5/2004) of the Takeover Panel which 
shows there are some proposed management buy-outs of listed company currently. Online: The Takeover Panel 
<http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/default.htm>. 
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The most distinctive feature of UK takeover regulation is the dominant role of self-regulatory 
institutions, particularly the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers which issues and supervises the 
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers.142 In UK, although the direct regulation of takeovers 
under the Companies Act 1985 and the common law is quite limited, the principal rules, 
procedures, and practices are prescribed by the City code and administered by the Takeover 
Panel in a highly efficient and flexible manner.143  
 
The City Code does not have the force of law, but a number of sanctions can be exercised.144 
If a material breach of the City Code occurs, the relevant person may be invited to appear 
before the Panel for a hearing. Compliance with Panel rulings is ensured in a number of 
ways.145 Also, the City Code has been endorsed by the DTI and by the London Stock 
Exchange and other regulatory bodies.146 Those who do not comply with high business 
standards and act according to the City Code may find that, by way of sanction, the facilities 
of the UK securities market are withheld.147 Therefore, the Panel remains non-statutory but it 
is clearly linked to the regulatory structure established by the Financial Services and Markets 
                                                        
142 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, Mergers and Takeovers in the US and UK: Law and Practice (New York: University of 
Oxford Express, 2004) at para. 7.01. 
143 Ibid at para. 7.02. 
144 City Code, Introduciton, para, 1(c). 
145 The City Code, online: The Takeover Panel <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/default.htm>. (“In essence, it 
derives from the fact that the organisations represented on the Panel feel bound by the Code and together comprise 
the totality of interests that constitute the domestic securities markets in the United Kingdom. In addition: 
Companies and their advisers know that the Panel can and will issue critical public statements during the course of 
a takeover bid if necessary. Shareholders are likely to treat warily documents which have been publicly criticised 
by the Panel.  
In particular, the Code has been endorsed by the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) under the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (the “FSMA”).  The effect of endorsement of the Code is that the FSA may, at the 
request of the Panel, take enforcement action against a person authorised under the FSMA who contravenes the 
Code or a Panel ruling.  Such action can include public censure, fines, the removal of authorisation, the imposition 
of injunctions and orders for restitution.  In addition, the FSA may, again at the request of the Panel, take 
enforcement action against an individual who is an “approved person” (eg. a director of an authorised firm).  
All those who deal in the securities markets are at risk, in the event of breach of Panel rulings, of being considered 
no longer “fit and proper” to be authorised under the Act to carry on investment business.” ) 
146 Ibid. 




The City Code applies to offers for all listed and unlisted public companies considered to be 
resident in UK, the Channel Island, or the Isle of Man.149 The City Code will also govern 
takeover offers for private companies considered to be resident but only when some 
requirements are satisfied.150
 
It has been recognized for some time that a management buy-out of a public company gives 
rise to particular concerns relating to conflicts of interest and the potential for management 
insiders to manipulate affairs to their advantage and to the detriment of shareholders.151 In 
October 1990, the panel introduced a number of amendments to the City Code to take account 
of the special circumstances surrounding MBOs of listed public companies152. These are 
discussed in more detail below. 
B. Specific applications of the City Code to MBO offers. 
i. Independent advice (Rule 3, Appendix 3) 
The City Code emphasizes that the need for competent advice by independent advisers is of 
paramount importance in takeover transactions.153 It expressly requires the board of directors 
                                                        
148 Takeover Panel, Annual Report on the Year ended 31 March 2003. (“It is the Panel’s practice to focus on the 
specific consequences for shareholders of rule breaches. Accordingly, the Panel's immediate priority is to provide 
appropriate redress; thereafter it will consider whether disciplinary action, if any, is necessary. If the Panel finds 
there has been a breach, it may have recourse to private reprimand, to public censure, to reporting the offender's 
conduct to another regulatory authority (for example, the Department of Trade and Industry or the Financial 
Services Authority) and to requiring further action to be taken, as it thinks fit.”) 
149 City Code, Introduction, paras. 4 (a), 4 (b). 
150 City Code, Introduction, para, 4 (a). 
151 Maurice, Dwyer, Private Equity Transactions, supra note 58 at para. 15.04. 
152 Weinberg & Blank, supra note 5 at para. 2-6010. 
153 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, supra note 142 at para. 9.31. 
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of the target company to obtain competent independent financial advice on any offer.154  
 
In an MBO transaction, the requirement to obtain competent independent advice and make the 
gist of such advice available to the shareholders reduces the likelihood that directors will act 
in their own interests and not in the best interests of the target company, or that directors will 
otherwise breach their fiduciary duties.155 Thus, the crucial role played by an independent 
adviser as a policeman is indicated in the City Code’s provision that the requirement for 
competent independent advice is of great importance in management buy-out transactions and 
other going private transactions made by the existing controlling shareholders.156
 
The City Code further states that, in the context of an MBO, it is particularly important that 
the independence of the financial adviser is beyond question and the adviser should be 
appointed as soon as possible after the board becomes aware that an offer may be made.157 
Where the existing financial adviser of he target company has had an especially close 
relationship with any member of the MBO team, a new financial adviser shall be appointed to 
advise on the merits of the offer.158
 
The responsibility of the financial adviser is therefore shared with the company’s independent 
directors. As Rule 3.2 provides that the board of an offeror must obtain competent 
independent advice on any offer when the directors are faced with a conflict of interest. The 
                                                        
154 City Code, Rule 3.1. 
155 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, supra note 142 at para. 9.34. 
156 City Code, Rule 3.1, Note 1. 
157 City Code, Rule 3.1, Note 1. 
158 Spencer Summerfield & Chiris Hale, “From Public to Private: Management Buyouts of Listed Companies” 
(1998) PLC 9(4), 1, 1998, 33-39. 
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substance of such advice must be made known to its shareholders.159  
 
In most management buy-outs cases, the independent directors of the target company shall 
retain target company’s existing advisers as their adviser under Rule 3, leaving Newco to 
choose a separate adviser of its own, because the City Code states that the Panel will not 
regard as an appropriate person to give independent advice a person who is in the same group 
as the financial or other professional adviser to an offeror or who has a significant interest or 
financial connection with either the offeror or the target company of such a kind to create a 
conflict of interest.160 It is also required that the target company’s adviser should have a 
sufficient degree of independence from the offeror to ensure that the advice given is properly 
objective; accordingly, it may not appropriate for a person who has had a recent advisory 
relationship with an offeror to give advice to the target company.161 Note 3 to Rule 3.3 draws 
attention to the fact that certain fee arrangements between an advisor and an offeree company 
may create a conflict of interest which would compromise the adviser’s independence, 
especially a fee that is paid to the adviser of a target company only in the event the offer 
fails.162
 
Section 2 of Appendix 3 to the City Code, which deals with financial advisers and conflicts of 
interests, set forth instances where a conflict of interest may arise between the financial 
adviser and the company it represents, or where the financial adviser’s independence is 
                                                        
159 City Code, Rule 3.2. 
160 City Code, Rule 3.3. 
161 City Code, Rule 3.3, Note 1. 
162 City Code, Rule 3.3, Note 3. 
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potentially compromised.163 Such conflict may arise where the adviser previously represented 
one of the parties in the transaction and in possession of material confidential information 
relating to that representation, and currently represents the other party.164 In such a case, the 
adviser may be compelled to withdraw to avoid likely conflict.165
ii. The response of the target company’s board of directors and independent committee of 
directors. (Rule 25.1, note 3 and note 4) 
Rule 25.1 of the City Code supplements Rule 3.1 by providing that the target’s board must 
circulate its views on the offer, including any alternative offers, and must make known to its 
shareholders the substance of the advice given to it by the independent advisers appointed 
pursuant to Rule 3.1.166
 
However, there is an inherent conflict of interest in any proposed MBO where some or all of 
the directors of the bidding vehicle are also directors of the target company. On the one hand, 
the bidder will wish to pay as little as possible for the target company while still obtaining the 
recommendation of the target company’s board to accept the offer. On the other hand, the 
target company’s board will wish to try to sell at the best price.167
 
Therefore, the City Code severely provides defensive measures. If the offer involves a 
management buy-out, a director will normally be regarded as having a conflict of interest 
where it is intended that he should have a continuing role (whether in an executive or 
                                                        
163 City Code, Appendix 3, Section 2.  
164 City Code, Appendix 3, Section 2. 
165 City Code, Appendix 3, Section 2. 
166 City Code, Rule 25.1. 
167 Spencer Summerfield, supra note 158. 
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non-executive capacity) in either Newco or the target if the offer is successful.168 In such 
circumstances, that director should not join with the remainder of the board in the expression 
of its views on the offer.169 Furthermore, the nature of the conflict of interest of a director 
must be clearly explained to shareholders.170 But it should be noted that this does not relieve 
the director from responsibility for the remainder of the information supplied to 
shareholders.171
 
Due to the inherent conflict, it is crucial in any contemplated MBO transaction for the target’s 
board to establish an independent committee of directors who will play a role to scrutinize the 
proposals to be made by the MBO team and to advise target shareholders on whether or not to 
accept the MBO team’s offer.172 The committee should comprise only those directors of the 
target company who are unconnected with, and independent of the MBO team. In order to be 
regarded as independent, no member of the committee should have a continuing role (whether 
in an executive or non-executive capacity) in either the bidder or the target company in the 
event of the offer being successful.173 The independent committee will initially need to decide 
whether, in principle, it is in the interests of shareholders of the target company to permit the 
MBO team to formulate an offer to be put to shareholders.174 It is also important that the 
buy-out team resist the temptation to make any kind of offer to the members of the 
independent committee which would impugn their independence.175
                                                        
168 City Code, Rule 25.1, Note 4. 
169 City Code, Rule 25.1, Note 3. 
170 City Code, Rule 25.1, Note 3. 
171 The buy-out team’s duty as directors will be discussed subsequently. 
172 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, supra note 142 at para. 10.50. 
173 City Code, Rule 25.1, Note 4. 
174 Spencer Summerfield, supra note 158. 
175 Graham Stedman, Takeovers (London: Longman Law, Tax and Fianance Longman Group UK ltd, 1993) at para. 
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iii. Equality of information to shareholders and competing bidders (Rule 20.2 and 20.3) 
It is likely that any equity or debt provider for an MBO requires legal and financial due 
diligence to be carried out on the target company.176  
 
Rule 20.2 of the City Code poses a particular problem if the management team’s offer attracts 
a competing offer.177 Under this rule, any information given to an offeror or potential offeror 
must, on request, be given equally and promptly to another offeror or bona fide potential 
offeror even the other offeror is less welcome.178 Apparently, in the case of an MBO, the 
management team may have full access to most, if not all, of the target company’s 
confidential information in their capacity as directors or senior managers of the target 
company. However, where a target company provides confidential business information or 
price sensitive material to the management team, the target company is obliged to disclose the 
same information to any other less welcome or hostile offeror or potential offeror which may 
subsequently emerge.179 Therefore, the management team will find itself in the problematic 
position where, on the one hand, it is desirable and necessary to furnish Newco and its funders 
with a complete package of information and, on the other hand, that information will thereby 
become available to a competitor. 
 
A note to the City Code 20.2 prescribes the information which must be passed to competing 
offerors in the case of management buy-out offers is only the information which is generated 
                                                                                                                                                               
21.5. 
176 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, supra note 142 at paras. 9.131-9.133. 
177 Debbie Anthony, supra note 11 at 101.
178 City Code, Rule 20.2. 
179 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, supra note 142 at para. 9.131. 
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by the target company (including the management of the target company acting in their 
capacity as such) and which is passed to external providers or potential providers of finance 
(whether equity or debt) to the offer or potential offer.180  
 
It should be noted that Note 3 refers only to information generated by the target company 
(including the management of the target company acting in their capacity as such).181 The note 
is ambiguous, since the test of whether information has been generated by the management in 
his capacity as a member of the buy-out team or as a director of the target company remains 
subjective. Management may therefore be able to circumvent this requirement by arranging 
for predictions and other key financial information to be produced by the funders based on the 
information furnished by management, rather than to be produced directly by management 
themselves.182 However, management should bear in mind that the Panel will block actions 
which it deems breach the spirit of the Code, notwithstanding that the action may comply 
technically with the rules of the City Code.183 It may therefore be prudent to consult with the 
Panel when considering what information should be disclosed, otherwise it may take a risk of 
subsequent censure. Also, it is left up to the independent directors and their advisers to 
determine and ensure fair dealing.184
 
Note 3 on Rule 20.3 continues to state the Panel’s expectation that the directors of a target 
                                                        
180 City Code, Rule 20.2, Note 3. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Maurice Dwyer, Management buyouts, supra note 140 at para. 14.05.
183 See the Takeover Panel, Annual Report on the Year Ended 31 March 2003. (“The essential characteristics of 
the Panel system are flexibility, certainty and speed, enabling parties to know where they stand under the Code in a 
timely fashion. These characteristics are important in order to avoid over-rigid rules and the risk of takeovers 
becoming delayed by litigation of a tactical nature, which may frustrate the ability of shareholders to decide the 
outcome of an offer.”) 
184 Weinberg & Blank, supra note 5 at para. 2-6015. See also the discussion of City Code, Rule 20.3 below. 
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company who are involved in a management buy-out offer shall co-operate with the 
independent directors of the target company and its advisers to collect the information which 
is provided to the management team’s debt and equity providers.185  
 
The City Code also provides that, if the offer is a management buy-out the offeror must on 
request promptly provide the independent directors of the target or its advisers with all 
information which has been furnished by the offeror to external providers or potential 
providers of finance (whether equity or debt) for the management buy-out.186 This rule is 
clearly designed to ensure that the independent directors and their financial adviser have the 
same information as the providers of finance for the offer when evaluating the merits of the 
offer relative to the value of the target company.187 It shall be noted that the information 
required to be disclosed under Rule 20.3 also includes information on the offeree company 
developed by or with the assistance of management for the purpose of the transaction. For 
instance, a business model prepared by a private equity investor will normally include the 
management team’s opinions, estimates and projections based on the team’s knowledge of the 
offeree company, and usually shall be disclosed in its entirety. Similarly, due diligence reports 
by lawyers, accountants and property consultants should be disclosed under Rule 20.3, as they 
will be derived from information supplied by the offeree company, reviewed by the 
management team for accuracy and furnished to the financiers.188
                                                        
185 City Code, Rule 20.2, Note 3. 
186 City Code, Rule 20.3. 
187 See the Takeover Panel, Annual Report for the Year Ended March 2002.  
188 The Takeover Panel, Annual Report for the Year Ended March 2002. (“The information passable pursuant to 
Rule 20.3 includes not only information generated by the offeree company but also information on the offeree 
company developed by or with the assistance of management for the purpose of the transaction. A business model, 
for instance, prepared by the private equity house will normally include the management team’s opinions, 
estimates and projections based on the team’s knowledge of the offeree company, its business and the markets in 
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 A very important distinction shall be drawn between Rules 20.2 (information to competing 
bidders) and 20.3 (information to independent directors). Information generated by the 
management of the target company acting in their capacity as members of the management 
buy-out team is not required under Rule 20.2 to be provided to competing bidders. In contrast, 
pursuant to Rule 20.3, all relevant information supplied to external debt or equity providers 
prepared by the management in their capacity as members of the management buy-out team 
shall be provided to the independent directors.189  
iv. The prohibition of special arrangements with favorable conditions. (Rule 16) 
Under the City Code, all shareholders of the same class of a target company must be treated 
similarly by Newco.190 As such, Rule 16 of the City Code provides a broad prohibition on 
arrangements involving favourable conditions that may result in the unequal treatment of 
shareholders of the target company. It shall be noted that Rule 16 will also be of particular 
relevance in management buy-out transactions, as in this situation, a venture capitalist 
investing in the equity of Newco and the members of the management team will be treated by 
the Panel as acting in concert with Newco.191 This rule states that, unless the Panel otherwise 
                                                                                                                                                               
which it operates and will accordingly be disclosable in its entirety. Similarly, due diligence reports prepared by 
professional advisers (e.g. accountans, lawyers and property consultants) are likely to be disclosable under Rule 
20.3, since they will be derived from information supplied by the offeree company, reviewed by the management 
team for accuracy and shown to the financiers.”) 
189 Spencer Summerfield, supra note 158. 
190 City Code, General Principle 1. 
191  The Takeover Panel, Annual Report on the Year Ended March 1998. (“MBOs AND SIMILAR 
TRANSACTIONS- During the course of the year, the Executive has noted a significant increase in the number of 
offers for Code companies by way of management buy-outs, management buy-ins, institutional buy-outs and other 
similar transactions. As a result, the Executive has reviewed how the Code should be applied to such transactions 
and some of the main issues are highlighted below. 
By definition, such transactions often involve incumbent management of the offeree taking an equity stake in the 
offeror bidding vehicle. If these individuals are also shareholders of the offeree, the Executive will want to ensure 
that such arrangements do not offend against the principle that all shareholders be treated similarly. The Executive 
will normally require the offeree’s adviser to state in the offer document that the terms of management’s 
participation in the offeror are fair and reasonable so far as other offeree shareholders are concerned. Independent 
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consents, Newco and any person acting in concert with the bidder may not make any 
arrangements with shareholders or deal or enter into arrangements to deal in shares of the 
target company or enter into arrangements which are not being extended to all shareholders.192  
 
In certain management buy-out transactions, venture capitalists will normally want the 
members of the management team to take the equity interest in Newco so that they share the 
risk and are properly motivated in running the new group following the transaction.193 On the 
other side, management will also be keen to have a share of the equity so that they may 
participate in future gains of the capital value of the enlarged group.194 However, the equity 
backers of Newco will not wish to extend the offer of participation in the shares of Newco to 
all of Target’s shareholders.195  Where the management are shareholders, this may mean that 
they are offered a deal which is different from that being offered to other shareholders.196 If 
this is the case, they will be a breach of the Rule 16. However, the Panel maybe prepared to 
consent to such an arrangement, if it complies with following requirement pursuant to Note 4 
                                                                                                                                                               
shareholder approval may also be required in certain circumstances. 
The Executive should be consulted at an early stage so that joint offerors (or members of the offeror concert party) 
are identified to ensure that, inter alia, appropriate disclosure on these parties is made in the offer document (for 
example, with regard to financial information on the offeror, material contracts, shareholdings and dealings). This 
is also important as dealings by such persons may have significant Code consequences, for example in relation to 
the minimum consideration which must be offered. Furthermore, in addition to the directors of the bidding vehicle, 
responsibility statements will be required from appropriate individuals from the joint offerors. 
Where outside finance is to be raised by the offeror bidding vehicle, the Executive should be consulted if 
negotiations or discussions are to be extended to include more than a very restricted number of people. The 
Executive should also be consulted in situations where the finance for the offeror is to be provided, wholly or in 
part, by an entity within the same group as the proposed financial adviser to the offeree as, inter alia, this may 
create a conflict of interest for the latter.”) 
192 City Code, Rule 16. 
193 Spencer Summerfield, supra note 158. 
194 Maurice Dwyer, Private Equity Transactions, supra note 58 at para. 15.12. 
195 Spencer Summerfield, supra note 158. 
196 The Panel commented in detail on Rule 16 note 4 in its Annual Report on the Year Ended March 2000. (“Note 
4 on Rule 16 recognises that in certain offers, for example MBOs, the services of certain of the offeree 
management need to be retained, but that management may need to be given an incentive to remain and perform in 
the form of a continuing financial involvement (usually including some form of equity participation) in the 
company. Where the management are shareholders, this may mean that they are offered a deal which is different 
from that being offered to other shareholders. Note 4 sets out the parameters which can make the difference 
acceptable, by balancing any benefits of the management’s retained interest with appropriate risks.”) 
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of Rule 16.197  
 
As a condition to consenting to any special arrangements, the Panel has, as a general rule, 
required the financial advisers under Rule 3 of the target company to confirm in the offer 
document that they consider the arrangements to be fair and reasonable in the context of the 
offer so far as other target shareholders are concerned.198 Accordingly, in a management 
buy-out, the Rule 3 adviser is required to provide two distinct views on the merits of Newco’s 
offer, a comment upon the question whether the terms of the offer are fair and reasonable, and 
the other one to tell whether the arrangements with management are fair and reasonable, in 
the context of the offer so far as the target’s shareholders are concerned.199
 
Furthermore, the Panel was previously amenable to the management team receiving different 
arrangements from the remaining shareholders provided that the value attributed to each of 
their shares in the target company is no higher than that attributed to the shares of the other 
target shareholders.200 However, recent changes to the City Code states, where the offeror and 
the management together own more than 5% of the offeree company’s equity shares, the 
Panel can also require the special arrangements to be approved at a general meeting of the 
target’s shareholders, at which only the independent shareholders can vote and at which a poll 
                                                        
197 The Takeover Panel, Annual Report on the Year Ended March 2000. (“The Executive was asked by the Panel to 
consider whether all arrangements coming within Note 4 should, as a condition of any Panel consent to such 
arrangements, normally be subject to approval by independent shareholders (in addition to the normal requirement 
of a fair and reasonable opinion from the Rule 3 adviser). Following a review, including a consultation exercise 
with practitioners and Panel members, the Panel decided that, in applying Note 4, a vote of independent 
shareholders should normally be required if the participating management and the offeror together hold more than 
5% of the offeree.”) 
198 City Code, Rule 16, Note 4.  
199 Maurice Dwyer, Private Equity Transactions, supra note 58 at para. 15.12. 
200 Ibid. 
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must be taken.201 So the Panel will normally require Newco to pursue shareholder’s approval 
in a general meeting to the equity participation and other arrangements being offered to the 
management team and, in those circumstances, the management team shall not themselves 
vote at the meeting.202
 
Moreover, the Panel is concerned to ensure that the members of the management buy-out 
team take the risks as well as the rewards associated with their new shareholding in Newco.203 
For example, the Panel will not normally find acceptable an option arrangement which 
guarantees the original offer price.204 As such, the Panel is unlikely to accept such provisions 
in management team’s new service agreements or in the Articles of Association for Newco 
which guarantee the management team’s right to subscribe for equity shares in Newco at a 
modest fixed price in the future, or there are provisions which entitle the management team to 
require Newco to purchase their shares back at a fixed price in the future.205
 
The problems caused by Rule 16 are avoided if no members of the MBO teams own any 
shares in the target company. However, even if Rule 16 does not apply, particulars of any 
special arrangements or understanding (including any compensation arrangement) existing 
between the offeror or any person acting in concert with it and any member of the MBO team 
who is also a director of the target company may need to be disclosed.206 For example, the 
offer document must contain the full summary of the proposed special arrangements for the 
                                                        
201 City Code, Rule 16, Note 4. 
202 Maurice Dwyer, Private Equity Transactions, supra note 58 at para. 15.12. 
203 City Code, Rule 16, Note 4. 
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management team, including details of terms for their investments in Newco and a summary 
of any new service contracts for them.207 As such, attention should be paid to the provisions of 
Sections 312,314 and 315 of Companies Act 1985 regarding the disclosure of, and possible 
requirement for prior shareholder approval of, payments made to the management team by 
Newco in consideration for their resignation as directors of the target company.208 It would 
not be possible for target itself to fund such termination payments, since such payments 
would contravene the prohibition on financial assistance pursuant to Section 151 of the 
Companies Act 1985.209
v. The buy-out team’s duties as directors. (Rule 19, Appendix 3) 
If a director of the target company is also part of the MBO team, he does not necessarily have 
to resign from the target’s board, but other than a fiduciary duty to continue to act in the best 
interests of the target company not those of Newco, he should have regard to the following: 
 
Any information obtained by him in his capacity as such should be disclosed to the 
independent directors.210 For instance, approaches from potential competing offerors or 
information pertinent to the offer would be caught by this requirement.211
 
As I mentioned above, the appointment of a committee of independent directors does not 
relieve the buy-out directors of their fiduciary duties or their duties to the target under the City 
                                                        
207 Maurice Dwyer, Private Equity Transactions, supra note 58 at para. 15.12. 
208 See Chapter 4 I Director’s duties at Common Law and other statute rules, above, for more discussion on this 
topic. 
209 See Chapter 4 IV Financial Assistance and MBO under Section 151 of the Companies Act 1985, below, for 
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Code.212 In particular, they still owe their duties to presume responsibility for documents 
issued to shareholders of the target and to ensure the accuracy of such documents.213
 
Where a director has a conflict of interest, he should not normally join the remainder of the 
board in expressing its views on the offer.214 The nature of the conflict should be clearly 
explained to shareholders. 215  Even though the actual recommendation to the target 
shareholders whether or not to accept the offer will come only from the independent 
committee of the target board, the other directors will still have to take responsibility for the 
other information contained in any circular or advertisement issued by the target company in 
connection with the offer.216 Depending on the circumstances, such a director may have to 
make the responsibility statement required by Rule 19.2, appropriately amended to make it 
clear he does not accept responsibility for the views of the board on the offer.217
 
The code also states that where the offeror is controlled, directly or indirectly, by another 
person or group, other persons (for example, directors of the ultimate parent company) will 
also usually need to give a responsibility statement.218
 
The guidance note on directors’ responsibilities and conflicts of interest is set out in Appendix 
3 to the Code.219
                                                        
212 City Code, Rule 19.2. 
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vi. Concert parties 
In the MBO of a publicly listed company, it is very important to establish who will be treated 
as acting in concert with the offeror, not only because of certain disclosures relating to concert 
parties made in the offer document, but also because of the general application of Rule 4.2,220 
Rule 5,221 Rule 6,222 Rule 9223 and Rule 11224 of the City Code. 
 
In a takeover transaction involving an MBO, the venture capitalist funding the MBO will be 
treated by the Panel as acting in concert with the Newco and the management team.225 The 
senior debt lender as a clearing bank which provides a loan facility to Newco will not 
normally be treated as automatically acting in concert with Newco. However, the Panel has 
previously ruled that a bank which was to receive warrants to subscribe for shares in Newco 
or convertible loans as part of the terms of its facility agreement would be so treated, 
therefore, the Panel ought to be consulted.226 It is not unusual for a mezzanine lender to 
receive warrants on an MBO. If this is the case, the Panel should be consulted to determine 
whether the mezzanine lender will be deemed to be acting in concert with the Newco.227 
Finally, the relatives of the management team will normally automatically be presumed by the 
Panel to be acting in concert with Newco.228
                                                        
220 Rule 4.2 regulates the selling of shares in Target during the offer period. 
221 Rule 5 provides timing restrictions on acquisitions. 
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2. Management bidders for a listed target should also have regard to guidelines published by 
the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee Guidelines. 
In addition to the requirements of the City Code, management bidders for a listed target 
should also comply with the guidelines published by the Institutional Shareholders’ 
Committee (“ISC”).229 The ISC, representing the interests of pension funds, insurance offices, 
unit trusts, investment trust companies and the asset management arms of merchant banks and 
securities house230, has worked closely with the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. Although it 
is obvious that the ISC guidelines do not have force of law, failure to comply with the 
guidelines may have an adverse effect on management’s future relations with the City and the 
prospects of the offer succeeding, as with the City Code.231
 
In December 1989 ISC issued a more detailed Guidance Note to those involved in 
management buy-outs.232 In April 1991, ISC published a statement of the role and duties of 
directors including guidelines on management buy-outs.233 The guidelines deal with several 
key areas of concern: 
A. Independent non-executive directors 
The ISC favours the presence of independent non-executive directors on boards of quoted 
                                                        
229 Maurice Dwyer, Management buyouts, supra note 140 at para. 14.06.
230 In 1991 the members of the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee were: the Association of British Insurers; the 
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companies.234 The content of the guideline is: “A management buy-out proposal is unlikely to 
be favourably received unless it is made by the executives of a company on the board of 
which there is, and has been for some time, a strong independent, non-executive presence.”235  
B. Independent advisers 
The ISC’s view is that in the event of an management buy-out proposals, it is not appropriate 
for a management team to employ the professional advisors who have previously been 
employed by the target company, unless independent non-executive directors advise that the 
interests of shareholders would not be adversely effected by such an arrangement between the 
management team and the advisors or virtually might be better protected by the appointment 
of new advisors.236 Bidders should not have access to the company's usual professional 
advisers, since this would aggravate the conflict of interest.237
C. Recommendation 
In line with the guidelines, it is most unlikely that a management buy-outs proposal would 
receive a sympathetic response unless they were supported and recommended by those 
independent non-executive directors of the target company.238
D. Holders of debentures and loan stock and other bonds 
                                                        
234 ISC Guidelines on Management Buy-outs December, 1989, 3.1, online: IVIS Institutional Voting Information 
Service <http://www.ivis.co.uk/pages/gdsc6_4.html>. 
235 ISC Guidelines on Management Buy-outs December, 1989, 3.1.1, online: IVIS Institutional Voting Information 
Service <http://www.ivis.co.uk/pages/gdsc6_4.html>. 
236 ISC Guidelines on Management Buy-outs, December 1989. 3.2.1, online: IVIS Institutional Voting Information 
Service <http://www.ivis.co.uk/pages/gdsc6_4.html>. 
237 ISC Guidelines on The Role and Duties of Directors April 1991, 10.2(c), online: IVIS Institutional Voting 
Information Service < http://www.ivis.co.uk/pages/gdsc6_1.html>. 
238 ISC Guidelines on Management Buy-outs, December 1989. 3.3.1, online: IVIS Institutional Voting Information 
Service <http://www.ivis.co.uk/pages/gdsc6_4.html>. 
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A proposal for a management buy-out should take account of the concerns of holders of any 
debentures, loan stocks and other bonds, and management should state at the same time as the 
announcement of the terms of their offers, their intentions with regards to such stocks and 
clarify any consequential changes in asset or income cover, if the debentures, loan stock and 
other bonds are to remain in issue.239
E. Sufficient Information disclosure 
The directors of a target company must use their best endeavours to ensure that there is made 
available to shareholders sufficient information to enable them properly to assess the value of 
the company or other assets which it is proposed to sell.240
F. Separate Committee. 
According to the guidelines, the board of a target company should appoint a separate 
committee consisting wholly or mainly of non-executive directors with direct access to 
independent advisers. Independent advisers should have access to all information necessary to 
enable them to give a fully informed opinion as to the merits of the offer. The committee 
should be responsible for a separate statement to shareholders, giving the views both of itself 
and of the independent advisers on the bid.241
                                                        
239 ISC Guidelines on Management Buy-outs, December 1989. 3.4, 3.4.1, online: IVIS Institutional Voting 
Information Service <http://www.ivis.co.uk/pages/gdsc6_4.html>. 
240 ISC Guidelines on The Role and Duties of Directors April 1991, 10.2(a), online: IVIS Institutional Voting 
Information Service < http://www.ivis.co.uk/pages/gdsc6_1.html>. 
241 ISC Guidelines on The Role and Duties of Directors April 1991, 10.2(b), online: IVIS Institutional Voting 
Information Service < http://www.ivis.co.uk/pages/gdsc6_1.html>. 
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3. A MBO of a listed company may also be governed by the relevant provisions of Listing 
Rules of the London Stock Exchange 
A Management buy-out of a listed company or a subsidiary of a listed company may also be 
governed by the provision of the Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange.  
 
The main significance of the current Listing Rule is that management buy-outs of listed 
companies are classified by Chapter 11 as “Transactions with Related Parties”. This chapter 
provides certain safeguards against current or recent directors taking advantage of their 
position. Where any transaction is proposed between a listed company or any of its 
subsidiaries and a related party, a circular and the prior approval of the company in general 
meeting will generally be required. And the related party should not be permitted to vote at 
the meeting. It makes clear that a director and shadow director of not only the listed target 
company but also any of its subsidiaries and an associate of such director will constitute a 
“Related Party” for the purpose of deciding whether shareholders’ approval is required.242  
 
A management buy-out is highly unlikely to be a transaction between Target and the director 
himself, it will be between Target and Newco. However, the director and his colleagues are 
likely to have an equity shareholding in Newco. According to the definition of “associate”243, 
where directors of the target or any of its subsidiaries will hold 30 percent or more of the 
voting share capital of Newco on completion of the management buy-out, the management 
buy-out will be a related party transaction unless it falls within the scope of certain exceptions 
                                                        
242 The Listing Rules, Chapter 11, Paragraph 11.1(b). 
243 The Listing Rules, Chapter 11, Paragraph 11.1(d)(iii). 
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from the requirements for “small” transactions clarified by Chapter 11.244 Therefore, the target 
will be required to make any announcement including information specified in para.10.31, 
details of the related party and the nature and extent of the interest of the related party, to send 
a circular to shareholders of such information, to obtain the approval of shareholders, and to 
ensure that both the related party and its associates abstain from voting on the resolution to 
approve the transaction.245
IV. Financial Assistance and MBOs under Section 151 of the Companies Act 1985 
1. Introduction 
A. Background 
Because of the leveraged nature of the management buy-out transactions, the provisions of 
section 151 of the Companies Act 1985 which prohibits the giving of financial assistance by a 
company for the acquisition of its own shares have particular relevance to MBOs.246 The 
principal objective of these provisions is to prevent the abuses which may likely arise where a 
purchaser relies on the funds of a company to finance the acquisition of the control of the 
company in circumstances where he is not able to provide the funds necessary to acquire the 
control of the company either from his own resources or by borrowing on his own credit.247 
Thus, these provisions are designed to prevent a company from providing financial assistance 
for the purchase of its own shares and thereby to protect the company’s creditors against 
shareholders realizing the assets of the company ahead of creditors. 
                                                        
244 The Listing Rules, Chapter 11, Paragraph 11.7, 11.8. 
245 The Listing Rules, Chapter 11, Paragraph 11.4. 
246 Weinberg & Blank, supra note 5 at para. 2-6006. 
247 Ibid. at para. 2-7002. 
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 The provision of financial assistance is most likely to come sharply into focus in the context 
of a management buy-out when the offeror has few assets of its own but intends to pay for the 
bid by borrowings which will be serviced and/or secured by the money and assets of the target. 
Notwithstanding the new readiness of lenders to rely on cash flow rather than assets as 
security for their lending, lenders will frequently seek a charge over the assets of a company 
subject to an MBO.248 If the bid is financed by equity then this is less of a problem, but if 
offeror is to borrow money to acquire the shares in the target, it is likely that the lenders will 
want security not only over the shares in the target, but also over the underlying assets of the 
target and its subsidiaries. In addition, the lenders will wish to ensure that there is a 
mechanism in place for cash generated by the target to be used to repay the borrowings of the 
offeror.249
 
To obtain the funding for the MBO, it may be necessary for the target company to charge all 
or some of its assets in favour of the lenders to the MBO vehicle. In entering into such 
arrangements it is important that the target company and its directors do not contravene the 
prohibitions on financial assistance provisions contained in the Companies Act 1985, and 
such arrangements would not give rise to both civil liability and criminal penalties for the 
target company and its directors. 
B. History 
                                                        
248 Ibid. at para. 2-6006. 
249 Graham Stedman, supra note 175 at para. 21.6.2. 
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It is often said that the relaxation of the rules prohibiting companies from providing financial 
assistance in connecting with purchases of their own shares in 1981 opened the door for the 
development of management buy-outs in UK. 
 
Historically, the prohibition on the giving of financial assistance derives from the “capital 
maintenance doctrine” in Trevor v. Whitworth.250 As with the restrictions on the ability of a 
company to repurchase its own shares, the prohibition on financial assistance is intended to 
prevent the improper return of capital to the company’s shareholders. It is supposed to provide 
some assurance that the company’s assets will not be unlawfully depleted to the detriment of 
creditors and minority shareholders.251
 
The potential for abuses from improper financial assistance was early recognized and 
legislative prohibition was recommended in the Greene Committee Report in 1926.252 As a 
consequence of the finding of the Committee in this regard, a section was introduced in 
Section 45 of the Companies Act 1929 to curb these abuses. Subsequent revisions were set 
forth in Section 54 of the Companies Act 1948.253 The purpose of the law was to protect 
creditors and shareholders against an unauthorized reduction of capital and to prevent the 
                                                        
250 Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) 12 App. Cas. 409 (HL). In this case, persons lending money or granting credit to a 
company are entitled to rely upon the existence of the issued capital of the company (subject to business losses) as 
a cushion against the possibility of the company being unable to repay its debts. 
251 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, supra note 142 at para. 7.89. 
252 See Report of the Company Law Amendment Committee, Cmnd 2657 (1926), at para. 30. The Greene 
Committee Report described the following situation: “A practice has made its appearance in recent years which we 
consider to be highly improper. A syndicate agrees to purchase from the existing shareholders sufficient shares to 
control a company, the purchase money is provided by a temporary loan from a bank for a day or two, the 
syndicate’s nominees are appointed directors in place of the old board and immediately proceed to lend to the 
syndicate out of the company’s funds (often without security) the money required to pay off the bank. Thus, in 
effect the company provides money for the purchase of its own shares. This is a typical example although there are, 
of course many variations. Such an arrangement appears to us to offend against the spirit if not the letter of the law 
which prohibits company from trafficking in its own shares and the practice open to the gravest abuses.” 
253 Paul L. Davies, supra note 56 at 259-261. 
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acquisition of companies with the use of the company’s own funds.254
 
The relaxation of the law relating to the provision of financial assistance by companies for the 
purpose of the acquisition of their own shares in Sections 42-44 of the Companies Act 1981 is 
said to have provided significant stimulus to the development of management buy-outs.255 
These sections introduced substantial relaxations on what was previously a comprehensive 
prohibition on companies providing financial assistance in connection with acquisitions of 
their shares or their holding company’s shares. 
 
The current legislation is now to be found in Chapter VI of Part V (Sections 151 to 158) of the 
Companies Act 1985. The principal objective of the financial assistance provisions is to 
prevent the depletion of a company's capital where such depletion is likely to be contrary to 
the interests of the company, its shareholders or its creditors. 
 
The new legislation relaxed the law set forth in and developed from Section 54 of the 
Companies Act 1948 in three significant ways. First, it contains a definition of financial 
assistance, now to be found in Section 152 of the Companies Act 1985. Secondly, the 
prohibition against financial assistance will not be breached by a transaction under Section 
153 of the Companies Act 1985. Section 153 establishes various exceptions to the general 
prohibition - including the “principal” and “larger” purpose exceptions. Thirdly, there is a 
general relaxation of the prohibition for private companies provided that they comply with 
                                                        
254 Debbie Anthony, supra note 11 at 110.
255 Ibid. 
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Sections 155 to 158 of the Companies Act 1985. Sections 155 to 158 relax the prohibition for 
private companies where the company's net assets are not reduced or the assistance is given 
out of distributable profits, and the “whitewash” procedure set out in those sections is 
followed.256
C. Reform of Sections 151 to 158 
In 1993, the Department of Trade and Industry(DTI) published a consultation document on 
reform of the law in relation to financial assistance in s.151 of the Companies Act 1985, 
which said that the provision had been criticised “as being uncertain in scope and liable to 
prohibit some transactions which may be innocent or in the interest of the company”.257 That 
consultation followed the House of Lords case of Brady v Brady(see below),258 which gave a 
very narrow interpretation to one of the key exemptions to the prohibition, namely where 
there is another principal or larger purpose to the transaction. More than ten years on, the 
proposals for reform have made no progress and another group of cases, in particular the 
Court of Appeal decision in Chaston v SWP Group Plc259 have increased the level of 
uncertainty for companies and their advisers. 
 
Section 151 must be one of the most scrutinized sections in the Companies Act. Breach is a 
criminal offence and can result in personal liability in damages for the directors of the 
company. As the Chaston case shows, breach of s.151 is a breach of fiduciary duty even if the 
                                                        
256 Richard Barham, “Financial Assistance: Proposals for Reform” (1994), ICCLR 1994, 5(2), 39-42. 
257 Company Law Review: Proposals for Reform of ss.151 - 158 of the Companies Act 1985, October 1993. 
258 Brady v. Brady [1989] AC 755 (HL). 
259 Chaston v SWP Group Plc [2002] EWCA Civ 1999. [2003] B.C.C. 140 (CA). 
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directors genuinely believed that they were acting in the best interests of the company. It is 
also noted from recent cases that liquidators and counter-parties on transactions will have no 
hesitation in seeking to rely on s.151 if things subsequently go wrong. 
 
The latest cases all require those advising on the section to look at the commercial substance 
of the particular transaction but the consequence of this is, according to the Court of Appeal in 
MT Realisations Ltd (In Liquidation) v Digital Equipment Co Ltd,260 that “the authorities 
provide useful illustrations of the variety of fact situations in which the issue can arise, but it 
is rare to find an authority on s.151 which requires a particular result to be reached on 
different facts”. This is not likely to bring any comfort to a corporate lawyer trying to give 
definitive advice to a client on whether a particular course of action could be in breach of 
s.151. A “may be” answer is not sufficient. The result is significant additional cost for 
companies in legal advice and in restructuring transactions to try to avoid the financial 
assistance problem arising.261
 
Thus, the provisions are under review in company law reform processes by the DTI as a result 
of the uncertain application of various provisions and after the doubts raised by the decision 
of the House of Lords in Brady v. Brady.262 The DTI acknowledged that the current 
provisions have proven to be notoriously difficult to interpret and made proposals for the 
further relaxation of the provisions to clarify and simplify the law. The DTI produced its first 
proposals for reform, comprising a single scheme for public and private companies in October 
                                                        
260 MT Realisations Ltd (In Liquidation) v Digital Equipment Co Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 494. 
261 Carol Shutkever, “Financial Assistance” (2004), Comp. Law. 2004, 25(2), 34. 
262 Brady, supra note 258. See also Chaston, supra note 259. 
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1993,263 but in their own words, it became clear that their suggested draft legislation “ran a 
serious risk of producing a result even more complex, and obscure, than the present 
legislation”. The DTI has, therefore, tried again,264 this time proposing separate schemes for 
public and private companies,265 And DTI produced a further proposal document taking into 
account responses received, in April 1997.266  
 
The failure to make any progress in reforming the law on financial assistance is an example of 
one of the unfortunate side effects of the proposed overhaul of company law first announced 
by the DTI in 1998.267 This is that the specific areas of law previously identified as being ripe 
for reform, and the subject of various DTI and Law Commission reform papers, have all now 
been bundled into the over-arching review process, rather than being progressed as separate 
reform proposals. This was well and good when the new Companies Bill to replace the 1985 
Act was announced on its original time track.  
 
The Company Law Review Steering Group268 set up to start the process of the company law 
review, recommended that the prohibition of financial assistance should be removed from 
private companies entirely. In relation to public companies, any reform of sections 151 to 158 
is limited by the need for the United Kingdom to comply with Article 23 of the Second 
                                                        
263 DTI's Consultative Document on proposals for reform of sections 151 to 158 Companies Act 1985: financial 
assistance by a company for the purchase of its own shares.(B.J.I.B. & F.L. 1993, 8(11), 566-567). 
264 Company Law Reform: Financial Assistance by a Company for the Acquisition of its Own shares ( DTI 
November 21, 1996) 
265 Jennifer Payne, “Financial Assistance for the acquisition of shares” (1997), COMPLAW 1997, 18(6), 186-187. 
266 Company Law Reform: Financial Assistance by a Company for the Acquisition of its Own shares (DTI, April 
21, 1997). 
267 Carol Shutkever, supra note 261. 
268 The Steering Group was formed of those with particular knowledge and expertise in company law matters to 
over see the management of the Review of company law. 
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Company Law Directive of the European Union269. This does not however prevent an 
overhaul of the wording itself to clarify its application.270
 
In July 2003 the Government announced its plan to change company law. Part of the reform 
relates to capital maintenance, which includes proposals for reforming the financial assistance 
legislation. The Government welcomes the Review’s proposals to simplify this capital 
maintenance regime, particularly for private companies and to make it more accessible and 
easy to use. The major recommendations were the removal of the prohibition on the giving by 
private companies of financial assistance for the acquisition of their own shares and the 
revision of some of the existing exemptions from the prohibition on financial assistance, and 
the introduction of new exemptions.271 The Government intends to consult on clauses 
implementing such financial assistance recommendations in due course. 
2. The general prohibition and applicability to MBOs 
As discussed above, in applying Section 151, it is important to note the different treatment 
given to public companies, as opposed to private companies. Sections 151 and 152 apply to 
both public and private companies for the acquisition of their own shares, but subject to a 
relaxation in relation to private companies if they comply with sections 153 to 158.  
A. Section 151- the general prohibition 
                                                        
269 77/91: [1977] O.J. L26/1. The wording of Article 23 of the Second Company Law Directive, which applies to 
public companies only, approaches the question of capital maintenance in a less detailed way. Article 23 provides 
that a company may not advance funds nor make loans, nor provide security with a view to the acquisition of its 
shares by a third party. 
270 Carol Shutkever, supra note 261. 
271 White Paper 'Modernising Company Law' (Cm 5553) published on 16 July 2002. For full text please see online: 
< http://www.dti.gov.uk/companiesbill/whitepaper.htm>. 
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Section 151 of the Act is often regarded as an extension of the protection given to 
shareholders and creditors against erosion of the company’s capital. It provides that it is 
unlawful for a company, or any of its subsidiaries, to give financial assistance, whether 
directly or indirectly, to enable a person to acquire shares in the company or to reduce or 
discharge a liability incurred in the purchase of such shares. The prohibition applies 
regardless of whether the financial assistance is given directly by the company to the purchase 
of its shares, or is first given to another party which in turn transfers the financial assistance to 
the ultimate purchases.272
 
Compared with earlier legislation, Section 151 draws a distinction between financial 
assistance given before the purchase of the company’s share and financial assistance given 
afterwards. Subject to the applicable exception, under Section 151(1), “where a person is 
acquiring or is proposing to acquire shares in a company, it is not lawful for the company or 
any of its subsidiaries to give financial assistance directly or indirectly for the purpose of that 
acquisition before or at the same time as the acquisition takes place.” Section 151(2) provides 
that subject to the same exception, when a person has acquired shares in a company and any 
liability has been incurred (by him or any other person) for that purpose, it is not lawful for 
the company or any of its subsidiaries to give financial assistance directly or indirectly, for the 
purpose of reducing or discharging that liability. 
 
A company acting in contravention of Section 151 is liable to a fine and its defaulting officers 
                                                        
272 Charterhouse Investment Trust v. Tempest Diesels Ltd. [1986] B.C.L.C. 1. 
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to imprisonment or a fine, or both.273 However the prohibitions do not deal with the 
consequences of a breach of section 151 with regard to the validity of the transactions in 
question. In management buy-outs one of the most significant consequences will be that any 
guarantees, charges or debentures given to funding banks will be unenforceable by them if 
given in breach of the prohibitions.274
 
It should be noted that Section 151 does not prohibit a foreign subsidiary from giving 
financial assistance for the purchase of shares in a UK parent company.275
B. The meaning of financial assistance in Section 152 and the applicability of Section 151 to 
MBOs. 
So what types of “financial assistance” within the meaning of Section 151 can be involved in 
management buy-outs? Section 152(a) provides a relatively broad description of “financial 
assistance” for purpose of Section 151. In addition to such obvious assistance as gifts, loans, 
guarantees, releases, waivers and indemnities (other than an indemnity in respect of the 
indemnifier’s own neglect or default), financial assistance includes any loans, or other 
agreement under which the obligations of another party to the agreement, and the novation of 
a loan or of such other agreement, or the assignment of rights under it.276 Also it includes any 
other financial assistance given by the company the net assets of which are thereby reduced or 
which has no net assets.277 However it does not provide the definition of what amounts to a 
                                                        
273 Section 151(3) of the Companies Act 1985. 
274 Heald v. O’Connor [1971] 1 W.L.R. 497. 
275 Arab Bank v. Mercantile Holdings [1994] 1 B.C.L.C. 330. 
276 Section 152(a)(i)(ii)(iii) of the Companies Act 1985. 
277 Section 152(a)(iv) of the Companies Act 1985. 
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material reduction of net assets in the context. This point was discussed in Parlett v. Guppys 
(Bridport) Ltd,278 where Nourse L.J. stated that “there can be no rule of thumb in such a 
matter and that the question is one of degree to be answered on the facts of the particular 
case.”279
 
The legislation lists a number of specific examples, but it is obvious that the list is not 
exhaustive. The reasoning of Hoffman J. in Charterhouse Investment Trust v. Tempest Diesels 
Ltd280 was considered by Arden J. in the recent case Robert Chaston v. SWP Group PLC,281 
and the Court stated that “the question whether financial assistance exists in any given case 
may be fact-sensitive and not one which can be answered simply by applying a legal 
definition.  
 
As the precise scope of the prohibition has been a matter of uncertainty for practitioners in 
management buy-outs, the most common example of financial assistance to be found in 
management buy-outs are as follows according to Section 151.282
 
The provision by the target or its subsidiaries of guarantees and charges in favour of to the 
Newco’s lenders to funding the buy-out of the borrowing obligations of Newco incurred for 
the purpose of funding the acquisition of target’s shares falls within Section 151(1)(a)(ii). 
                                                        
278 Parlett v. Guppy (Bridport) Ltd. [1996] 2 B.C.L.C. 34. 
279 Lucy Lambert, “The Meaning of “Financial Assistance” in S.151.” Case Comment on Parlett v. Guppy 
(Bridport) Ltd, COMPLAW 1997, 18(8), 272.  
280 Hoffman J. stated that because “the words have no technical meaning” it was important to construe them in the 
context of “the language of ordinary commerce” and adopt a pragmatic approach in determining what transactions 
amounted to giving “financial assistance”. 
281 Chaston, supra note 259. 
282 Graham Stedman, supra note 175 at para. 21.6.3. 
 96
 The provision of a loan by a target to Newco to enable it to meet the purchase price (financial 
assistance before transactions) or to help to discharge borrowing incurred by Newco and used 
to pay the purchase price (financial assistance after transactions) in both cases falls within 
Section 151(1)(a)(iii). 
 
The repayment by target or one of its subsidiaries of an intra-group loan owed to the vendor 
as part of the arrangements being put in place before completion of buy-out will fall within 
Section 151(1)(a)(iv), if the repayment were materially reduce the net assets of repaying 
company or were make earlier that its due date.283
 
The “hive up” of the target’s business and assets to Newco following the transaction falls 
within Section 151(1)(a)(iii), where it is often done at market value but with the consideration 
for the transfer payable by Newco to Target left outstanding as a loan owing by Newco. 
 
It is sometimes arguable that the payment of the legal, accountancy and other professional 
fees incurred in connection with the buy-out to be paid by Newco would not constitute 
financial assistance. The reasoning here is that the payment of fees is not for the purpose of 
the subscription for shares and is not sufficiently closely connected to provide financial 
assistance for the subscribers to pay subscription monies. Reliance might also be place upon 
on the “principle purpose” exemption contained in Section 153 as below. The DTI has 
                                                        
283 Plaut v Steiner (1988) 5 B.C.C. 352. See also British & Commonwealth Holding Plc v. Barclays Bank Plc 
[1996] 1 W.L.R. 1, CA. 
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proposed reforms which would make an exemption available for legitimate costs connected 
with the issue and transfer of shares so as to remove the uncertainty in this area.284
3. Exemptions to Section 151 and applicability to management buy-outs 
There are four categories of exemption contained in the Companies Act 1985. The first two 
apply equally both to public and private companies; the third one applies to both but with 
more limitations for public companies; and the fourth applies to private companies only. 
These are considered below.285
A. First category: “Principal purpose” exception 
Section 153 provides specific exceptions to the prohibition under Sections 151(1) and (2). In 
general, financial assistance will be permissible where it is given both in good faith in the 
interests of the company and the company’s “principal purpose” is not for the acquisition of 
its own shares, nor to reduce or discharge a liability incurred by the purchaser.286 The 
“principle purpose” exception is intended to ensure that legitimate business transactions do 
not inadvertently breach Section 151.  
 
Although the question of what a company’s “purpose” in giving assistance is appears to be a 
subjective test, the court in Brady v. Brady287 decided, on a narrow interpretation of “purpose”, 
                                                        
284 White Paper “Modernising Company Law” (Cm 5553) published on 16 July 2002. For full text please see 
online: < http://www.dti.gov.uk/companiesbill/whitepaper.htm>. 
285 Graham Stedman, supra note 175 at para. 22.1.5. 
286 Sections 153(1), 153(2)) of the Companies Act 1985. 
287 In Brady, two brothers, Bob and Jack , carried on various businesses under the umbrella of Brady Ltd. 
including a haulage business and a drink business. After an irreconcilable argument, they agreed to divide the 
business and its assets equally between them. An agreement was drafted to memorialize those intentions, but this 
was later effused by Bob who alleged that the assets had been unfairly divided. Jack then brought an action for 
specific performance of the agreement. Bob argued that the agreement was illegal in so far as it involved the giving 
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it had little to do with the director’s motives. In this remarkable case, the trial judge held the 
principal purpose of the financial assistance was to resolve the conflict and deadlock between 
the brothers and to rescue the business. However, the House of Lords rejected this reasoning. 
The Court accepted that the reason for the provision of the financial assistance was more 
important than the relevant acquisition of shares and it was given in good faith in the interests 
of the company. Nevertheless, the court pointed out that “purpose” had to be distinguished 
from “reason” or “motive”, and held that the principal purpose was to enable shares to be 
acquired, and therefore the transaction did not fall under the “principal purpose” exception. It 
is generally considered by practitioners that the Brady case has substantially reduced the 
scope for relying on the “principal purpose” exemption. 
 
Accordingly, the DTI proposes in its White Paper of July 2002 to revise some of the existing 
exemptions from the prohibition on financial assistance and introduce new exemptions. It is 
believed that the principal purpose exemption will be revised. It can be seen that the DTI 
proposes that the exemption from the prohibition on financial assistance for transactions 
whose principal purpose was not the acquisition of shares should be reformulated in terms 
that the acquisition of shares was not the predominant reason for the transaction.288 The 
change of focus appears to lower the test allowing more scope for the practitioner to argue 
that the transaction fits within the general exception. However such optimism should be 
treated with caution in the context of management buy-outs, because it will be likely that in 
                                                                                                                                                               
of the financial assistance by Brady Ltd towards discharging the liability for the purchase of its own shares. 
288 Chapter 7.14 of Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy-Completing the Structure (November 
2000). For full text please see online: < http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/reviews/comstruc.htm>. 
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all circumstances the pre-dominant reason for a transaction is the acquisition of the shares.289
B. Second category: Specific exempt transactions- Section 153(3) 
In addition, Section 153(3) specifies a number of transactions which are not unlawful if they 
comply with statutory procedures and in certain cases receive judicial approval.  
 
This exemption can be used in the context of management buy-outs. Firstly, the payment of a 
lawful dividend by the target out of its distributable profits does not amount to financial 
assistance.290 Thus the target must have sufficient distributable profits and available cash and 
the dividend must be paid in accordance with the target’s memorandum and articles of 
association and in compliance with Sections 263-281 of the Companies Act 1985. The Newco 
shall acquire 100% of the target unless it is willing to pay a large dividend to the remaining 
minority.  
 
Secondly, it may be possible in certain instances to incorporate the buy-out proposals for 
financial assistance as part of Court Scheme where this method of effecting the buy-out is 
practicable.291 A Court Scheme is appropriate for a management buy-out, particularly where 
the lenders to the buy-out team wish to use the target’s assets as security for their loans 
without any objection from a minority of the target’s shareholders. A scheme can be approved 
by a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the members present and 
                                                        
289 David Cabrelli, “In Dire Need of Assistance?: Sections 151-158 of the Companies Act 1985”, J.B.L. 2002, May, 
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290 Section 153(3)(a) of the Companies Act 1985. 
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voting either in person or by proxy at a special meeting convened at the direction of the court 
and sanctioned by the court.292 Anything done pursuant to a scheme under section 425 of the 
Companies Act is exempt under Section 153(3)(e) and hence if the proposed financial 
assistance is part of a scheme and is approved by the court, it will be permitted. 
C. Third category: Lending in the ordinary course of business and employee share ownership 
- Section 153(4) 
Section 153(4) provides exceptions for certain specific transactions such as those conducted 
in the ordinary course of business and for the purchase of shares under employee share 
ownership schemes so long as it is in good faith in the interests of the company. However, the 
extent of the exceptions under Section 153(4) is limited by Section 154(1) for a public 
company. Thus a public company may only rely on such exceptions if the company has net 
assets which are not thereby reduced if the assistance is provided out of distributable profits.  
 
D. Fourth category: The “Whitewash procedure” 
i. “Whitewash procedure” under Sections 155 to 158 and its applicability to MBOs 
In addition to the exceptions described above, it is not uncommon in management buy-outs 
for the purchasing company to take advantage of Sections 155 to 158 of the Companies Act 
1985. These sections set out the procedure which permits a private company, not a public one, 
to give financial assistance for the acquisition of its own shares, otherwise prohibited by 
                                                        
292 Graham Stedman, supra note 175 at para. 21.6.6. 
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Section 151 -- commonly known as a financial assistance whitewash.293 There is also a 
restriction on the use of the sections by subsidiary private companies in a group with public 
companies.294
 
Private companies may provide financial assistance, provided they can fulfill the requirements 
of sections 155 to 158--the “Whitewash procedure”. At present, this is the most common 
method used by practitioners as a means of ensuring that the assistance is not classified as 
prohibited. In reality, where only private target companies are involved, this will prove the 
most desirable approach in management buy-outs where borrowings obtained from a bank by 
the newly incorporated company are secured by the assets of the target and its subsidiaries.295  
 
However, where the target is not a private company, but a publicly listed company, the 
Section 151 prohibition on financial assistance significantly affects the structure of 
management buy-outs and other such leveraged transactions in which purchasers look to the 
Target’s cash flow and assets to repay and secure debt that was incurred to acquire the 
company.296 In practice, such transactions are effected by re-registering the publicly listed 
target company as a private company so that it can take advantage of the “whitewash 
procedure”.297 By following the steps set out in the whitewash procedure, a private target 
                                                        
293 But there is nothing to stop a public company from registering as a private company to take advantage of the 
provisions and then re-registering as a public company as discussed above. 
294 Section 155(3) of the Companies Act 1985. 
295 David Cabrelli, supra note 289. 
296 Stephen Kenyon-Slade, supra note 142 at para. 7.107. 
297 In short, a public company is one which is said to be a public company by its memorandum, and which is 
registered as such under the Companies Act 1985. A public company must have at least two members and its name 
must end with the words “public limited company” or “PLC”. A public company must at a minimum allot to its 
members shares with a nominal value of £50,000, although it is permissible for the members to pay up only 25% 
of the nominal value of the shares. By contrast, a private company limited by shares is one which is not a public 
company. The word “limited” or “Ltd.” typically follows the name of the company. The private company may have 
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company is permitted to grant financial assistance for the acquisition of its shares.298 
Converting to a private company requires a special resolution (75% approval of those 
voting).299 However, such a resolution can be challenged. As the re-registration may adversely 
affect minority shareholders, the holders of 5% or more in nominal value of the target’s issued 
shares, or any class thereof, or 50 or more of its shareholders who did not vote in favour of 
the resolution may apply within 28 days to the court for a cancellation of the re-registration.300 
Accordingly, only by acquiring over 95% or reducing the minority below 50 shareholders can 
Newco be sure of successfully converting the target into a private company for this purpose. 
ii. Requirements for application of “whitewash procedure” 
There are some conditions to be satisfied for the provision of the financial assistance. These 
requirements are complex, and there are even more complexities over timing.301
 
The first condition is that the assistance may only be given if the company has net assets 
which are not thereby reduced or to the extent that they are reduced, if the assistance is 
provided out of distributable profits.302  
 
This requirement means that in the most common case of financial assistance on a 
management buy-out such as the provision of guarantees and charges by the target and its 
                                                                                                                                                               
only a token amount of contributed capital, eg. £1, and may have only one member. Importantly, only the shares of 
a public company may be listed on a stock exchange. A publicly listed company will always be a public company. 
298 For full discussion, see Spencer Summerfield & Chiris Hale, “From Public to Private: Management Buyouts of 
Listed Companies” (1998) PLC 9(5), 1, 1998, 21-28. See also Stephen Kenyon-Slade, supra note 142 at para. 
7.109. 
299 Section 53 of the Companies Act 1985. 
300 Section 54 of the Companies Act 1985. 
301 David Wainman, Company Structure: Law, tax and accounting for companies and groups, growing and 
evolving, 2nd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1999) at para. 9.21. 
302 Section 155(2) of the Companies Act 1985. “Net assets” is defined in Section 154(2) and “distributable profits” 
is defined in Section 152(1)(b). 
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subsidiaries, it must be determined whether or not the provision of such security will reduce 
net assets. In practice, the banks may require the target’s auditors as a condition of providing 
debt funding to provide a “non-statutory auditor’s report” stating the compliance with the “net 
assets” requirement.303 Also, a letter from the auditors may be required by the banks to 
demonstrate that they have not been reckless in satisfying themselves as to any potential 
infringement of the financial assistance prohibition.304 Whether the entering into of the 
guarantee and charges creates a liability which may reduce such net assets, current accounting 
practice is to reach a view as to whether or not the relevant guarantee will be called within the 
foreseeable future. If such a guarantee is likely to be called, it would constitute a liability 
within the meaning of section 154(2)(b) and would therefore have to be taken into account in 
calculating net assets. If this is the case, the amount of the reduction in the net assets will 
make it impossible to utilize the whitewash procedure.305
 
The next requirement is if the target is not a wholly-owned subsidiary (ie. 100% of the target’s 
shares are not acquired by Newco), the giving of financial assistance must be approved by a 
special resolution of the company in general meeting or written resolution under Section 
318A. 
 
The third requirement is that all the directors must make a statutory declaration confirming 
the projected solvency of the company for the next 12 months.306 A statutory declaration made 
                                                        
303 Maurice Dwyer, Private Equity Transactions, supra note 58 at para. 11.20. 
304 Eagle Trust plc v. SBS Securities Ltd [1991] B.C.L.C. 438. 
305 Maurice Dwyer, Private Equity Transactions, supra note 58 at para. 11.21. 
306 Section 155(6) of the Companies Act 1985. 
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by the company’s directors must contain such particulars of the financial assistance to be 
given, and of the business of the company of which they are directors, and shall identify the 
person to whom the financial assistance is to be given.307 It is advisable to set out in as much 
detail as possible in the declaration a description of the nature of the financial assistance.308
 
However, the major area of uncertainty which exists in connection with the making of the 
statutory declaration concerns the appropriate treatment of contingent and prospective 
liabilities. Also the procedures for the giving of the declarations and the particulars to be 
shown on the form are unclear.309
 
In the context of management buy-outs, the case of Re SH & Co (Realisations) 1990 Ltd310 
provides guidance for advisors on the meaning of Section 156 and the proper completion of 
the statutory declaration. The particulars in the statutory declaration did mention a debenture 
but did not state what property had been charged, nor the nature of the charge nor the fact that 
a guarantee had been given. Lord Mummery J held that the matters omitted did not prevent 
the particulars that had been given from complying with the requirements of s. 156 of the Act 
so that the statutory declaration in question had satisfied the statutory requirement, albeit it 
                                                        
307 Section 156(1) of the Companies Act 1985. 
308 Re SH & Co (Realisations) 1990 Ltd [1993] B.C.C. 60 (Ch D). 
309 Gary Senior, “Financial Assistance: The Perils of the Companies Act 1985, S. 155: Problems In Relation To the 
Directors’ Statutory Declaration” (1994), COMPLAW 1994, 15(2), 54-56. 
310 Re SH & Co (Realisations) 1990 Ltd, supra note 309. It arose out of the administrative receivership of SH & 
Co (Realisations) 1990 Ltd ('SH Co') following a management buy-out. A purchasing vehicle, Rolelock Ltd ('R Co') 
was formed to acquire the entire share capital of SH Co. Nyckeln Finance Co Ltd ('NF Co') lent money to R Co to 
enable it to acquire the shares of SH Co, thereby effecting the management buy-out. The receivers of the company 
sought directions whether the debenture was void because the statutory declaration by the directors of SH Co. 
pursuant to the Section 155 did not contain full particulars of the financial assistance given by the company for the 
purchase of its shares. 
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was one which was “close to the line”.311  
 
Thus, directors should be aware that the duty imposed by Sections 155-158 is to comply with 
“objective requirements”not just to use best endeavors to comply with them.312 However, as 
the decision was said to be “close to the line”, directors should take care to disclose full 
particulars so as to avoid any possibility of liability. Care should be taken to include adequate 
information when completing such a statutory declaration. If there is any cause for concern as 
to the necessity for inclusion of information, prudence dictates that the information should be 
provided. As the learned judge aptly put it, advisors in turn should heed the judge’s warning 
that “solicitors responsible for completing the statutory declaration should err on the side of 
caution”.313
 
Finally, directors should bear in mind timing considerations under Section 157 and 158. Also, 
the director’s declaration must be supported by an auditor’s report stating that the auditors 
have enquired into the state of affairs of the company and are not aware that the opinion stated 
in the directors’ statutory declaration is unreasonable in all the circumstances. The statutory 
declaration and auditor’s report must be delivered to the Registrar of Companies either with 
the special resolution or where no such resolution is required, within 15 days after the making 
of the statutory declaration.314  
 
                                                        
311 Ibid. 
312 McKenna & Co, “Financial Assistance: Relaxation of S. 151 for Private Companies” (1993) COMPLAW 1993, 
14(5), 104-105. 
313 “Financial Assistance: A Warning to Directors”, Case Comment on Re SH & Co (Realisations) 1990 Ltd 
COMPLAW 1993, 14(4), 77. 
314 Section 156(5) of the Companies Act 1985. 
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However, even if there is a late filing of the statutory declaration form and the form 
completed is wrong, the case of NL Electrial Limited v. 3i plc315 surprisingly holds that the 
form will be valid. In this case, the statutory declaration was filed 15 days late. However, it 
was held that, as the legislation provided a specific penalty of a fine for late filing, this should 
not also invalidate the relaxation procedure. The case also concerned the use of an out-of-date 
Companies Registry form during the transitional period when the Companies Act 1985 was 
being brought into force. However, the old and new forms, apart from having different 
numbers, were identical and this, together with the fact that s 155(6) simply refers to “the 
prescribed form” but does not specify a particular form, led the court to hold that it made no 
difference which form was used as long as all the relevant information was given. This 
decision would probably have been different if the old and new forms had not required 
precisely the same information to be provided. 
Chapter 5: Legal issues concerning MBOs in China 
I. Overview of the present legal regime of Chinese law concerning MBOs.  
1. Background 
Compared with the Common Law legal system, the PRC legal system is a codified system 
with written laws, regulations, circulars, administrative directives and internal guidelines. The 
PRC government is still in the process of developing its legal system, so as to meet the needs 
of investors and to encourage diversified private and foreign investment. Some of the laws 
                                                        
315 NL Electrical Ltd v. 3i plc [1994] 1 B.C.L.C.22. 
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and regulations, and the interpretation, implementation and enforcement thereof, are still at an 
experimental stage and are therefore subject to policy changes.  
 
As the PRC economy is undergoing development generally at a faster pace than its legal 
system, some degree of uncertainty exists in connection with whether and how existing laws 
and regulations will apply to certain events or circumstances. For example, as a 
business vehicle, management buyouts in China have developed over a relatively short period 
of time and have been constructed around applicable laws rather than having resulted from an 
evolution of those laws.  
 
The U.K. law relating to management buy-outs is not a self-contained discipline, and the 
same is true of Chinese law governing management buy-outs. Accordingly, the law relating to 
buyouts is drawn from many different areas and it is necessary to look at the 
structures commonly used in management buyouts to know which areas of law are relevant. 
2. Legal source 
Although the legal source of Chinese laws guiding and governing MBOs is complex, they can 
be categorized into following main groups.316
                                                        
316 In accordance with the structure of the lawmaking powers, Chinese law can be divided into four levels. The 
highest and fundamental law of the PRC is the Constitution. At the second level are laws, resolutions, orders 
adopted by the National People's Congress(NPC) and its Standing Committee. At the third level are the 
administrative rules, regulations, decisions and orders of the State Council. The ministries and commissions under 
the State Council are also authorized to issue orders, directives and regulations within the jurisdiction of their 
respective departments Ministerial regulations and rules are, in general, more limited in nature and their 
application is generally within the sphere of the function of the ministry in question. Very often, the ministerial 
provisions are intended to supplement and implement regulations adopted by the State Council. Finally are the 
local regulations by the people's congresses of provinces, autonomous regions and cities 
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A. National legislation adopted by NPC and its Standing Committee 
Although the legality of management buy-outs is not established in the Constitution, which is 
the highest legal authority in China, the ties of national legislation composed of laws adopted 
by the NPC and its Standing Committee provide general applicable rules concerning the 
activity. 
 
A management buy-out, as a category of corporate acquisition, is governed by the Company 
Law of the PRC317 and the Securities Law of PRC.318 Meanwhile, as it is impossible to realize 
a management buy-out without financing by institutional investors who may require relevant 
guaranties on the target’s assets, the Commercial Banks Law of the PRC319 and the Guaranty 
Law of the PRC320 are applicable to the same transaction. There are also scattered provisions 
regarding management buy-outs in the Income Tax Law of the PRC for Enterprises,321 the 
Individual Income Tax Law of the PRC,322 the Trust Law of the PRC323 and the Insurance 
Law of the PRC.324
                                                        
317 It was adopted at the Fifth Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on 
December 29, 1993, as amended at the Thirteenth session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National 
People's Congress on December 25, 1999. For full Chinese text please see online:< 
http://www.molss.gov.cn/correlate/gsF.htm>. 
318 It was adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on 29 December 1998. For full 
Chinese text please see online:< http://www.bjflzc.com/html/hetong/003.htm>. 
319 It was promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and effective on July 1 1995. 
It was modified in 2003 and took effective on February 1 2004. For Chinese full text please see online: 
<http://www.pbc.gov.cn/detail.asp?col=310&ID=16>.  
320 It was adopted at the 14th Meeting of the standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on 
June 30 1995, and effective as of October 1, 1995. For full Chinese text please see online:< 
http://www.cin.gov.cn/law/other/2000111609-00.htm>. 
321 It was promulgated by the National People’s Congress on January 1 1994. 
322 It was adopted at the Third Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on September 10, 1980 and revised 
on October 31 1993 and August 30 1999. For Chinese full text please see online: < 
http://www.sdinfo.net.cn/fagui/content/ba010.htm>. 
323 It was promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on April 28 2001 and 
effective on October 1 2001. For Chinese full text please see online: < http://www.jincao.com/fa/law09.02.htm>. 
324 It was promulgated by The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on June 30, 1995, and was 
amended on October 28, 2002. For Chinese full text please see online: < 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/43/20021029/853076.html>. 
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 However these legislation adopted prior to the explosion of management buy-outs in China do 
not provide explicit rules of such activities and have caused much complexity and confusion 
which will be addressed in detail later in this chapter. 
 
B. National legislation issued by the State Council and its ministries 
Besides the laws enacted by the NPC and its Standing Committee, the State Council and its 
ministries have issued many administrative regulations and rules governing such transactions.  
i. General regulations 
In general, some applicable rules can be applied to the management buy-outs, such as the 
Measures for the Administration of Disclosure of Shareholder Equity Changes of Listed 
Companies,325 the General Rule of Loan,326 the Administrative Rules on Trust and Investment 
Companies,327 and the Provisional Rules on Entrusted Funds Management of Trust and 
Investment Companies328
ii. The landmark legislation of the Measures for Administration of the Acquisition of Listed 
Companies 
It shall be noted that the adoption of the Measures for Administration of the Acquisition of 
                                                        
325 This measure was promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Commission("CSRC") and come into force on 
December 1 2002. For Chinese text please see online: < 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/cn/jsp/detail.jsp?infoid=1059812607100&type=CMS.STD>. 
326 It was issued by the People’s bank of China on June 28, 1996. For Chinese text please see online: < 
http://www.jincao.com/fa/law09.29.htm>. 
327 It was promulgated by the People’s Bank of China and take effective on July 18 2002, for Chinese text please 
see online: < http://www.fotic.com.cn/Knowledge/K_law/0206_005.htm>. 
328 It was promulgated by the People’s Bank of China and took effective on July 18 2002. For Chinese text please 
see online:< http://www.trustabc.com/read/readnews.asp?id=23822>. 
 110
Listed Companies (“the Measures”)329 in December 2002 marked the beginning of Chinese 
legislation in the management buy-outs sector.  
 
The Measures elaborate upon Chapter IV (“Acquisition of Listed Companies”) in the 
Securities Law of the PRC and provide a full template for the acquisition of control over 
listed companies. In addition, the Measures provide hints of transfers of illiquid state-owned 
and corporate shares to non-state actors, which encourage the development of management 
buy-outs in China.330  
 
Most importantly, it was the first time that the Chinese government acknowledged the legality 
of management buy-outs in the Chinese legislation. Provisions are made for management 
buy-outs and the role of independent directors in offering separate opinions with respect 
thereto is strengthened.331 Besides, the Measures provide the legal basis for other aspects 
relating to MBOs including director’s duties and financial assistance which will be discussed 
respectively later in this chapter. The purpose of these provisions is to protect the target 
companies, their creditors and shareholders in such transactions from violations by the 
involved management.  
 
For the first time in Chinese legislation, the promulgation of the Measures introduces some 
contents relating to management buy-outs. However, it neither provides an explicit 
                                                        
329 It was promulgated by the CSRC on September 28, 2002 and just become effective on December 1, 2002. For 
Chinese text of the Measures, see online: 
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/cn/jsp/detail.jsp?infoid=1059840567100&type=CMS.STD>. 
330 See III 4 Pricing of management buy-outs in this chapter, below, for more explanations. 
331 The Measures for Administration of Acquisition of Listed Companies, Article 15, 31. See III 4 Pricing of 
management buy-outs in this chapter, below, for more discussion 
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explanation of the particular definition of management buy-outs, nor imports transparent 
regulations guiding the exercise of such transactions.332 Moreover, although boards of 
directors and independent directors are under a duty to express on the appropriateness of an 
offer, and obliged to engage the services of investment banks and law firms to provide the 
equivalent of fair opinion and legal opinions respectively, the Measures do not specify what 
consequences would follow from the issuance of a false, misleading or otherwise dishonest 
opinion. Also, applying the Measures in practice may cause some confusion and uncertainties 
as some regulations permitting a management buy-out in the Measures are in contradiction 
with some prohibitions in several regulations enacted by the NPC and its Standing Committee, 
such as the Company Law, the Securities Law and the Commercial Banks Law of the PRC. 
For example, the Company Law formulates a threshold of investments by a company in other 
companies, which discourage Newco from purchasing shares in a target company.333 Besides, the 
Measures do not provide principles for the purchaser to determine pricing in acquisition of 
shares in listed companies by agreement, but only specify the acquisition price in public offer. 
In fact, acquisitions of non-marketable shares by agreement prevail in the present 
management buy-outs. Lastly, even though the Measures remarkably play a core role in 
governing and guiding the management buy-outs of listed companies, it however can not 
apply to management buy-outs where the target is an unlisted company.  
iii. Specialized rules for duty of information disclosure and duties imposed on independent 
directors 
                                                        
332 Peng Zhenming & Zhou Zifan, “Legal Analysis of Management Buy-outs”, Science of Law, 2003, vol.3. at 
112. 
333 This prohibition and more examples will be discussed in this Chapter, below.  
 112
In order to avoid self-interested transactions and protect the rights and interests of the target’s 
shareholders, creditors and the target’s assets, the duty of information disclosure is stressed by 
CSRC in the Administrative Rules of Information Disclosure on Change of Shareholding in 
Listed Companies 334  and four guidelines composed of the Contents and Formats for 
Information Disclosures by Companies that Offer Securities to the Public Guidelines (No. 15 
Guidelines): Change of Shareholdings in Listed Companies Report;335 the Contents and 
Formats for Information Disclosures by Companies that Offer Securities to the Public 
Guidelines (No. 16 Guidelines): Listed Company Takeover Report;336 the Contents and 
Formats for Information Disclosures by Companies that Offer Securities to the Public 
Guidelines (No. 17 Guidelines): Takeover by Offer Report;337 and the Contents and Formats 
for Information Disclosures by Companies that Offer Securities to the Public Guidelines (No. 
18 Guidelines): Board of Directors’ Report.338  
 
For the same purpose, CSRC issued the Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to 
the Board of Directors in Listed Companies339 which is the first legislation to introduce the 
concept of the independent director and the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed 
Companies in China.340
                                                        
334 It was issued by CSRC on September 28, 2002 which took effect on December 1, 2002. For Chinese full text 
please see online: < http://www.plusemi.com/3255.htm>. 
335 It was issued by CSRC on November 28 2002 and effective on December 1 2002. For Chinese text of the rules, 
see online: < http://www.csrc.gov.cn/cn/jsp/detail.jsp?infoid=1059840433100&type=CMS.STD>. 
336 It was issued by CSRC in November 2002 which came into effective in December that year. For Chinese text 
please see online: <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/cn/jsp/detail.jsp?infoid=1059840256100&type=CMS.STD>. 
337 It was issued by CSRC in November 2002 which came into effective in December that year. For Chinese text 
please see online: <http://www.csrc.gov.cn/cn/jsp/detail.jsp?infoid=1059840188100&type=CMS.STD>. 
338 It was issued by CSRC in November 2002 which came into effective in December that year. For Chinese text 
please see online: < http://www.csrc.gov.cn/cn/jsp/detail.jsp?infoid=1059839967100&type=CMS.STD >. 
339 It was issued by CSRC on 16 August 2001. For Chinese text see online: 
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/en/jsp/detail.jsp?infoid=1059842062100&type=CMS.STD>. 
340 It was issued by CSRC on 7 January 2002. For Chinese full text see online: 
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/en/jsp/detail.jsp?infoid=1060360880100&type=CMS.STD>. 
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iv. Special regulations on MBOs of State-owned Enterprises(“SOE”) 
In a management buy-out, where a target is a state-owned enterprise, special regulations for 
state-owned companies will also apply. 
 
In the first place, the development of the management buy-out transaction is one of the results 
of the reform of the state-owned assets management system.341 However, there is a historical 
problem left over from China’s old economic system that the status of the investor in 
state-owned enterprises was not recognized.342 Where the target companies are state-owned in 
management buy-outs, it is arguable that the government may play dual roles of being the 
vendor and the rule-maker in such transactions. A question of unfairness may arise in this case. 
The establishment of SASAC 343  and the promulgation and implementation of Interim 
Regulations on Supervision and Management of State-owned Assets of Enterprises mean that 
the reform of the state-owned assets management system of China has achieved a significant 
breakthrough and entered a new stage. Because, firstly, according to it, the investors of 
state-owned assets are clarified separately into two categories, the State Council holding 
equity concerning lifelines of the national economy and national security and in enterprises 
engaged in the fields of important infrastructure and natural resources on behalf the State and 
                                                        
341 The reform is not only a major task of deepening economic system reform, but also an important content of the 
improvement of socialist market economic system. 
342 See Chapter 3 II History and background of MBOs in China, above, for detailed discussion. 
343 See the website of the SASAC of the State Council , News Update “China State-owned Assets Management 
System Reform Entering New Stage” (22 May 2003), online: 
<http://www.sasac.gov.cn/eng/eng_qygg/eng_qygg_0001.htm> “SASAC is the organization authorized by the 
State Council to perform the responsibilities as the investor of the State-owned asset on behalf of the central 
government. Authorized by the State Council and in accordance with Corporate Law of People’s Republic of 
China and related administrative regulations, SASAC act as the State-owned assets’ investor to guide and push the 
reform and restructuring of the state-owned enterprises. Supervise the maintenance and appreciation of state assets 
value for those state-invested enterprises, reinforce the management of the state-owned assets, promote the 
establishment of modern enterprise system of the SOEs and improve enterprises’ corporate governance, drive the 
strategic adjustment of the state-owned economic structure and layout.” 
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the local people’s governments holding equity concerning the remainder.344 Secondly, the role 
of SASAC as the investor of the State-owned asset on behalf of the central government is 
separated from the functions of the government social and public management.   
 
In the next place, an important notice pertaining to MBOs was later issued by the State 
Council, in November 2003, on Publication of Proposal by SASAC for Guidelines Governing 
Restructuring of State-owed Enterprises(“the Proposal”).345 The Proposal envisions that the 
state will ultimately only retain an interest in a few industries and that SOEs will be subject to 
sweeping reorganization and sale. This loosening lent an impetus to the existing management 
in SOEs to acquire the SOEs’ business which are already under their control and operation. 
 
This proposal, as the first national set of rules for the restructuring of SOEs, is intended to 
address the large-scale loss of state-owned assets that occurred frequently in previous 
restructurings of SOEs. The Proposals also stress the urgency of increasing transparency in 
SOE sale transactions and acceleration and facilitation of the sale of state assets to either 
domestic or foreign private interests. According to the proposal, governance of restructuring 
of SOEs includes the following steps: government approval, general check of enterprise assets, 
financial auditing, assets evaluation, deal management, pricing management, payment 
collection management, protection of creditor’s rights and protection of legal rights of 
employees. Transactions involving state-owned assets need approval from relevant 
                                                        
344 The Interim Regulations on Supervision and Management of State-owned Assets of Enterprises, Article 4, 5 
and 6. 
345 State Council, 30 November 30, 2003, O’Melveny & Myers LLP, China Law & Policy Digest (30 December 
2003), “Notice by State Council on Publication of Proposal by state-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission for Guidelines Governing Restructuring of State-owed Enterprises”. For Chinese text please see 
online: < http://www.sasac.gov.cn/qygg/qygg_0033.htm >. 
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governmental agencies, and creditors and workers that are affected and shall be conducted by 
way of competitive bidding in the open market for ownership transfer in the case of unlisted 
companies. 
 
Importantly, the proposal addresses the hot topic of management buy-outs in the restructuring 
of SOEs. In all respects, private interests are encouraged to take a more active role in the 
modernization of the public sector,346 but transactions that are grossly undervalued or that 
undermine social stability are to be suspended in accordance with the Proposals.347 The 
government is keen to minimize the abuses, in particular in the context of management 
buy-outs which periodically make news headlines.348 For instance, the Proposal states that 
self-interested purchases are strictly prohibited. It requires that managers buying the 
state-owned assets of their own companies are banned form participating in key decisions, 
such as determination of price, and managers are not permitted to finance the purchase of 
state-owned assets through either loans made by SOEs, or through loans secured by 
state-owned assets, which is also in line with the General Rule of Loan. Besides, 
managements who are responsible for the decrease of the Company’s profit shall not be 
allowed to purchase the state-owned shares of such companies.349  
 
                                                        
346 The Proposal by SASAC for Guidelines Governing Restructuring of State-owed Enterprises, Article 3(1).  
347 The Proposal by SASAC for Guidelines Governing Restructuring of State-owed Enterprises, Article 1, 3(2). 
According to official statistics, the average price reached by state-owned assets in non-listed companies transferred 
through equity exchanges is 10% above their appraisal value, whereas the average price of state-owned assets 
negotiated privately is about 30% below their appraisal value. See “Opinion on Governing the Restructuring of 
SOEs Delivered by the Principal Officers of SASAC” (December 18 2003), China Securities Journal, online: < 
http://www.cs.com.cn/>. 
348 For instance, the sale of State-owned Zhengzhou Yutong Bus Co., Ltd to a group of managers in 2001. For 
detail discussion on this case, see II types of present management buy-outs in China in this chapter, below. 
349 The Proposal by SASAC for Guidelines Governing Restructuring of State-owed Enterprises, Article 10. 
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However, though principal requirements for management buy-outs are set out in the Proposal, 
detailed rules will still be issued in the future.  
 
In the third place, on February 1 2004, the SASAC and the Ministry of Finance's Tentative 
Procedures of Administration of the Assignment of Enterprise State-owned Assets and Equity 
(“the Tentative Procedures”) came into effect, which marks another legal step in China's 
effort to reform the state sector of the economy. 
 
The Tentative Procedures state that transfers of state-owned assets must be conducted either 
through auction, competitive bidding or agreement. The Tentative Procedures go one step 
further than the Proposal and establish a compulsory regime by which any transfer of 
state-owned assets in enterprises should be conducted through qualified equity exchanges.350 
Admittedly, this move to further regulate the market has been discussed for some time and is 
already reflected in some notable local regulations.351 With the enactment of the Tentative 
Procedures, equity exchanges are promoted as a new platform for state-owned asset 
transactions. 
 
Thus, it shall be borne in mind that management buy-outs usually regarding the acquisitions 
of shares and assets in state-owned companies shall not contravene the above legislation 
issued by SASAC for the protection of the state-owned assets. 
                                                        
350 Equity exchanges are established and sponsored by local governments to act as equity and asset transaction 
platforms and to provide a wide range of services to facilitate transactions. 
351 A number of local regulations have recently been enacted that govern the establishment and management of 
equity exchanges. Local regulations have been promulgated in Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Shenzhen, Chongqing, 
Guangzhou and Shandong province. 
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C. Regional regulations regarding MBOs 
According to the 1982 constitution, the People’s Congress and their Standing Committees of 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government can 
adopt local regulations that do not contravene the Constitution, state laws and regulations.  
 
Regional regulations play an important role in regulating management buy-outs. In practice 
they supplement the national law and regulations which are usually only general and broad 
principles. To some extent, they fill the legal loophole left temporarily by the national 
legislations. The Opinions on Holding of Shares in SOEs by Management issued by local 
governments in Shanghai, Shenzhen, Beijing and Hubei governing management buy-outs are 
such examples.352
 
Overall, The above three categories of laws comprise the majority of Chinese law on MBOs. 
II. Types of present management buy-outs in China 
Before discussing the legal issues of the recent MBO transactions in China, it is important to 
review several typical MBO cases and demonstrate empirical types of MBOs in four 
categories(Figure 5). The reasons for different structures of MBOs below will be discussed 
later in this Chapter. 
                                                        
352 See “Opinion on Holding of Shares in SOEs by Management” issued by Beijing local government on June 20 
2001. For Chinese full text, see online: <http://chanye.cashq.ac.cn/html/10/43330.htm>. See also “Opinion on 
Holding of Shares in SOEs by Management” issued by Shenzhen local government on January 17 2002. For 


























Type D - China Kanghui Travel Co ., Ltd
Management team
Figure 5: Four Prevailing Types of Management Buy -outs in China
 
In the first place, management team may incorporate a Newco with the Employee Stock 
Ownership Union established by a number of employees to procure the shares of the target. 
The example of management buy-outs of Guangdong Media Holding Co., Ltd.353 is illustrated 
as Type A in Figure 5. In the second place, a Newco is incorporated by management team 
solely to acquire an equity interest in their business of the target, for instance, management 
buy-outs of China Fangda Group Co., Ltd.354 which is demonstrated as Type B in Figure 5. In 
the third place, management team set up a Newco to acquire a controlling stake of the 
majority shareholder of the target. This method proved to be successful in management 
                                                        
353 See this company on <http://www.midea.com.cn/english/contactus/contact.jsp>. 
354 See this company on <http://www.fangda.com/main.asp>. 
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buy-outs of Zhengzhou Yutong Bus Co., Ltd355 according to Type C in Figure 5. Finally, a 
novel way by which a trust company is entrusted by management team China Kanghui Travel 
Co., Ltd.356 to hold the shares of the China Kanghui Travel Co., Ltd is indicated by Type D in 
Figure 5. 
III. Legal problems arising in current MBOs 
1. Who can be the purchaser? 
A. Can an individual directly acquire shares or assets of the target in management buy-outs? 
In line with the Measures, the purchaser in the acquisition is described as the person who 
obtains actual control of the target company through certain share transfer activities or by 
other lawful means.357 However, it is not clear whether incorporated entities, organizations 
and individuals are all within the scope of the purchaser in an acquisition. In the same way, 
the Chinese Securities Law doesn’t provide explicit rules either.  
 
The Tentative Procedures apply to activities whereby state-owned assets supervision and 
administration authorities and enterprises holding state-owned capital assign, with 
consideration, the enterprise state-owned assets and equity held by them to domestic or 
foreign legal persons, individuals or other organizations.358 Accordingly, individuals are 
included as assignees. However, the following separate rules impede management individuals 
                                                        
355 See this company on <http://www.yutong.com/EN/about/qygk.asp>. 
356 See this company on <http://www.cct2000.com.cn/default.asp>. 
357 The Measures for Administration of the Acquisition of Listed Companies, Article 2. 
358 The Tentative Procedures, Article 2. 
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purchasing directly shares and assets of the target company in practice.359
 
Firstly, In the light of the Interim Measures for Administration of Share Issuing and Dealing, 
an individual is not allowed to hold more than 0.5% of the ordinary shares issued to the public 
of a listed company.360 Thus, individuals are obviously deprived of the capacity of the 
theoretical purchaser of marketable shares in management buy-outs of a listed company 
accordingly. However, another regulation imposes disclosure obligations on an investor 
including a natural person who starts to directly hold361 or control362 more than 5% of the 
shares issued by a listed company.363 A discrepancy in the two statutes causes a great 
confusion as to the extent to which an individual can directly hold the shares in a listed 
company. 
 
Secondly, it is explicitly stipulated that directors and the managers shall not operate their own, 
or operate for others, the same category of business as the company they are serving or, 
engage in activities which damage the interests of the company. If a director or the manager 
engages in such business or activities, the incomes derived therefrom shall belong to the 
company.364 In China, following the management buy-outs, management team usually would 
                                                        
359  Zhu Wuxiang (School of Economics and Management Tsinghua University), “Comparative Study on 
Management Buy-outs”(2003), Shanghai Stock Exchange, online: < 
http://www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/jysjs/sseResearch/2003-2/20032d.pdf>. 
360 The Interim Measures for Administration of Share Issuing and Dealing, Article 46. 
361 A share holder refers to a natural person, legal entity or other organization that is registered in the shareholder 
register of a listed company. 
362 A share controller refers to a natural person, legal entity or other organization that, without registering the 
shares under his or her name, controls the shares of a listed company held by other legal means, such as equity 
control in an incorporated entity, agreement or other arrangement etc, other than share assignment in the stock 
exchanges. 
363 The Administrative Rules of Information Disclosure on Change of Shareholding in Listed Companies, Article 7, 
8 and 15. 
364 The Company Law of PRC, Article 61. 
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not only hold a post in the Newco they incorporated but also retain their post in the target 
company which is already under their successful operation. In this case, there is a likelihood 
of contravening the relevant regulations.  
 
Finally, in practice, where the acquirer in a management buy-out is merely composed of 
management individuals, financing provided by them out of their savings is unlikely to be 
sufficient to finance the management buy-out. The Company Law of the PRC states that 
directors and the managers shall declare the number of shares held by them in the company, 
and shall not transfer such shares during their term of office.365 However, only shares which 
are transferable according to law can be pledged.366 As a result, management team members 
who hold shares of the target company could not get financing that required a pledge of such 
shares. It can be predicted that such restrictions on the transfer and pledge of shares will 
contribute to a rise in the acquisition cost in management buy-outs. 
 
As a result, currently, a management individual doesn’t have the capacity of acting as the 
direct purchaser in management buy-outs according to above statutes. Also practically, it is 
very difficult for the management individual to purchase the shares or the assets of the target 
to complete the management buy-outs. Management have to seek another ways to achieve 
their purpose for MBO. 
 
                                                        
365 The Company Law of PRC, Article 147. 
366 The Guaranty Law of PRC, Article 75. 
 122
B. Can a Special Purpose Vehicle, Newco be incorporated to acquire shares or assets of the 
target in management buy-outs? 
In UK, Newco is commonly a limited company which management and outside financiers 
will set up and in which they will subscribe for shares whilst the managers have insufficient 
funds to buy the company outright and therefore need a third party to finance the deal. It is 
Newco which will purchase either the shares in the company or the business and assets of the 
company being sold by the vendor. And normally management will hold a majority or a 
substantial minority of the equity in the new company.   
 
Currently, most management buy-outs in China have been achieved where a Newco is set up 
by the management team to purchase either the shares in the company or the business and 
assets of the company being sold by the vendor. The management buy-out of China Fangda 
Group Co., Ltd. is a representative example in this situation, which is demonstrated as Type B 
in Figure 5. And Type C in Figure 5 shows a Newco is incorporated to purchase either the 
shares or the business and assets of the majority shareholder of the target company. Also, in a 
Type A situation a Newco is established by management and Employee Stock Ownership 
Union. However, management buy-out through a Special Purpose Vehicle is problematic in 
China for certain reasons. 
 
On one hand, in conformity with the Company Law of the PRC, in the event that a company, 
other than an investment company or a holding company as specified by the State Council of 
the PRC, invests in other limited liability companies or joint stock companies (also referred to 
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as company limited by shares), the aggregated amount of such investments shall not exceed 
fifty percent of the net assets of the company. There is only one exemption to this restriction 
of fifty percentages if an increase of investment is out of the profit of the company.367 
However, Newco is not recognized as an investment company or a holding company by law, 
and it is virtually impossible for the newly-established Newco to maintain its net assets 
double of the capital to be raised to purchase the shares of the target. Many scholars are 
skeptical of this impediment and propose it shall be discarded, but before the amendment to 
the Company Law, a threat of violation arising from this method utilized in management 
buy-outs in China must be scrutinized.  
 
On the other hand, a company is not capable of being established by a single management 
member to carry on a management buy-out in accordance with the Company Law of PRC, 
because companies incorporated within the territory of the People's Republic of China can 
take two forms368, one is limited liability company369, the other is joint stock company370, a 
limited liability company shall be jointly invested in and incorporated by not less than two 
and not more than fifty shareholders.371  Only state-authorized investment institutions or 
departments authorized by the State may independently invest in and establish wholly 
State-owned limited liability companies.372 To incorporate a joint stock company, there shall 
                                                        
367 The Company Law of the PRC, Article 12. 
368 The Company Law of the PRC, Article 2 
369 The Company Law of the PRC, Article 3, in the case of a limited liability company, shareholders shall assume 
liability towards the company to the extent of their respective capital contributions, and the company shall be liable 
for its debts to the extent of all its assets.  
370 The Company Law of the PRC, Article 3, in the case of a joint stock company, its total capital shall be divided 
into equal shares, shareholders shall assume liability towards the company to the extent of their respective 
shareholdings, and the company shall be liable for its debts to the extent of all its assets.  
371 The Company Law of the PRC, Article 20. 
372 Ibid. 
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be five or more sponsors, of which more than half must have their domicile within the 
territory of the People’s Republic of China.373 In practice, as the incorporation of a joint stock 
company must be subject to the complicated procedures of examination and approval from 
the relevant governing institute of the PRC, a limited liability company is commonly set up 
for the purpose of management buy-outs.374  
 
In contrast, in UK any type of company is capable of being incorporated with a single 
member. The decision of the House of Lords at the end of the nineteenth century in Salomon v 
Salomon & Co375 established the legality of the “one-man” company as it in effect allowed the 
incorporation of a company with a single member and other six being nominees for him. This 
judicial decision preceded by nearly a century the adoption of EC Directive 89/667376, which 
requires private companies formally to be capable of being formed with a single member.377 
And the one-person company is now expressly recognized by English Law. Although in China 
a single management could circumvent two-member threshold by a device such as having a 
company incorporated by him and his nominees as the other member, legislation permitting 
incorporation of a company with a single member should be considered in China.378  
 
Also, management team shall bear in mind the threshold of the number of shareholders where 
more than 50 management team members and institutional investors intend to be involved in 
                                                        
373 The Company Law of PRC, Article 75. 
374 The Company Law of PRC, Article 9. 
375 Salomon v Salomon & Co [1897] A. C. 22, HL. In this case, the House of Lord held that the company has been 
validly formed since the Act merely required seven members holding as least one share each. 
376 [1989] O. J. L395/40. See s.1(3A). For public companies, the minimum requirement remains at present two 
members (s.1(1)), through the CLR (Formation, para. 2.11) has proposed that any type of company should be 
capable of formation with a single member.  
377 Paul L. Davies, supra note 56 at 5, 29. 
378 Wang Tianhong, Comparative Study on Corporation with One Member (China: Law Press China, 2003) at 377. 
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the management buy-outs.379 And in the management buy-outs where a Newco is incorporated 
to purchase shares or assets of the target company, not only income tax shall be paid by 
Newco on the income derived from its production and business operations,380 individual 
income tax shall be also imposed on management’s income from share dividends and 
bonuses.381
 
Thus, the current legislation throws obstruction in the way of the development of management 
buy-outs activities in China. 
C. Can Employee Stock Ownership Union be established to acquire shares or assets of the 
target with management of the target in management buy-outs? 
i. Impediment under Chinese Law 
In order to circumvent the 50-member limit prescribed by the Company Law, in the earlier 
case of management buy-outs of Guangdong Media Holding Co., Ltd.(Type A in Figure 5) 
where more than 50 management team members were involved, the chairman of the board of 
directors and Employee Stock Ownership Union of the target company incorporated a limited 
liability company to purchase the shares of the target company. In this case, the Employee 
Stock Ownership Union is recognized as one member. In the same way, management buy-outs 
are implemented through the incorporation of Newco by Employee Stock Ownership Union 
                                                        
379 The Company Law of PRC, Article 20. 
380 The Income Tax Law of the PRC for Enterprises(effective on January 1, 1994), Article 5. For Chinese text 
please see online: <http://www.wetdz.gov.cn/cn/policy/pop.asp?id=57>. 
381 The Individual Income Tax Law of the PRC, Article 2. It was adopted at the Third Session of the Fifth National 
People’s Congress on September 10, 1980 and revised on October 31 1993 and August 30 1999. For Chinese full 
text please see online: < http://www.sdinfo.net.cn/fagui/content/ba010.htm>. 
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of the target companies including China Stone Group Co., Ltd,382 Dazhong Jiaotong Group 
Co. Ltd. However, there is a dispute about whether Employee Stock Ownership Union is 
capable of participating in the management buy-out transactions. 
 
In line with the purpose of the 15th National congress of the communist party of China held 
in September 1997, Employee Stock Ownership Union has been considerably generated as a 
provisional trust organization during the process of the restructuring of Chinese enterprises so 
as to clarify the ownership of the state-owned or collective-owned enterprise.383 Since there is 
no unified code governing Employee Stock Ownership Union, and no separate rules can be 
found in the Company Law of PRC regarding Employee Stock Ownership Union’s capacity 
of being a shareholder of a company, some provisional rules on Employee Stock Ownership 
Union are provided by the local governments of Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, that where 
individual employees intend to subscribe for shares of a company, a union shall be set up and 
registered as a social organization to hold all shares subscribed by employees.384   
 
However, since the Regulations on Registration Administration of Private Non-enterprise 
Units385, Employee Stock Ownership Union shall be established as a social organization by 
individual employees using non-state-owned assets and conduct not-for-profit social service 
activities.386 As no private non-enterprise unit shall conduct business activities for profit, 
                                                        
382 See this group on <http://www.stone-group.com.cn/> 
383 Wang wei & Li shuguang, MBO: Managers Become Shareholders, (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 
1999), at 100. 
384 Ibid. at 102. 
385 This regulation was promulgated by the State Council on Oct 25 1998 and come into effective on the same day. 
For the full Chinese text please see online: <http://www.cec-ceda.org.cn/shangqxd/stfg/sttl1.htm>. 
386 The Regulations on Registration Administration of Private Non-enterprise Units, Article 2. 
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Employee Stock Ownership Union is forbidden to be engaged in management buy-out 
transactions.387 In accordance, the Ministry of Civil Affairs of PRC suspended the registration 
of Employee Stock Ownership Union for social organization since 1999. Subsequently, CSRC 
concluded that Employee Stock Ownership Union is not a legal entity but only an internal 
organization of a company, so it is ineligible to be the shareholder of a listed company.388  
 
On the other hand, in such management buy-outs, the actual scope of the purchasers in regard 
with the management buy-out is expanded to the whole employees but not certainly limited to 
the management team only. This may give rise to an unclear ownership of a target company 
which contradicts the original purpose to clarify the ownership during the restructuring of the 
target company.  
 
As a result, the deterrent regulations and policies above make the equity participations of the 
Union of Shareholding Employee unfeasible in management buy-outs. However, this method 
used in earlier management buy-outs is akin to the variant form of management buy-outs in 
UK, the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (“ESOP”).  
ii. Background and concept of ESOP in U.K. 
In UK, the participants in management buy-outs may consist of a select team of the most 
senior management, or it may include a group of all the employees of the business concerned. 
An ESOP can be used to give employees a stake in a management buy-out, especially when 
                                                        
387 The Regulations on Registration Administration of Private Non-enterprise Units, Article 4. 
388 For Chinese text of “A reply regarding whether the Union of Shareholding Employees is capable of being a 
shareholder of a listed company” (December 11 2000) please see China Securities Regulation Commission, online : 
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/cn/jsp/detail.jsp?infoid=1060090957100&type=CMS.STD>. 
 128
constraints of confidentiality and time may not allow involving the employees directly, with a 
subsequent allocation at the buy-out price. The first and best example was the massive 
buy-out of the National Freight Corporation by 26,000 of its managers and employees in 
1981.389 It was this deal which first introduced the concept of the management buy-out to the 
public at large. Also, it proved successful as a means of denationalizing a company in the 
public sector that this pattern was used again for the purchase of the Victaulic Company, a 
former subsidiary of the British Steel Corporation, by 561 out of its 880 employees390. Later 
in 1986, the government accepted a management consortium bid of £100m for its Vickers 
warship yard, in which were offered not only to employees and their relatives, but also to 
residents in the area around the yards.391
 
Section 309 of the Companies Act 1985 places a duty on company directors to have regard to 
the interests of their company’s employees as well as to the interests of their shareholders. 
Also Section 719 of the 1985 Companies Act specifically empowers a company to provide for 
employees on the cessation or transfer of a business, notwithstanding that such provision may 
not be in the best interests of the shareholders. 
 
And the tax environment for buy-outs was rendered progressively more favorable for 
employees. Since the Finance Act 1974, tax relief had been available for interest paid on loans 
to individuals to enable them to finance equity investments in close companies. Later, 
legislation was introduced in the Finance Act 1984 to extend the tax relief to 
                                                        




employee-controlled companies where more than 50% of the equity is held by its 
employees.392
 
The Section 153 of CA 1985 was also amended by the section 132 of CA 1989, with effect 
from 1 April 1990, to permit companies to provide all forms of financial assistance for the 
purchase of their own shares, provided that such assistance is given in good faith in the 
interests of the company and for the purposes of an employees’ share scheme. The trust, 
whether approved or not, is capable of being an employees’ share scheme for CA purposes. 
 
Finally, the concept of the ESOP was approved by the Government in the Finance Act 1989 
(FA 1989).393 A trust can now be a qualifying employee share ownership trust under the FA 
1989, and there are now quite a number of ESOPS in place and considerable interest is being 
shown in them. 
 
The extent and form of employee participation in the management buy-out is considered at an 
early stage. The practical difficulties of a full employee buy-out are numerous and such a 
scheme is appropriate only in a limited number of cases. In UK, employees can participate in 
the future success of their company in a number of ways from productivity bonuses, 
profit-related pay schemes, share option schemes (whether or not Inland Revenue approved), 
ESOPs to direct subscription for shares, possibly shortly after completion of the buy-out.394  
                                                        
392 Ibid. at paras. 14.06-14.07. 
393 William M. Rees. & Simon B. Jeffreys, “What is an ESOP”, COMPLAW 1990, 11(7), 144-145. 
394 Parliament has over the last dozen years introduced a statutory framework for the approval by the Inland 
Revenue of three types of employee share scheme: profit sharing schemes in the Finance Act 1978, savings-related 
share option schemes in the Finance Act 1980 and executive share option schemes in the Finance Act 1984. These 
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 The central feature of an ESOP is that it is a discretionary trust in favour of employees, 
former employees and their immediate families, which can borrow money from the company 
or banks, then use that money to buy the company’s shares, and feed those shares over a 
period of time to employees.395 A common type of ESOP involves a dual trust structure: one 
trust, an employee benefit trust, acquires shares in a company, usually with financial 
assistance from that company; the second trust, an approved profit sharing scheme trust, 
acquires shares from the ESOP trust and distributes them to employees.396
 
Under ESOP arrangements, a block of shares can be held for employees generally and can be 
distributed to them over a period of years. This is often done through an Inland Revenue 
approved profit sharing scheme so that no tax charge arises. ESOP has a number of 
advantages397, including being publicly acceptable, being a source of additional funding for 
the management buy-out, providing incentives for the employees who will have a close 
identification with the company and its performance and being tax efficient. 
 
In this respect, an ESOP utilized in UK to give employees a stake in a management buy-out 
should be progressively introduced and legitimated in China.398
                                                                                                                                                               
three schemes concerned with the distribution of shares, can be used as part of an employee share ownership plan. 
395 Maureen J. Gorman. & M. Ellen Robb, “ESOPS for Multinationals”, J.I.B.L. 1992, 7(8), 329-332. 
396 S.J.M. Evans, “Finance Bill Notes-Rollover Relief on Disposals to Qualifying Employee Share Ownership 
Trusts”, B.T.R. 1990, 7, 206-213 (Legislative Comment). 
397 William M. Rees, supra note 393. 
398 Zhang Xianzhong, “Research on Legal Problems arising form Management Buy-outs of Listed Company”, 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, online: < http://www.sse.com.cn/ps/zhs/sjs/xw/ssenews20030606.html>. 
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D. Can a Trust Investment Company be utilized to acquire shares or assets of the target in 
management buy-outs? 
In an effort to overcome current hindrances to management buy-outs in China, a more 
desirable methodological approach (Type D in Figure 5) is employed. In this case, a trust 
company is entrusted by management team China Kanghui Travel Co., Ltd to hold the shares 
of the target company, China Kanghui Travel Co., Ltd. By 2003, 24 management buy-outs of 
listed companies have been accomplished through trusts buying corporate shares of listed 
companies.399  
 
Now, trust and investment products have become very popular among Chinese investors. The 
promulgation of the Trust Law of PRC400 represents an important step forward for China and 
its legal development. According to the Law, a trust refers to that the trustor, based on his faith 
in the trustee, vesting his property rights in the trustee, and allows the trustee to, according to 
the will of the trustor and in the name of the trustee, manage or dispose of such property for 
the interests of the beneficiary or any intended purposes.401
 
In accordance with the Administrative Rules on Trust and Investment Companies,402 a trust 
company can manage or use the entrusted property by means of leasing, selling, lending, 
                                                        
399 Lu Aibing, “MBO of An Hui Shui Li” (April 30 2004), Holly High Mergers and Acquisitions, Online: 
<http://www.hollyhigh.cn/hollylib/view.php?newsid=1151>. 
400 It was promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and come into effective on 
October 1 2001, full Chinese text please see online:< 
http://www.icbc.com.cn/detail.jsp?infoid=1071308921100&infotype=CMS.STD>. 
401 The Trust Law of the PRC, Article 2. 
402 It was promulgated by the People’s Bank of China and take effective on July 18 2002, for Chinese text please 
see online: < http://www.fotic.com.cn/Knowledge/K_law/0206_005.htm>. 
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investing or interbank lending according to the terms of entrustment contracts,403 and it can be 
engaged in considerably broad business.404 A trust company’s own capital in the account of 
owner's equity, which is permitted to be used according to relevant rules, can be deposited in 
banks or used in interbank lending, lease financing and investment.405, Accordingly, making 
use of a trust company’s own capital and entrusted property can legally and flexibly pave the 
way for diversifying approaches for management buy-outs in china. 
 
In line with the regulation and from some successful experience which is illustrated by Figure 
6, management buy-outs can be funded by both debt and equity provided by a trust company. 
 
In the first instance, a trust is akin to a commercial bank where it provides loans to 
management or Newco to meet the capital demand in a management buy-out, it is the Newco 
which purchases the shares or assets of the target company. 
 
In the second instance, a trust company purchases the shares or assets of the target company 
on its own name. In this situation, it is unnecessary to incorporate a Newco. According to the 
Provisional Rules on Entrusted Funds Management of Trust and Investment Companies406, 
management team or their institutional investors vest their legitimately held funds in the trust 
company, the trust company is entrusted to purchase the shares or assets of the target 
company in its own name from the vendor with entrusted funds and their own funds. Under 
                                                        
403 The Administrative Rules on Trust and Investment Companies of the PRC, Article 22. 
404 The Administrative Rules on Trust and Investment Companies of the PRC, Article 20 
405 The Administrative Rules on Trust and Investment Companies of the PRC, Article 24. 
406 It was promulgated by the People’s Bank of China and took effective on July 18 2002. For Chinese text please 
see online:< http://www.trustabc.com/read/readnews.asp?id=23822>. 
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an entrustment agreement between the trust company and management team together with 
their institutional investor, the acquired shares are in the possession of, disposed of and 
managed by the trust company in line with the trustors’ will and aimed at benefiting the 
management team and their institutional investors.407 Finally, the trust company returns the 
shares to management until gradual repayment by the management out of the benefits they 
obtained or under the entrustment agreement the trust company returns cash to management 






















• Trust Company Provides  Debt 
• Trust Company Provides Equity 
Figure 6: MBOs Funded by Trust Company 
 
The advantage of inviting a trust company in the management buy-outs is multifold. First, it 
can obviate the restrictions stipulated by current statutes of China on the investment threshold 
by Newco in the shares of the target company and shareholder number threshold between 2 
and 50. Second, it can surmount the current financing difficulties in management buy-outs 
caused by an insufficiency of financing resources in China. Third, in the management 
buy-outs where a Newco is incorporated to purchase shares or assets of the target company, 
                                                        
407 The Provisional Rules on Entrusted Funds Management of Trust and Investment Companies, Article 2. 
408  Guan Jianjun, “New Productions of Trust and Legal Analysis.” Grandall Legal Group, online: 
<http://www.grandall.com.cn/bestweb/ghlaw/info/corpus/showcorpus.jsp?corpus_id=1011>. 
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not only income tax shall be paid by Newco on the income derived from its production and 
business operations,409 individual income tax shall be also paid by the management as 
shareholders of the target on the income from share dividends and bonuses.410 In the event 
that a trust company is entrusted by the management to purchase shares or assets of the target 
company with vested property, income taxes levied on the Newco can be avoided. Forth, trust 
property is differentiated from other properties owned by trustor not under the trust411 and the 
property owned by the trustee412 so that trust property is not considered as liquidated property 
when a trustor or a trustee is declared bankrupt. This plays a critical role on giving the parties 
involved in management buy-outs a feeling of security of their capital and properties. Finally, 
following a management buy-out, management’s vested property is adequately protected 
because compulsory measures can not be taken over the vested property unless creditors have 
rights of repayment over the vested property before the establishment of a trust relationship.413  
 
There is no exception to the fact that everything has its merits and demerits, although 
investing in management buy-outs through a trust is a convincing approach, management 
shall be discreet when introducing it to the deals. The Measures for the Administration of 
Disclosure of Shareholder Equity Changes of Listed Companies414 reads that shareholder, 
share controller and person acting in concert obliged to disclose the information when the 
                                                        
409 The Income Tax Law of the PRC for Enterprises(effective on January 1, 1994), Article 5. For Chinese text 
please see online: <http://www.wetdz.gov.cn/cn/policy/pop.asp?id=57>. 
410 The Individual Income Tax Law of the PRC, Article 2. It was adopted at the Third Session of the Fifth National 
People’s Congress on September 10, 1980 and revised on October 31 1993 and August 30 1999. For Chinese full 
text please see online: < http://www.sdinfo.net.cn/fagui/content/ba010.htm>. 
411 The Trust Law of the PRC, Article 15. 
412 The Trust Law of the PRC, Article 16. 
413 The Trust Law of the PRC, Article 17. 
414 This measure was promulgated by China Securities Regulatory Commission and come into force on December 
1 2002. For Chinese text please see online: < 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/cn/jsp/detail.jsp?infoid=1059812607100&type=CMS.STD>. 
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number of shares of a listed company held or controlled by it is changed or may be changed 
and the change has reached the prescribed ratio415, and the information disclosed by them 
shall be authentic, accurate, complete, and without false records, misleading statements or 
major omissions.416 Apparently, in the context of a management buy-out of listed company, a 
trust company falls within the share controller and person acting in concert,417 so relevant 
information shall be disclosed. But on the other side, the trustee shall have the obligation to 
keep confidential the information relating to the trustor and the beneficiary of the trust and the 
situation of entrustment affairs, unless stipulated otherwise by laws, administrative 
regulations or the entrustment contract. 418  As the Measures for the Administration of 
Disclosure of Shareholder Equity Changes of Listed Companies is not at a high level of law 
or administrative regulation, the obligation of information disclosure is disputed. To take 
advantage of trust in management buy-outs’ practice, it is necessary to remove inconsistencies 
of the statutes in this respect.  
2. Financing of MBOs 
Unless the target business is relatively small and can be financed directly by individuals, most 
buy-out teams can only provide a small proportion of the necessary funding. In UK, virtually 
all MBOs are financed with a combination of debt finance, mezzanine finance and equity. As 
a result, management are likely to look to a number of funding sources including debt usually 
                                                        
415 Measures for the Administration of Disclosure of Shareholder Equity Changes of Listed Companies, Article 6. 
416 Measures for the Administration of Disclosure of Shareholder Equity Changes of Listed Companies, Article 3. 
417 Measures for the Administration of Disclosure of Shareholder Equity Changes of Listed Companies, Article 9. 
“Person acting in concert refer to two or more natural persons, legal persons or other organizations that make the 
same declaration of will when exercising their voting power of the listed company to expand the ratio of shares of 
that listed company controlled by them or to strengthen their control over the listed company by legal means such 
as agreement, cooperation, association relationship, etc.” 
418 The Trust Law of the PRC, Article 33, and The Administrative Rules on Trust and Investment Companies of 
the PRC, Article 34. 
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provided by specialized acquisition finance units of UK clearing banks or investment banks, 
and equity provided by venture capital companies or specialist buy-out funds.419
But financing the management buy-outs is a huge problem in China because of insufficient 
financing instruments in china and more importantly, numerous impediments in financing 
under Chinese law.  
A. Current finance resources and relevant problems in China 
The most commonly used sources of finance disclosed in the recently completed management 
buy-out transactions in China are obtained in the following ways. First, employees of the 
target company raise the funds and entrust the Employee Stock Ownership Union to purchase 
the shares of the target, as what I discussed above this finance resource is only attainable in 
earlier transactions but is banned under current law. Second, management may rely on their 
own funds to implement the transaction. But funds from the management individuals’ 
remuneration are too finite. And where management is state functionary in a state-owned 
enterprise and his enormous financing in such a transaction obviously exceeds his lawful 
income, he may be ordered to explain the sources of his financing. If he cannot prove that the 
sources are legitimate, the part that exceeds his lawful income shall be regarded as illegal 
gains, and he shall be sentenced to imprisonment or criminal detention, and the part of 
financing that exceeds his lawful income shall be recovered.420 Third, a great portion of the 
whole purchase price is financed by a term loan provided by commercial banks with a pledge 
of target company’s shares by Newco. It obviously falls foul of the prohibition on the loan 
                                                        
419 See Chapter 4 II 2 Types and sources of finance, above, for further discussion. 
420 The Criminal Law of the PRC, Article 395. 
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provided by commercial banks under the General Rule of loan which I will explain later. 
Fourth, some financing is provided from the capital of the target company. Such financing is 
illegal because it is incumbent upon directors and the managers of a target company not to 
misappropriate company funds or lend company funds to others.421 Finally, in several cases, 
debt financing was provided by civilian individuals. But the rights and benefits of individuals 
who provide this kind of financing may not be protected as there are no explicit rules 
governing such activities under the Chinese Law. Also, this type of financing is expensive due 
to a normally higher interest rate than that of the loan provided by commercial banks. 
 
To sum up, because of a threat of violating relevant Chinese laws, most information on the 
financial resources in above management buy-outs transactions are not disclosed or may be 
disclosed ambiguously. 
B. Financing the management buy-outs under Chinese law. 
i. Finance provided by commercial banks 
Banks have established a strong presence in the financing of the larger UK management 
buy-outs. However, the most important role in financing management buy-outs played by UK 
commercial banks in either debt finance or equity finance is restricted under Chinese Law.  
 
Firstly, financing by banks is restricted by the General Rule of Loan422. In regard with the 
General Rule of Loan, a borrower is prohibited to make equity capital investment with a loan 
                                                        
421 The Company Law of the PRC, Article 60. 
422 It was issued by the People’s bank of China on June 28, 1996. For Chinese text please see online: < 
http://www.jincao.com/fa/law09.29.htm>. 
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from a bank including subscription for registered capital, or increasing registered capital. Nor 
could a borrower invest in the securities or futures market with the loan obtained from the 
bank.423  
 
In the same way, under the Commercial Banks Law of the PRC,424 no commercial banks shall, 
within the People’s Republic of China, engage in trust investment or securities business or 
invest in non-banking financial institutions or enterprises.425 As well as under the Securities 
Law of the PRC, banks are prohibited from putting funds in the stock market.426
ii. Financing by way of public issue of bonds. 
Unlike management buy-outs in UK, it is very difficult to finance management buy-outs 
through a public issue of bonds in China. Because only a joint stock limited company, a 
wholly state-owned company, and a limited liability company incorporated by two or more 
state-owned enterprises or by two or more other state-owned investment entities may issue 
company bonds for the purpose of raising funds for its production and operation.427 And funds 
raised through the issue of company bonds must be used for the purpose approved by the 
examination and approval authorities and shall not be used to make up the losses of the 
company or for non-production expenditure.428 Also, to issue company bonds, it is impossible 
for a Newco to meet such conditions required by law as for a joint stock company, i.e. the 
value of its net asset may not be lower than RMB 30,000,000; for a limited liability company, 
                                                        
423 The General Rule of Loan, Article 71.  
424 This law was promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and effective on July 
1 1995. It was modified in 2003 and took effective on February 1 2004. For Chinese full text please see online: 
<http://www.pbc.gov.cn/detail.asp?col=310&ID=16>.  
425 The Commercial Banks Law of the PRC., Article 43. 
426 The Securities Law of the PRC. Article 133. 
427 The Company Law of the PRC, Article 159. 
428 The Company Law of the PRC, Article 161. 
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the value of its net asset may not be lower than RMB 60,000,000, the accumulated value of 
the bonds issued may not exceed forty percent of the value of the net assets of the company, 
the average distributable profits for the past three years shall be sufficient to pay the interest 
on the company bonds for one year.429
 
In addition, high yield bonds(junk bonds) can not be issued in China as the interest rate for the 
bonds shall not exceed the ceiling fixed by the State Council. Thus, it is illegal to finance 
management buy-outs through issuing company bonds. 
iii. Finance provided by venture capital institutions, pension funds or insurance companies. 
One feature which all the leading equity investors in management buy-outs in the UK have in 
common is that they are active players in the venture capital business.430 This is in sharp 
contrast to the situation in China where the financing function of venture capitalists and 
institutional investors are at an early stage.  
 
Also, mezzanine finance in UK is often made available by venture capital institutions and 
other specialists in the buy-out field including pension funds, insurance companies and other 
institutional investors. But capital providers including pension funds and life insurance funds 
in China are not permitted to engage in management buy-out financing. Under the Insurance 
Law of the PRC,431 the employment of funds of an insurance company is limited to bank 
deposits, dealing in government and financial bonds and other forms of funds stipulated by 
                                                        
429 The Company Law of the PRC, Article 159 
430 Bryan de Caires, supra note 15 at 28. 
431 The Insurance Law of the People's Republic of China was promulgated by The Standing Committee of the 
National People's Congress on June 30, 1995, and was amended on October 28, 2002. For Chinese full text please 
see online: < http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/43/20021029/853076.html>. 
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the State Council. The funds of an insurance company shall not be used for the establishment 
of organizations dealing in bonds or securities, and shall not be used for the establishment of 
enterprises other than those of insurance business.432  
 
Like UK and other countries, it is necessary to expand the function of pension funds to 
investments in China including stocks, other than bank deposits and treasury bonds. This 
move is expected to make better use of the pension funds, infuse fresh blood into the capital 
market and bring lucrative business opportunities to fund managers. China’s current pension 
system is formed by the basic social pooling pension, personal accounts, which are 
contributed to by the employees and employers together, and commercial insurance. So far, 
the funds put in personal accounts are expected to be released from constraints and the 
government should speed up relevant legislation. 
iv. Two novel financing channels -- finance provided by trust investment companies and 
specialized management buy-out funds. 
Currently, in order to overcome the financing difficulties to pave the way for the development 
of management buy-out activities in China, two financing innovations, specialized funds and 
trust companies, shall be introduced, although both of them have been subjected to legal 
limitations and risk under present Chinese law. 
 
At present, trust and investment products have been in the lead in China’s financial 
innovations. So far, 52 of China’s trust and investment companies have obtained renewed 
                                                        
432 The Insurance Law of the PRC., Article 105. 
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registrations in line with China’s current laws and regulations. The legality and advantage of 
financing by trust companies and how to provide debt and equity by a trust company have 
been already discussed above. 
 
For specialist buy-out funds, although there is no investment funds law which makes them 
available for the financing of management buy-outs, the Trust Law of the PRC has 
implications for many aspects of structuring investments and financing within China. It 
applies to civil, business and charitable trusts and is intended to pave the way for a new 
investment funds law to further stimulate the Chinese economy. More importantly, its 
accessorial rules provide a feasibility of financing management buy-outs by specialist buy-out 
funds. First, a trust and investment company can be entrusted to operate investment funds 
businesses allowed by the laws or administrative regulations, and to engage in such 
businesses as a promoter of investment funds or a fund management company.433 In addition, 
a trust and investment company can accept entrustment of two or more than two clients and 
manage, utilize and dispose of the entrusted funds collectively in an approach determined by 
the clients or by the trust and investment company on behalf of the clients.434
 
Accordingly, a specialist buy-out can be incorporated in the form of a trust and investment 
company. In practice, some specialist management buy-outs funds have been incorporated 
recently.435 To finance a management buy-out, a specialist buy-out fund and management can 
incorporate a Newco to purchase the shares of the target company, and in this situation, a 
                                                        
433 The Administrative Rules on Trust and Investment Companies of the PRC, Article 20. 
434 The Provisional Rules on Entrusted Funds Management of Trust and Investment Companies, Article 5. 
435 “Specialist management buy-outs funds in China”, online: <http://www.winking.com.cn/MBO-9.htm>. 
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violation of the Company Law of the PRC which prescribes that the aggregated amount of 
investments by the Newco shall not exceed fifty percent of its net assets can be avoided. 
Alternatively, a specialist buy-out fund may play a role of institutional investor and acquire 
the shares or assets of the target company with the Newco, management will purchase back 
the shares at an appropriate time. Besides, specialist funds may provide a term loan, but loans 
between incorporations are strictly restricted, otherwise involved companies would be fined 
for violation.436 Therefore, it is still necessary to provide a new investment funds law by 
Chinese government to govern the financing by investment funds. 
3. Financial assistance 
A. Background of financial assistance in UK 
In many of the larger buy-outs, the management will of course be unable to subscribe 
sufficient share capital or borrow sufficient funds, at least on the strength of their own 
resources, to fund the purchase price. The only assets which can be made available as security, 
and the only cash flow which can service the necessary debt burden, are those of the target 
company itself.437
 
In UK, one substantial impediment to management buy-outs in the past was the inability of 
the management to provide assets of the target company as security in the raising of loans to 
support the acquisition. The only security available was personal guarantees or indemnities 
provided by the purchasing managers themselves, which was not an attractive proposition for 
                                                        
436 The General Rule of Loan, Article 73. 
437 Lord Hanson, supra note 17 at para. 14.19. 
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either borrower or lender. However in the 1985 Companies Act the government changed the 
law so that, subject to certain conditions, the assets of a private company could be provided as 
security for an acquisition of its shares. This encouraged the development of the so-called 
“leveraged buy-out” whereby loans are secured on the assets of the target company 
concerned.438  
B. Restrictions on financial assistance imposed by similar regulations in China.  
The Company Law of the PRC stipulates that directors and the manager of the target company 
shall not misappropriate company funds or lend company funds to others.439 And directors 
and the manager shall not use company assets as security for the personal debts of 
shareholders of the company or of other individuals.440 Provided directors and the manager of 
the target company use company assets as security for the personal debts of shareholders of 
the company or of other individuals the contract of guaranty shall be declared null and void 
by the people’s courts.441
 
It can be noticed that the currently-generated Measures import the UK corporate law 
prohibition against financial assistance which is also a feature of the financing exercise in a 
management buy-out. It is stipulated that a purchaser without the capacity to actually perform 
is prohibited from making the acquisition of a listed company, and a company being acquired 
                                                        
438 Ibid. at para. 14.12. See Chapter 4 IV Financial Assistance and MBO under Section 151 of the Company Act 
1985, above, for more discussion on this topic. 
439 The Company Law of the PRC, Article 60. 
440 The Company Law of the PRC, Article 60. 
441 The Judicial Interpretations of the Supreme Peoples Court on Implementing the Guaranty Law of the PRC, 
Article 4. 
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may not provide any kind of financial assistance to a purchaser.442
 
The latest Proposals also address that managers are not permitted to finance the purchase of 
state-owned assets through either loans made by SOEs, or through loans secured by 
state-owned assets. This prohibition is also in line with the General Rules of Loan. 
 
The most common type of financial assistance is giving security over the assets of the target 
or its subsidiaries in the form of guarantees, charges and mortgages to support loans to Newco. 
Other common forms of financial assistance are making loans, waiving loans, giving credit or 
selling assets on deferred terms or a gift. However, the existing statutes in China relating to 
restrictions on financial assistance are too broad and it is only applicable to the acquisition of 
listed company. After looking at the prohibition on financial assistance in the relevant UK 
Law, for the sake of protecting the target’s assets and creditors of the target, a general 
prohibition such as Section 151 and a clear description of “financial assistance” as Section 
152(a) should be furnished in China’s Statute, followed by several exemptions to the general 
prohibition based on China’s practice to facilitate the financing in management buy-outs and 
China’s economic reform. 
4. Pricing of management buy-outs  
In China, there has been a certain amount of discussion as to whether, in existing management 
buy-outs, the target companies are acquired at a reasonable and fair price, in terms of 
protecting state-owned assets and minority ordinary share holders. In UK, usually, appropriate 
                                                        
442 The Measures for Administration of Acquisition of Listed Companies, Article 7. 
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price earnings ratios are used and the net assets base is considered in such transactions;443 due 
to the different corporate mechanism in China, appropriate valuation method shall be 
projected and scrutinized to service the management buy-outs under Chinese law. 
A. target companies in acquisitions  
In light of the different ownership and legal status, the objects acquirable in China are 
categorized by state-owned shares and corporate shares in listed companies, marketable 
shares in listed companies, unlisted state-owned enterprises, unlisted collectively-owned or 
private enterprise, unlisted foreign-invested enterprise. Currently, State-owned shares and 
corporate shares possess a majority proportion of targets to be acquired in management 
buy-out transactions in China. 
 
In China, shares in listed companies are of two types, shares that can be directly traded on 
stock markets(generally known as marketable shares) and shares that can not be circulated on 
stock markets(generally known as non-marketable shares). Holders of marketable shares 
include individual investors and institutional investors. Non-marketable shares include 
state-owned shares held by institutions authorized by the State, corporate shares held by 
corporate legal entities or other institutional legal entities and a small quantity of 
non-marketable shares held by individuals. According to the data provided by the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange444 in July 2001, the state-owned shares and corporate shares in listed 
                                                        
443 See Chapter 4 II 1 Valuation and price, above for more discussion on this topic. 
444 The State Council decided to use Shanghai and Shenzhen to experiment in the trading of shares. The Shanghai 
Stock Exchange was established in 1984 and was officially opened on December 19 1990. 
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companies account for 62.95% of total shares in listed companies.445  
B. Current pricing measures and problems 
The position for a listed company in UK is very different from those in China, as the market 
itself sets a value on the individual shares and this sets a market capitalization for the 
company as a whole. Due to the lack of marketability, it is difficult to apply the price of 
marketable shares in secondary stock markets to price the state-owned shares and corporate 
shares in listed company of China in management buy-out transactions. Also, there is no 
market mechanism setting a price for unlisted collectively-owned or private enterprises. 
 
For current acquisition of non-marketable state-owned and corporate shares, acquisition by 
agreement, not the acquisition by public offer normally used in the securities market, is 
adopted in current China’s management buy-out transactions. These non-marketable shares 
are held by government departments or their authorized corporations, so governmental 
interference is irrevocably involved in pricing negotiation, which may result in unfairness.  
 
As there is no explicit pricing rule for acquisition by agreement under Chinese law, price 
negotiation in practice is normally based on net assets of the target. For acquisition of 
corporate shares, the usual practice is that price is negotiated at a discount to the net assets 
valuation of the target. For acquisition of state-owned shares, price in negotiation is simply 
                                                        
445  China Securities Regulatory Commission, “State-owned Shares and Corporate Shares?” online: 
<http://www.csrc.gov.cn/cn/jsp/detail.jsp?infoid=1062563912100&type=CMS.STD>. 
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based on the policy in 1997 by SASAC,446 which set out a threshold that the price of 
state-owned shares transfer shall not be less than the net assets value of the target.   
 
However when a target company is a listed company, the whole shares of the listed company 
consist of not only the non-marketable shares but the marketable shares. As a result of a 
dilution of profits generated by marketable shares subscribed by the marketable shareholders 
at a premium, the net assets value of the non-marketable shares in listed company will 
increase. It is not equal and fair to the holder of marketable shares in a listed company as they 
are not capable of purchasing non-marketable shares at a price less than the net asset value or 
slightly higher than net asset value. But such shares at such prices can be easily acquired by 
the management.  
 
Moreover, while the price of state-owned shares in a management buy-out is not less than the 
net asset value of the target, a loss of state-owned assets still can not be avoided, as it can be 
argued that the value of the target is simply the valuation of the assets less any liabilities that 
it has in its balance sheet. It is the current net asset which only provides historical profits with 
an unknown future profits generated by the target. Furthermore, there is a loss of the 
state-owned assets of the target even where a price negotiated is higher than the net asset 
value of the state-owned shares, because a large quantity of intangible properties as goodwill 
and intellectual property may contribute significantly for the future profits of the target, but 
due to the limitation of current accounting mechanism, they are not included in the net assets 
                                                        
446  Chen Mingjian, “Transform of State-owned Assets”, SASAC, online: 
<http://www.sasac.gov.cn/gzyj/200304/0414-4.htm>. 
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of the target. Additionally, the market value of an asset may be materially different to the 
value shown in the balance sheet, where a price negotiated is less than the net assets value of 
the state-owned targets, a loss of state-owned properties occurs.447  
 
Some people hold that the measures adopted in UK should be introduced to the pricing in 
China’s management buy-outs, as appropriate price earnings ratios are used, the net asset 
value of the company can be used for setting a base price level, and Discounted Cash Flow is 
considered in certain cases.  However, in my point of view, simple reliance on net asset 
valuation is not an appropriate measure of pricing in China’s management buy-outs, and the 
popular measures employed in UK may not be suitable for the current economic system of 
China during reform, which is substantially different from other countries’. Although, how to 
make an applicable pricing mechanism in China’s management buy-outs shall be left to the 
Chinese economists, it is necessary to improve the Chinese law in this respect, introduce the 
independent financial advisors’ role, develop and guide the business of professional 
institutions and invite purchasers in competition with the management for acquisition of the 
target. 
C. Pricing legislation and improvement 
i. Introducing pricing in acquisition of shares in listed companies by public offer  
The Measures provide principles for the purchaser to determine the acquisition price in a 
public offer. For instance, in the case of listed and traded shares, the acquisition price for 
                                                        
447 Zhu Wuxiang, (School of Economics and Management Tsinghua University) “The Rationalization of the 
Pricing” ( September 24, 2003), Xinhua News, 
online:<http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2003-09/24/content_1098027.htm>. 
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shares of the same kind shall not be less than the highest price paid by the purchaser for the 
said kind of shares of the company within 6 months prior to the date of publication of the 
declaratory announcement or 90 percent of the arithmetic mean of the daily weighted average 
price of the same kind of listed and traded shares of the company to be acquired within 30 
trading days prior to the date of publication of the declaratory announcement, whichever is 
higher.448
 
In the case of unlisted shares, the acquisition price for shares of the same kind shall not be 
less than the highest price paid by the purchaser for the same kind of unlisted shares within 6 
months prior to the date of the declaratory announcement or the net asset value per share of 
the target company which is audited in the last announcement, whichever is the higher.449
 
Under special circumstances, if it is necessary to change the implementation of the price 
determination principle described above, the purchaser shall seek the prior approval of the 
CSRC. If the price proposed by the purchaser is obviously unfair, the CSRC may demands the 
purchaser to make readjustment.450
 
The purpose of the above principles is to protect the minority shareholders of the target from 
any loss and damage caused by offering a lower price by the purchaser in a public offer with 
an agreement prior to the public offer between the majority shareholders and the purchaser on 
a higher price and more preferential conditions. For pricing in acquisition of shares in a listed 
                                                        
448 The Measures for Administration of Acquisition of Listed Companies, Article 34. 
449 The Measures for Administration of Acquisition of Listed Companies, Article 34. 
450 The Measures for Administration of Acquisition of Listed Companies, Article 34. 
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company by agreement, principles for the purchaser to determine the acquisition price in a 
public offer under the Measures may provide a valuable reference.  
ii. Special guidelines for pricing in acquisition of SOEs 
Taking into account the large-scale loss of state-owned assets that occurred frequently in 
previous restructurings of SOEs, especially in management buy-outs of SOEs, for pricing in 
acquisition of SOEs, guidelines governing restructuring of SOEs reads that managers buying 
the state-owned assets of their own companies are banned form participating in key decision, 
such as determination of price and self-interested purchases are strictly prohibited and the 
departments in charge of the SOE must determine the price of the state-owned assets. The 
appraisal price is an essential reference, but the price might also be affected by elements such 
as market supply and demand for the assets, the price of other comparable assets on the 
market, the terms of the employees’ settlement plan and the introduction of advanced 
technologies. For listed companies, the price of state-owned shares should be set according to 
the company’s performance and profits, and above the net asset value of each share.451
iii. Important role of independent financial advisers and developing the professional 
institutions 
It is noted that the recently promulgated legislation has recognized that the target company’s 
independent directors and financial advisers have a key role to play when an offer for the 
company is made by a management team. For acquisition of a listed company by its 
management by agreement, the Measures make it incumbent on the independent directors to 
                                                        
451 The Proposal by SASAC for Guidelines Governing Restructuring of State-owed Enterprises, Article 1(6),(7). 
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express opinions on the impact such acquisition may produce on the company and require the 
company to retain a professional institution such as an independent financial advisor to 
provide an advisory opinion, which shall be publicly announced together with the opinions of 
the independent directors.452 Also in an acquisition by public offer453, if management or staff 
and employees undertake the acquisition of a listed company, the independent directors of the 
company to be acquired shall engage a professional institution such as an independent 
financial advisor to analyze the financial condition of the company to be acquired and issue a 
professional opinion on matters such as whether the terms of the acquisition public offer are 
fair and reasonable and the possible effects of the acquisition on the company and make a 
public announcement of the same.454
 
In both situations, the financial advisers must assess all available information, take into 
account the possible change of management style should a buy-out proceed and recommend 
in clear terms to the target’s shareholders whether or not the pricing is reasonable. They may 
also consult with the target’s auditor, industry experts and economic and marketing 
consultants.  
 
Therefore, expertise on appraisal of the target issued by professional institutions can provide a 
                                                        
452 The Measures for Administration of Acquisition of Listed Companies, Article 15. 
453 The Measures for Administration of Acquisition of Listed Companies, Article 23. “When a purchaser holds or 
controls at least 30% of the already issued shares of a listed company, and it continues to increase its shareholding 
of such company or increase its control of such company, it shall by means of a public offer make an acquisition 
offer to all shareholders of the company to buy all of the shares they hold.”  
The Measures for Administration of Acquisition of Listed Companies, Article 62 (a). “The term “acquisition by 
public offer” means a purchaser’s openly-issued expression of an intention to shareholders of a company to be 
acquired to the effect that such purchaser wishes to buy the shares in the company to be acquired held by such 
shareholder pursuant to the terms of the public offer.” 
454 The Measures for Administration of Acquisition of Listed Companies, Article 31. 
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fair and reasonable groundwork for pricing in the management buy-outs. It is crucial to 
develop and manage the professional institutions in China including accounting firms, law 
firms and asset appraisal organizations to provide professionally devoted, precise, efficient, 
practical and innovative financial and accounting evaluation businesses. 
iv. Introduce competing bids  
Finally, non-marketable shares are held by government departments or their authorized 
corporations. On the purchaser side, other than internal management members, external 
purchasers are excluded from the negotiation with the shareholders or offering a bid to the 
shareholders. So the pricing in the acquisition of the non-marketable shares of the target 
company is usually agreed between the shareholders and management and a lower price based 
on undervalued assets of the target is easily accessed by the management. To stress the 
urgency of increasing transparency in price negotiation of management buy-out transactions, 
it is necessary to invite competing bidding whereby the owners of a business invite bids from 
trade buyers alongside management’s bid. 
 
Practically, the Proposals require that the management buy-outs involving state-owned assets 
shall be conducted by way of competitive bidding in the open market for ownership transfer 
in the case of non-listed companies. Also, the Measures consider that the shareholders of a 
listed company can transfer the shares of the listed company they hold through public 
solicitation upon approval by the CSRC and the stock exchange.455 In the future, express and 
definite rules in this respect should be provided by the Chinese government.  
                                                        
455 The Measures for Administration of Acquisition of Listed Companies, Article 21. 
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5. Duty of information disclosure under Chinese Law 
Both the common law and statute law in UK contain rules requiring directors to disclose the 
existence and nature of any personal interest which they have in a contract to which their 
company is a party.  
 
However, as I have mentioned before, in most Chinese management buy-outs, where 
information on the purchaser, pricing, financing resource are not open to the public, a risk of 
violation of relevant Chinese law may occur. Usually, management have easy access to the 
inside information of the target under their control; in order to avoid self-interested 
transactions and protect the rights and interests of the target’s shareholders, creditors and 
state-owned assets, the duty of information disclosure should be imposed.  
 
Formerly, only the Securities Law provides general rules on information disclosure, for 
instance, a stockholder shall notify the company within three days when the stocks in his 
possession have reached 5% of the stocks issued by a joint-stock limited company. The 
company shall report it to the securities regulatory body under the State Council within three 
days of receipt of the report. Where the company is listed, it shall also report it to the 
securities exchanges.456  
 
Later, in accordance with the Securities Law and the Company Law of the PRC, the 
Administrative Rules of Information Disclosure on Change of Shareholding in Listed 
                                                        
456 The Securities Law of PRC, Article 41. 
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Companies which took effect in December 2002 requires the person who bears the obligation 
to disclose change of shareholding as to the shareholders of listed companies to strictly carry 
out their information disclosure obligations, and the information disclosed by them shall be 
authentic, accurate, complete, and without false records, misleading statements or major 
omissions. The rules also set out the obligations of the shareholders, controlling persons and 
persons acting in concert, together with the disclosure procedures.  
 
In addition, the concept of persons acting in concert in UK has been first imported in China 
and the information disclosure obligation is expanded to persons acting in concert.457 In the 
City Code of the U.K., persons acting in concert comprise persons who, pursuant to an 
agreement or understanding (whether formal or informal), actively co-operate, through the 
acquisition by any of them of shares in a company, to obtain or consolidate control of that 
company.458 Similarly, in China persons acting in concert refer to two or more natural persons, 
legal persons or other organizations that make the same declaration of will when exercising 
their voting power of the listed company to increase their holding of shares in the listed target 
company or to consolidate their control of the listed company by legal means such as 
agreement, cooperation, association relationship, etc.459 In the result, where there is a 
management buy-out through a vehicle company formed for the purpose of making an offer, 
the Newco, management of the target and institutional investors in a consortium will normally 
be treated as acting in concert with the offeror, and the onus of information disclosure lies 
                                                        
457 The Administrative Rules of Information Disclosure on Change of Shareholding in Listed Companies, Article 
6. 
458 The City Code of UK, Definition. 
459 The Administrative Rules of Information Disclosure on Change of Shareholding in Listed Companies, Article 
9. 
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with them.  
 
Recently, particular rules on duty of information disclosure are progressing. For instance, four 
guidelines for contents and formats for information disclosures by companies that offer 
securities to the public, No. 15 Guidelines for change of shareholdings in listed companies 
report, No.16 Guidelines for listed company takeover report, No.17 Guidelines for takeover 
by offer report and No.18 Guidelines for report of target company’s board of directors, were 
promulgated by CSRC.  
 
In accordance with the No. 15 Guidelines, management is required to prepare a report and 
disclose a change of shareholdings in the listed company.460 The report shall disclose the 
details of the information including disclosure obligors, change of their shareholdings in the 
relevant listed company, trading of the listed shares in the listed company. The directors or 
principal responsible persons of the information disclosure obligor shall be jointly and 
severally liable for the truthfulness, accuracy and completeness of the contents of the report461  
 
Management is also required to prepare a Listed Company Takeover Report in accordance 
with the No. 16 Guidelines and a Takeover by Offer Report pursuant to the No. 17 Guidelines 
to disclose the details of the purchasers, their shareholdings in the target company, trading of 
the shares in the target company during the last six months, major transactions between the 
                                                        
460 China Securities Regulatory Commission, Contents and Formats for Information Disclosures by Companies 
that Offer Securities to the Public Guidelines (No. 15): Change of Shareholdings in Listed Companies Report, 
Article 2. 
461 China Securities Regulatory Commission, Contents and Formats for Information Disclosures by Companies 
that Offer Securities to the Public Guidelines (No. 15): Change of Shareholdings in Listed Companies Report, 
Article 11. 
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purchasers and the target company, source of funds for the takeover, any action to be taken in 
relation to the target company following the takeover, impact of the takeover on the target 
company and financial information of the purchaser.462  
 
Significantly, both the No. 15 and the No.16 Guidelines provide specific rules for information 
disclosure obligations of management in management buy-outs. It is required that particular 
information shall be disclosed in management buy-outs, including the shareholdings of the 
management in the target or the Newco, basis of pricing, payment, funding source and 
repayment plan. Directors shall testify their duty has been performed and there is no violation 
of the rights and interests of the target and other shareholders.463
 
The No. 18 Guidelines prescribe that the board of directors of the target company in a 
takeover transaction shall prepare a board of directors’ report.464 In the report, apart from the 
basic information of the target company, any conflict of interests management have in the 
takeover transaction shall be disclosed. 465  For example, any connection between the 
management and the Newco shall be disclosed including the shareholdings of the 
management in the Newco or any relationship between the management of the target and the 
                                                        
462 China Securities Regulatory Commission, Contents and Formats for Information Disclosures by Companies 
that Offer Securities to the Public Guidelines (No. 16): Listed Company Takeover Report, Article 2. China 
Securities Regulatory Commission, Contents and Formats for Information Disclosures by Companies that Offer 
Securities to the Public Guidelines (No. 17): Takeover by Offer Report, Article 2, 13. 14. 
463 China Securities Regulatory Commission, Contents and Formats for Information Disclosures by Companies 
that Offer Securities to the Public Guidelines (No. 15): Change of Shareholdings in Listed Companies Report, 
Article 32. China Securities Regulatory Commission, Contents and Formats for Information Disclosures by 
Companies that Offer Securities to the Public Guidelines (No. 16): Listed Company Takeover Report, Article 31. 
464 China Securities Regulatory Commission, Contents and Formats for Information Disclosures by Companies 
that Offer Securities to the Public Guidelines (No. 18): Board of Directors’ Report, Article 2. 
465 China Securities Regulatory Commission, Contents and Formats for Information Disclosures by Companies 
that Offer Securities to the Public Guidelines (No. 18): Board of Directors’ Report, Article 18, 19, 23. 
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management of the Newco.466 Like the City Code of the U.K.467, where a director has a 
conflict of interest, he should not normally be associated with the remainder of the board in 
the expression of its views on the acquisition and the nature of the conflict should be clearly 
explained to shareholders.468 Additionally, in the case of an acquisition of the target by the 
management, the recommendation or statement from the board of directors shall consist of the 
opinions provided by the independent directors on the funding resources of the acquisition, 
any unfairness and reasonableness of the acquisition condition, any activity violating the 
rights and interests of the target and other shareholders and any contingent effect of the 
acquisition on the target.469 Furthermore, in the event that a management buy-out occurs, the 
opinions of an independent financial advisor shall be provided on whether the independent 
financial advisor is related to the acquisition and whether the valuation and the price of the 
target is fair.470  
 
The purpose of the existing rules and guidelines relating to obligation of information 
disclosure is to ensure fair, equal and transparent treatment of all shareholders in relation to 
management buy-outs and apply responsibilities to those who are actively engaged in the 
transactions including directors, vehicle companies and professional advisors. In practice, 
however, the information disclosure mechanism is still deficient. The reasons are three fold. 
First, the above rules are issued by the CSRC which is an enterprise unit directly under the 
                                                        
466 China Securities Regulatory Commission, Contents and Formats for Information Disclosures by Companies 
that Offer Securities to the Public Guidelines (No. 18): Board of Directors’ Report, Article 21, 22, 26. 
467 The City Code of UK, Rule 25.1, Note3, 4. 
468 China Securities Regulatory Commission, Contents and Formats for Information Disclosures by Companies 
that Offer Securities to the Public Guidelines (No. 18): Board of Directors’ Report, Article15. 
469 China Securities Regulatory Commission, Contents and Formats for Information Disclosures by Companies 
that Offer Securities to the Public Guidelines (No. 18): Board of Directors’ Report, Article 29. 
470 China Securities Regulatory Commission, Contents and Formats for Information Disclosures by Companies 
that Offer Securities to the Public Guidelines (No. 18): Board of Directors’ Report, Article 30. 
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State Council.471 In accordance with the structure of the lawmaking powers in China, 
regulations and rules issued by ministries and commissions under the State Council are, in 
general, at a lower lever and more limited in nature. Their application is generally not stable 
within the sphere of the function of the ministry in question.472 Second, the information 
disclosure regulations do not specify what consequences would follow from contravening the 
duties of information disclosure. For instance, the directors or principal information 
disclosure obligor shall be jointly and severally liable for the truthfulness, accuracy and 
completeness of the contents of the report,473 but where there is an issuance of a false, 
misleading or otherwise dishonest opinion by them, the question of the extent of the civil 
liability of the management for breach the rule in not answered.474 Finally, when management 
buy-outs of unlisted companies exist, there is no specific rule for duty of information 
disclosure in the acquisition of unlisted companies to apply.  
6. Duties of management 
A. Director’s duties under Chinese Law 
                                                        
471 In 1998, the State Council approved the Provisions regarding CSRC's Functions, Internal Structure and 
Personnel, confirming CSRC to be one of the enterprise units directly under the State Council and the authorised 
department governing the securities and futures markets of China. 
472 Supra note 316 for detailed explanation. 
473 China Securities Regulatory Commission, Contents and Formats for Information Disclosures by Companies 
that Offer Securities to the Public Guidelines (No. 15): Change of Shareholdings in Listed Companies Report, 
Article 11. 
474 The Administrative Rules of Information Disclosure on Change of Shareholding in Listed Companies, Article 
34 “If a disclosure obligor fails to perform the relevant obligations pursuant to the present Measures, it shall make 
voluntary corrections; for its failure to correct, the stock exchange shall deal with it pursuant to its professional 
rules, and the securities registration and settlement institution shall suspend processing the formalities for transfer 
of share ownership for it pursuant to its professional rules; if the obligor refuses to correct, CSRC shall order it to 
correct. In case of any violation of the securities laws and regulations, the legal liabilities shall be investigated 
pursuant to the law.” Article 35 “If the information disclosed by the disclosure obligor contains false records, 
misleading statements or major omissions, it shall make voluntary corrections; for its failure to correct, the stock 
exchange shall deal with it pursuant to its professional rules, and the securities registration and settlement 
institution shall suspend processing the formalities for transfer of share ownership for it pursuant to its professional 
rules; if the obligor refuses to correct, CSRC shall order it to correct. In case of any violation of the securities laws 
and regulations, the legal liabilities shall be investigated pursuant to the law.” 
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As was discussed in chapter 4 above, duties of the directors are emphasized in UK. The 
framework of fiduciary duties under common law is that directors are required to act bona 
fide to the benefit of the company, to exercise their power for the proper purpose, and not to 
allow for any conflict between their duties as directors and their personal interests. In addition, 
directors’ obligations are imposed by employment agreement and their statutory duties. Also 
the City Code of the U.K. also imposes relevant duties on directors in a management 
buy-out.475  
 
A number of similar obligations or duties are imposed on company officers including 
directors, managers and supervisors(discussed below) of Chinese companies under the 
Company Law of the PRC. These duties are codified both in respect of limited liability 
companies and joint stock companies. Directors, supervisors and the manager shall be liable 
for compensation, if they breach the duties stipulated by the Company law, administrative 
rules and regulations or the articles of association and thus cause damage to the company.476  
 
Although, the concept of fiduciary duties at common law can not be found in Chinese 
company law system, there are a number of similarities between the Chinese and the common 
law system. 
i. Abide by the Articles 
In the first instance, the Chinese Company Law requires directors, managers and supervisors 
to act in accordance with the company’s articles of associations and perform their duties 
                                                        
475 See Chapter 4, III MBOs concerning public companies, above. 
476 The Company Law of the PRC., Article 63. 
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faithfully in the interests of the company.477  
 
In addition to the general obligations, they are not permitted to take advantage of their 
positions, functions and powers in the company to seek or obtain personal gains. Despite the 
obvious differences between the two forms of jurisprudence, such a requirement can be read 
in the light of similar requirements under the common law to reflect the fact that the directors 
must put the company’s interest first and certainly before their own. 
ii. Abuse of power 
Directors, supervisors and managers are prohibited from using their powers of office to accept 
unlawful incomes, nor may they misappropriate the property of the company.478 Also, 
directors and managers are prohibited from embezzling funds or lending company funds to 
others.479 This protection is extended to financial assistance, so that directors and managers 
are also prohibited from using company assets to provide a guarantee for personal debts 
payable by the company’s shareholders or other persons.480 Like the discussion above on 
financial assistance, it is also arguable that such a prohibition is most relevant to the financing 
problems in management buy-outs. 
iii. Conflict of interests 
The Company Law seeks to prevent directors or managers from engage in any activities that 
may cause damage to the interests of the company of which they are directors or managers, 
                                                        
477 The Company Law of the PRC., Article 59, 123. 
478 The Company Law of the PRC., Article 59,123. 
479 The Company Law of the PRC., Article 60. 
480 The Company Law of the PRC., Article 60.. 
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otherwise, any profit obtained through those actions must be repaid to the company.481 The 
prohibition on competition is also extended to a director have a position of conflict of 
interests with the company. 
 
This is particular identical to the provisions under the common law and statutory law in UK 
which stipulated that unless provided for in the company’s articles of association or approved 
by the board of directors, a director or manager is not permitted to conclude contracts or to 
conduct business with his own company. 
iv. Confidentiality 
To complete the protection provided to the company and its assets, the Company Law of the 
PRC has adopted the common law formulation regarding maintaining a company’s 
confidential information unless required by law or approved by the board of directors.482  
v. New legislation introducing the concept of “fiduciary duty” 
A newly-described duty of care, “chengxin yiwu”483 which is synonymous with “fiduciary 
duty” is introduced in the Measures for Administration of Acquisition of Listed Companies. 
In the case of acquisitions in listed companies, directors, supervisors and senior officers of a 
listed company shall have a fiduciary duty to the listed company they hold positions in and 
such company's shareholders. While it seems certain that this is not meant to import 
wholesale “fiduciary duty” and standards of care developed under better elaborated 
jurisprudence in United Kingdom, this does represent the first time such a duty has been 
                                                        
481 The Company Law of the PRC., Article 61. 
482 The Company Law of the PRC., Article 62. 
483 The Measures for Administration of Acquisition of Listed Companies, Article 9.  
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explicitly identified in a Chinese statute, with a description as to whom precisely the duty is 
owed – the company and the other shareholders.484
 
Notwithstanding the import of new duties, there is no explicit right granted to individual 
shareholders to bring a cause of action against breaching purchasers, officers, directors, etc. 
This is consistent with the Securities Law, notwithstanding the immense pressure in China 
from private shareholders to bring private actions against illegal behavior. By the same token, 
the Measures do not forbid private suits, and we may thus expect pleadings by aggrieved 
minority shareholders and other actors in the near future. 
B. Approaches for minimizing the conflict of interest. 
i. Revision of Company Law 
How to properly provide for the rights, duties and responsibilities of directors and limit the 
activities of directors and other senior officers is thus one of the key tasks of company law in 
China. Since the existing company law only has some general provisions on the passive office 
qualification, duty of loyalty and legal liabilities of directors and managers, in the revision of 
the Company Law of the PRC., the active office qualifications of directors should be added, 
the status of directors should be clarified, the obligations of directors should be added, and the 
civil liabilities as a result of a breach of such obligations shall be provided in detail. 
                                                        
484 The only previous attempt to import fiduciary duty into PRC law on corporations was in the letter from the 
now-defunct Commission on Restructuring of the Economic System (“CRES”) to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
of June 1993 in connection with proposed Hong Kong or “H” share listings of PRC companies. In that letter, 
CRES assured Hong Kong regulators that a form of words in Article 62 of the now superseded “Opinion on 
Standards on Companies Limited by Shares” (subsequently absent in the PRC Company Law, but reinstituted for 
overseas issuers in the CSRC’s “Overseas Listing Rules”) had “… the same meaning as ‘chengxin zeren [fiduciary 
duty]’ of Hong Kong law.” 
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ii. Introduce independent directors to the board of directors 
Moreover, due to the independence of the independent directors from other directors involved 
in the management buy-outs, the employment of independent directors in supervising such 
transactions is paramount to protect the target’s assets and the shareholders’ benefits, 
particular the minorities’ interests.  
 
It is the Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors in Listed 
Companies issued by CSRC that first introduce the concept of the independent director. To 
further improve the governance structure of listed companies and standardize their operation, 
CSRC issued the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China. Thus 
introducing independent directors to listed companies’ board become compulsory. 
Independent directors introduced to the board of directors in a listed company shall not hold 
any other position in the listed company and shall be independent from the listed company, 
the company's major shareholders, directors, managers and other interested parties. At least 
one of the independent directors should be an accounting professional and one third of board 
shall be independent directors. They owe the duties to the listed company and all the 
shareholders to act in good faith and due diligence in accordance with laws, regulations and 
the company's articles of association. And they shall perform their duties faithfully to protect 
the overall interests of the company and shall particularly protect the interests of minority 
shareholders from being infringed.485  
 
                                                        
485 The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, Article 49, 50. The Guidelines for 
Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies, Article 1. 
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In the context of management buy-outs, to protect the listed company’s assets and 
shareholders, the Measures impose duties on independent directors not only to independently 
express their opinions on the impact such acquisition may produce on the company but also 
engage a professional institution such as an independent financial advisor to provide an 
advisory opinion.486 However, in an ordinary acquisition, independent directors own no duty 
to require the target company to engage an independent advisor. Hence, the necessary role of 
independent directors who maintain no relations with the listed company and its major 
shareholders that might prevent them from making objective judgment independently is 
consolidated. 
 
However, legislation in respect to the newly imported role of independent directors needs to 
be improved. First, the independent director’s role shall be imported in a statute at a high level 
such as the Company Law of PRC, and specific rules on their powers, duties need to be 
respectively provided. Especially in management buy-outs, duties shall be fully imposed on 
the independent directors to engage professional institutions including lawyers and financial 
advisors for obtaining objective and independent opinions as to whether such transactions are 
viable and whether the purchase price is fair and reasonable. Also, their liabilities as a 
consequence of a breach of their duties shall be clarified. Second, the independence 
requirements shall be emphasized in legislation. According to the existing legislation, 
independent directors’ independence is questionable because the election of independent 
directors is only based on the nomination by the board of directors and shareholders,487 and 
                                                        
486 The Measures for Administration of Acquisition of Listed Companies, Article 15, 31. 
487 The Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies, Article 
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independent directors’ remuneration is decided by the boards and paid by the employee 
company. Thus, to make them adequately independent from shareholders and other directors, 
it is advisable that a national institution composed of independent directors can be 
incorporated to provide professional and qualified members to the board of directors of a 
company and independent directors’ remuneration shall be paid by such an institution.488 
Third, the proportions of independents directors in the company’s board and specialized 
committees shall be increased.489  
iii. Supervisory board 
Another variation on the common law is the supervisory board of a company. Although the 
employment of independent directors has been a practice in China for the enhancement of 
corporate governance, the independent director system cannot completely replace the 
supervisory board system. It may be realistic choice in China to further enhance the 
supervisory broad system and strengthen the rights and duties of supervisory boards.  
 
The supervisory board composed of representatives of the shareholders and an appropriate 
proportion of the employees of the company, is constructed only in respect of a large limited 
liability company.490 And the exact proportion is stipulated in the articles of association. To 
reinforce the independence of the supervisory committee from the company’s executives, 
none of the directors, managers or senior financial personnel are permitted to act as 
                                                                                                                                                               
4(1). 
488 Xie Nana, Research on MBOs in China and Relevant Legal Issues (LLM. Thesis, Shanghai Institute of Foreign 
Trade, Nov 2003) [unpublished]. 
489 Zhang Xianzhong, “Research on Legal Problems arising form Management Buy-outs of Listed Company”, 
Shanghai Stock Exchange, online: < http://www.sse.com.cn/ps/zhs/sjs/xw/ssenews20030606.html>. 
490 The Company Law of the PRC., Article 52. 
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supervisors. The powers of this independent body are extensive with the supervisors 
effectively constituting the watchdog of the company’s assets and activities.491 In the same 
way, duties of the directors and managers under Chinese company law are imposed on the 
supervisors. When a management buy-out takes place, the supervisors of the target company 
can exercise their powers to investigate the target’s financial affairs, supervise acts undertaken 
by directors and managers during the performance of their duties and request directors and 
managers to rectify their conduct where such conduct may be detrimental to the interests of 
the company.492  
 
It shall be noted that duties imposed by current Chinese Law on the independent directors and 
supervisors in a company may overlap. Hence, it is recommended to clarify the division into 
their powers so as to completely protect the shareholders and the company.493 For example, 
for the independent directors, duties may mainly be imposed on them to monitor whether the 
transactions including management buy-outs are beneficial to the target company, whether the 
proposed structure of such transactions is fair and reasonable, and whether there is any 
possibility of violating the rights and interests of the minority shareholders and any probable 
risk arising from such transactions. For the supervisors, duties may be imposed to supervise 
whether such transactions contravene relevant legislation.  
                                                        
491 Ibid. 
492 The Company Law of the PRC., Article 54. 
493  Meng Gang, Legal Issues in MBOs in Listed Companies (LLM. Thesis, Peking University, 2003) 
[unpublished]. 
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Chapter 6: Prospect of future development of China’s law regarding MBOs 
It is the same situation as that in UK that the general regulation of MBOs in China is 
separated in many different areas such as the Company Law, the Securities Law, and other 
laws. However, in spite of the practice, the legal environment is still unprepared for 
full-fledged MBOs. Neither regulations nor judicial precedents are adequate in elaborating on 
the exact nature of MBOs, the corporate manager’s duties to their companies and minimize 
conflict of interests in MBOs scenarios. Therefore, it is necessary to propose cautious 
amendments to relevant laws governing management buy-out transactions. 
I. Revision of certain regulations and import of new regulations 
It is for the reason that the Company Law and Securities Law were passed many years ago, 
the stipulations in them may be unreasonable and inconsistent with present practices and 
needs. For example, a statutory obligation imposed by the Company Law on the Newco, a 
shell vehicle when it invests in the target, that the amount of such investment shall not exceed 
fifty percent of its net assets seems to be too stiff and makes a negative impact on some 
innocent transactions including management buy-outs. 494  Another example is that the 
incorporation of Newco is restricted that it shall be jointly invested in and incorporated by not 
less than two and not more than fifty shareholders.495 In order to pave the way for innocent 
management buy-outs, a shell company such as Newco shall be allowed by the Company Law 
to be incorporated for the mere purpose of investment and holding equity in other companies 
and the threshold for its investment in other companies shall be removed. 
                                                        
494 The Company Law of the PRC, Article 12. 
495 The Company Law of the PRC, Article 20. 
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 Also, it is most likely that directors, managers and senior administrators of a target company 
in management buy-outs are personnel with inside information as they can have access to 
relevant information because of their offices in the company they serve.496 But according to 
the Securities Law of the PRC, insiders of securities trading with inside information shall be 
completely prohibited from carrying out securities trading operations by taking advantage of 
the inside information.497 The said rules prohibiting management team being involved in the 
management buy-out transactions are repugnant with the Measures which admits the legality 
of the management buy-outs in the listed company for the first time in Chinese Law. 
Amendments to current inconsistent rules may avoid uncertainty and confusion. 
 
Moreover, other relevant laws adopted before the explosion of the management buy-outs 
which may include unreasonable obstacles to the practical conduct of management buy-outs 
or may be in the lack of coordination in themselves shall be revised or eliminated. One 
example of the unreasonable obstacles largely limiting the conduct of China’s MBOs is the 
prohibition on debt finance provided by banks in a management buy-out prescribed both by 
the General Rule of Loan498 and by the Commercial Banks Law of the PRC.499 Another 
example of discrepancy is the disclosure obligation imposed on an investor who starts to hold 
or control more than 5% of the shares issued by a listed company by the Administrative Rules 
of Information Disclosure on Change of Shareholding in Listed Companies 500  which 
                                                        
496 The Securities Law of PRC, Article 68. 
497 The Securities Law of PRC, Article 67. 
498 The General Rule of Loan, Article 71. 
499 The Commercial Banks Law of the PRC., Article 43. 
500 The Administrative Rules of Information Disclosure on Change of Shareholding in Listed Companies, Article 7, 
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contradicts the prohibition that an individual is not allowed to hold more than 0.5% ordinary 
shares issued by a listed company.501  
 
In proposed revisions, there shall be some relaxation to the debt finance that commercial 
banks shall be permit to provide debt finance for equity investment and some legislation 
should be provided to facilitate the finance provided by investment funds, pension funds, 
insurance companies and other institutional investors in management buy-outs. 
 
It should be also noted that in the absence of regulations elaborating on director’s duties to the 
target company and its shareholders and lack of explicit prohibitions on financial assistance 
with certain relaxations, conducting a management buy-out where management have their 
own interests may run a risk of violating the assets of the target company and interests of the 
shareholders.502 Statutory provisions and common law practice in this respect under UK law 
could be respectively imported into the Chinese legislation according to the practice in China. 
 
Thus, merely applying the current laws to management buy-outs is not enough, revising them 
to better serve the purpose of governing existing and imminent activities is necessary. It is 
hoped that the new Company Law could combine the merits of the current Chinese Company 
Law, relevant supplemental regulations and sophisticated modern English law, while 
eliminating the defects and unreasonable prohibitions from the current Company Law.503 Such 
                                                                                                                                                               
8 and 15. 
501 The Interim Measures for Administration of Share Issuing and Dealing, Article 46. 
502 See Chapter 6, above, for separate discussion. 
503 Yang Hongsheng, Proposal of Legal Framework for MBOs (LLM. Thesis, China University of Politics & Law, 
May 2003) [unpublished]. 
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improvements are also respected for other relevant laws.  
II. A unified code-Management buy-outs Code(“the Code”) 
A unified code could also avoid legal loopholes and discrepancies existing in the present laws. 
Some important issues were not addressed in the current laws, for example, for the first time 
in Chinese legislation, the Measures impose a duty on independent directors to express their 
views where there is a management buy-out of listed companies, but regrettably, the law is 
silent on such a crucial problem of conflict of interests arising in management buy-outs of 
un-listed companies. Moreover, while some regulations including the Measures incorporate 
rules guiding such an activity as management buy-outs, the other regulations previously 
adopted including the Company Law and the Securities Law place a barrier to the exercise of 
management buy-outs in practice. It reflects the lack of coordination in the recent laws 
themselves. Therefore, it is expected that in a unified code these legal loopholes and 
discrepancies could be fixed. 
 
Optimistically, early in April 2003, Mr. Jia Chan, head of the Enterprise Section of Ministry 
of Finance(“MOF”) said that the MOF would concentrate on the promulgation of 
management rules for management’s acquisition of Listed Companies.504 It was also noticed 
that the SASAC is studying laws and regulations pertaining to management buy-outs.505 
Thirteen subjects, including issues concerning the authorized operation of state-owned assets, 
                                                        
504 O’Melveny & Myers LLP, China Law & Policy Digest( 30 April 2003), (China Securities Journal), April 22, 
2003), “Ministry of Finance (MOF) to Perfect Financial Systems through Promulgation of MBO Management 
Rules for Listed Companies.” online: <http://www.omm.com/webdata/content/publications/clp030430.pdf>. 
505 O’Melveny & Myers LLP, China Law & Policy Digest (21 November 2003) “SACSAC is studying Laws and 
regulations regarding MBO methods” online: 
<http://www.omm.com/webdata/content/publications/clp031121.pdf>. 
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administrative measures for the resolution disputes over the ownership of state-owned assets, 
utilization of corporate counsel and assessment measures for operational performance of 
state-owned assets, are on the schedule recently. It was also emphasized that all MBOs in 
China will be overseen by the SASAC to prevent the loss of state-owned assets and to create 
equal opportunities for all investors. 
 
1. General Principles  
Management buy-outs in China are complex activities, which not only concern the interests of 
the target, shareholders and management, but also impact on the benefits of the state and 
public society when state-owned assets are involved. Therefore, the Code should be based 
upon a number of General Principles, which are essential statements of standards of 
commercial behaviour in management buy-outs. These General Principles apply to all 
management buy-outs transactions. 
 
Firstly, the Code’s principle is to devise rules to ensure fair and equal treatment of all 
shareholders in relation to management buy-outs and provide an orderly framework within 
which management buy-outs are transparently conducted.506 Secondly, persons who are 
actively engaged in such transactions should be aware of the spirit of the Code and have a 
responsibility to ensure the Code is complied with in the conduct of management buy-outs. 
The boards of the target company, engaged management and their respective advisors have a 
                                                        
506 Peng Zhenming & Chang Jian, “Improve the Legislation Concerning Management Buy-out: Protect the 
State-owned Assets”(Feburary 19 2004), , online: China Civil Law 
<http://www.civillaw.com.cn/weizhang/default.asp?id=13248>. 
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duty to act in the best interests of the target and shareholders, particularly in the context of the 
pricing in a management buy-out. Also, rights must be exercised in good faith and the 
oppression of a minority is wholly unacceptable. Thirdly, all parties in the management 
buy-outs must use every endeavour to prevent the loss of state-owned assets. 
2. Contents of the proposed Management Buy-out Code 
The following contents can be incorporated into the Code: 
A. Target company 
Considering the level of economic development in china, in the “junior period of socialist 
market economy” as defined by the Chinese government, China still needs to protect certain 
state-owned industries indispensable to the whole country including energy sources, 
infrastructure and finance and keep a certain degree of control over such industries. Thus, the 
state shall still hold equity concerning lifelines of the national economy and national security 
and in such enterprises engaged in the fields of important infrastructure and natural resources 
on behalf the State. So, not all management buy-outs are desirable as some industries may be 
reserved for national investment. Taking this reality into account, the target companies which 
could be acquired by their management shall exclude those companies engaged in the 
industries exclusively controlled by the state investment.507
 
In terms of the target companies which management are allowed to acquire, the Code may 
contain contents of three aspects. The first aspect is ownership guide. Provisions either 
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reserve certain economic sectors for the state or define certain sectors in which a certain 
proportion of private capital is permitted to participate could be a guide for determining in 
what economic sectors management buy-outs are forbidden. The second is government 
supervision. The government should screen the proposed management buy-outs and decide 
whether to approve it or not according to the guide. The third may be commercial criteria for 
characteristics of a target in management buy-outs. In practice, some scholars found a target 
with consistent track record of turnover and profit growth or demonstrable scope for 
improvement, in a strong competitive position within a growing, stable industry, has a spread 
of products and services, not unduly dependent on any particular customer or supplier, and 
with strong asset backing or demonstrable cash generation may be predicated to help a 
buy-out in China508
B. Define the management, co-operative institutional investor, nature and structure of 
management buy-outs. 
Qualified management engaged in management buy-outs according to the Code shall be 
restricted to directors and senior managers of the target, who can run the target independently 
with great competence and experience, provide sufficient financing resources by legal means, 
have contributed much for the prosperous operation of the company, and always act faithfully 
in the best interests of the company. In order to avoid a conflict of interest, independent 
directors and supervisors shall be prohibited to be engaged in management buy-outs and be 
prevented from having any associations with the interested management. A group of 
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management should be restricted from participating in the management buy-outs, including 
government functionaries, management without capacity or with restricted capacity for civil 
activities, management who undertook criminal liabilities for the crime of misappropriation of 
the company’s property or for undermining the socio-economic order, management who were 
personally responsible for the bankruptcy liquidation of the company due to mismanagement 
and management with relatively large amounts of personal debts that have fallen due but 
haven't been settled.509  
 
Besides, following the revision to the Company Law and relaxation to the finance limitation, 
in the conduct of management buy-outs, a shell company, Newco is allowed to be 
incorporated to acquire the shares or business of the target and management and the 
institutional investor could subscribe for shares in Newco. Also debt and equity finance 
models should be illustrated in detail in the Code. Finally a well-found pricing mechanism 
should be devised for all management buy-outs including acquisition of unmarketable 
state-owned shares and corporate shares in listed companies, marketable shares in listed 
company, unlisted state-owed enterprises, unlisted collectively-owned or private enterprises.  
C. Impose obligations of information disclosure and the consequences following the breach of 
the obligation. 
In order to avoid self-interested transactions and protect the rights and interests of the target’s 
shareholders, creditors and state-owned assets, the duty of information disclosure should be 
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imposed in the Code.510 First, obligations of information shall be applied not only to 
management buy-outs of listed companies, but also to the management buy-outs of unlisted 
companies. Second, information disclosure obligations shall be extended to the Newco, 
management of the target and institutional investors in a consortium. Third it is required that 
particular information shall be disclosed in management buy-outs, including the 
shareholdings of the management the Newco, basis of pricing, payment, funding sources and 
repayment plan. Finally, the Code shall specify the liabilities which directors or principal 
information disclosure obligor shall be subject to, as a consequence of breach of duty of 
information disclosure. 
D. Director and supervisor’s duties 
Despite the general duties imposed on directors by the Company Law of PRC., the Code shall 
impose more onerous duties on directors in the case of management buy-outs. And 
supervisors in the target company shall not participate in the management buy-outs and shall 
keep a close eye on the conduct of such transactions. Where a management buy-out takes 
place, the supervisors of the target company can exercise their powers to investigate the 
target’s financial affairs, supervise acts undertaken by directors and managers during the 
performance of their duties and request directors and managers to rectify their conduct where 
such conduct may be detrimental to the interests of the company. 
 
Over all, a unified MBO code can be justifiable, since it will avoid discrepancies and legal 
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loopholes and simplify the legal framework to make it more accessible for management and 
investors. 
III. Supervision and Government administration 
To stress the independence of independent directors to supervise the transactions where 
management have their interests, it is advisable that a national institution composed of 
independent directors can be incorporated and to provide professional and qualified members 
to the board of directors of a company and independent directors’ remuneration shall be paid 
by such an institution. Rules guiding and governing such an institution should be devised 
accordingly.511  
 
In management buy-outs, it is necessary for the financial advisers to assess all available 
information, take into account the possible change of management style should a buy-out 
proceed and recommend in clear terms to the target’s shareholders whether or not the 
transaction is fair and reasonable. They may also consult with the target’s auditor, industry 
experts and economic and marketing consultants. It is crucial to develop and manage the 
professional institutions in China including accounting firms, law firms and assets appraisal 
organizations to provide professionally devoted, precise, efficient, practical and innovative 
financial and accounting evaluation business.512
 
To prevent loss of state-owed assets, and protect the shareholders of the target company, 
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management buy-outs concerning transfer of shares and assets in a company with a large 
scale of state-owned assets should be subject to government examination and approval. The 
procedure of examination and approval and the responsibilities should be respectively 
established for Regulatory authorities including CSRC, SASAC and MOF.513
IV. State-owned Property Law governing MBOs of state-owned company 
A unified state-owned property law is necessary to specify the ownership of state-owned 
assets, classification of state-owned assets, valuation of classified state-owned assets, pricing 
of state-owned shares, procedure of state-owned shares and assets transfer, and approval and 
examination procedure. As current management buy-outs frequently occur where the 
management intends to purchase the illiquid state-owned shares by agreement, confusion of 
the vendor whom the management shall negotiate with, and uncertainty of the basis of pricing 
the state-owned shares may be avoided, if the State-owned Property Law is applicable. Finally, 
the supervisory responsibility of relevant authorities in compliance with the approval and 
examination procedure is most likely to prevent the loss of the state-owned assets. 
Chapter 7: Conclusion 
Management buy-outs are now a world-wide phenomenon, however, their nature and extent 
varies considerably from country to country, depending upon the particular characteristics of 
individual business, industrial base, financial and entrepreneurial backgrounds. In addition, 
the present state of MBOs in any country depends upon the stage reached in the life-circle of 
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this form of ownership change.  
 
MBOs originated in UK in the late1970s and spread rapidly in the early 1980s. The 
backgrounds to improvements arising from MBOs can be seen in consideration of both 
agency cost theory and entrepreneurship theory.514 The majority of the sources of MBOs in 
UK are divestments of non-core business by UK listed companies.515 The development of the 
MBOs business in UK has been accompanied by an increase in the number and size of 
financing institutions and in the scope of the service they offer. 
 
In China, the management buy-out is a new development. The deals were frequently 
motivated by China’s market-orientated economic reform. State-owned asset needs to be 
reallocated, which must bring the transfer of ownership of a large number of stated-owned 
assets to individuals. In such an economic situation, the MBO is employed by many 
enterprises and is supposed to be essentially a device to clarify property rights and excite 
management. Also, some legislation has also facilitated the growth of MBOs. 
 
Management buy-outs are an important innovation in China’s economic reform. However, in 
spite of the issuance of several supportive rules and regulations pertaining to MBOs over the 
past years, there remain quite a lot of obstacles and risks when conducting the deals under the 
Chinese legal regime. Moreover, China has an undeveloped capital market, the industrial 
banks have had problems with both debt finance and equity investments, and the venture 
                                                        
514 Mike Wright & John Coyne, supra note 6 at 41-53. 
515 Janette Rutterford & David Carter, eds., Handbook of UK Corporate Finance, (London: Butterworths, 1988) at 
60. 
 179
capital market in China, unlike UK is at an early stage of development. Therefore, relative 
laws and regulations should be improved or established as soon as possible in order to take 
advantages of MBOs during the special period of state-owned enterprises’ reform. 
 
One can gain a wider perspective of the importance of MBOs by considering them in the 
context of mergers and acquisitions generally. In China, with the further reform of 
state-owned enterprises, and the changing of government’s economic function after China’s 
entry to the WTO, it is certain that the state economic construction will be adjusted 
accordingly. 
 
It is anticipated that an improvement of the legal regime will be more helpful and constructive 
to the development of management buy-outs, which could in turn be actively beneficial to 
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